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Abstract
Development on the basis of extraction and export of natural resources is a
dynamically complex problem. Empirical evidence shows that while some na-
tions have been successful to translate natural resource wealth into long-term
development but many have failed too. In this dissertation a system dynamics
approach is taken to understand why this is happening and what strategies could
facilitate a resource-based development process. In this regard, Mashayekhi’s
model of oil-dependency of Iranian economy as one of the few relevant system
dynamics examples is updated and revalidated. The results show that despite
its capability in showing the dynamics of the problem from an economic per-
spective it lacks socio-political features that are necessary to address the most
fundamental issues of resource-based development. It is shown that Katouzian’s
theory of “arbitrary state and society” could fill this gap. The theory is, thus,
translated into a system dynamics model so that it could be tested for internal
consistency and used for policy analysis. The model is able to explain long-
term socio-political-economic instability of a resource-dependent society. On
the basis of Mashayekhi’s model, Katouzian’s theory, and other fundamental
explanations of natural resource dependency that are available from the lit-
erature, a generic eclectic model is developed. The model has gone through
a comprehensive list of confidence-building tests. Controlled experimentation
through Monte Carlo simulations show that, on the contrary to the current
belief, it is unlikely that natural resource wealth be harmful for social welfare.
Results also revealed that rule of law is a crucial factor that affects trajectory
of the socio-political-economic development. Other findings are as follow. Civil
resistance (disobedience) can be harmful for the system in the long-run. While
sanctions could affect the economy it has barely an impact on socio-political
settings of a society. Finally, wage stabilization, facilitation of social mobility,
and privatization of natural resource revenues (within certain limits) could help
the resource-based development to achieve better outcomes.
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Preface
Development on the basis of extraction and export of natural resources is a
dynamically complex problem. It is still a common belief that natural resource
abundance is a “curse” than a “blessing.” Even among academics no consen-
sus has been reached over the issue. This is perhaps because of the intrinsic
nature of the problem. In fact, many factors come into play to determine ul-
timate developmental outcome of natural resource dependency, namely, social,
political, and economic factors. So far, there has been no comprehensive study
that could take all these facets into account. This is indeed a theoretical gap.
Advancement in computer technologies which made the numerical simulation
of large models possible and led to methodological improvements in the social
sciences has enabled us to overcome this challenge though. The dissertation
presented here takes this advantage and bridges the gap by taking a system dy-
namics approach to improve our understanding of resource-based development.
Hopefully, this will shed some light on the issue and help us to develop bet-
ter strategies and policies for the next generations who may be affected by the
long-term consequences of natural resource dependency.
Although the nature of the resource curse problem urges for a dynamical
systems perspective, but little system dynamics modeling effort has been made
to shed light on the issue. Mashayekhi’s model of Iranian oil-based economic
development (Mashayekhi, 1978) is one of these efforts. It is unique in the sense
that it captures complex economic dynamics of natural resource dependency in
“developing” countries. In order to investigate the natural resource curse prob-
lem the first step was to examine the existing theories instead of reinventing
the wheel. In this regard, Mashayekhi’s model had to be updated and revali-
dated. It was not an easy task though. The original model was written with
DYNAMO1 which is not in use anymore. So, to test the model it must had
been reprogrammed in a modern platform. I rewrote the model in modern sys-
tem dynamics software and updated all units of measure and documentations.
The revived model has gone through a comprehensive validation tests. This
effort is reported in Chapter 1. Test results show that despite its capability in
replicating dynamics of the problem from an economic perspective, the model
lacks socio-political features that are necessary to address the most fundamental
1DYNAMO is a computer simulation language developed in the late 1950s within the
system dynamics analytical framework (Richardson and Pugh III, 1981; Pugh III, 1983).
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issues of resource-based development. More precisely, the model is unable to en-
dogenously reproduce rise and fall of political power that may happen in a social
system. This socio-political dynamic is particularly essential for the problem of
natural resource curse. It may arise from a natural resource bonanza and it can
significantly affect phenomena such as corruption, chaos, freedom, institutional
development, etc. which eventually propagate through the economic system too
and affect the social welfare.
Fortunately, there is Katouzian’s theory of “arbitrary state and society” that
could fill the gap. It includes most fundamental structures needed for a socio-
political analysis of a natural resource curse. In particular, Katouzina’s theory
is able to explain long-term socio-political-economic instability of a resource-
dependent society. However, this theory is descriptive, not mathematical. For
it to be formally tested it required to be transformed into a mathematical format.
Hence, I translated it into a system dynamics model so that it could be tested
for internal consistency and used for policy analyses. Chapter 2 reports the
translation process and the test results. Examination with the model reveals
that Katouzina’s theory is internally consistent and its structure can be used
to enhance explanatory power of economic models of natural resource curse.
Results also revealed that rule of law is a crucial factor that affects trajectory
of the socio-political-economic development while civil resistance (disobedience)
can be harmful for the system in the long-run. And, economic sanctions could
negatively affect the economy but it has barely an impact on socio-political
settings of a society.
On the basis of Mashayekhi’s model, Katouzian’s theory, and some other
important theories, I developed a generic eclectic model for political economy of
natural resource dependency. In fact, the model takes into account 7 different
explanations of natural resource “curse.” The explanations are “Dutch disease,”
“temporary loss in learning by doing,” “corruption,” “volatility of commod-
ity prices,” “rent seeking behavior,” “socio-political conflict,” and “suboptimal
policies.” The model has gone through a comprehensive list of confidence-
building tests then. These are reported in Chapter 3. Controlled experimenta-
tion through Monte Carlo simulations show that on the contrary to the current
belief, the chance of natural resource revenue being a “curse” is low. Finally,
simulation results reveal that wage stabilization, facilitation of social mobil-
ity, and limited privatization of natural resource revenues might improve the
outcome of a resource-based development.
At the end, I would like to thank Professor Michael Radzicki, my advisor,
who patiently and carefully reviewed my work during (and even before) my doc-
toral program. This dissertation would not have happened if it had not been
for his guidance. I am also indebted to professors, Alexander Smith, Rajib Mal-
ick, Nader Shetab Boushehri, Ali Mashayekhi, and Homa Katouzian for their
valuable comments and advice throughout this journey. I am thankful to my
friend and colleague, Raafat Zaini, with whom I have had the best (academic
and non-academic) moments of my doctoral life. His encouragement and moral
support during difficult times were a real blessing. My special thanks go to
members of WPI’s System Dynamics Club and participants of Collective Learn-
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ing Meetings at the department of Social Science & Policy Studies, in particular,
professor Oleg Pavlov, Timothy Clancy, James Hacunda, Christine Tang, Shiya
Cao, Fredrick Kautz, and Raid Zaini from whom I have received great feedback
and comments on my work. I am grateful to professors Khalid Saeed and Isa
Bar-On for their support and mentoring without which the dissertation would
not have been possible. My eternal gratitude goes to my parents who taught
me lessons that are not offered by any academic courses. Finally, I cannot find
words that could do justice to the thanks deserved by my wife, Mahsa. She
sacrificed a lot for this dissertation to be finished.
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Chapter 1
Resurrecting a forgotten
model: Updating
Mashayekhi’s model of
Iranian economic
development1
1.1 Introduction
In 1978, Ali Naghi Mashayekhi developed a system dynamics model to investi-
gate the dependency of the Iranian economy on oil revenue (Mashayekhi, 1978).
Although this study created a general awareness about Iranian oil-dependency
among academics and politicians, the model itself has, by and large, been for-
gotten. The purpose of this chapter is to revisit and update Mashayekhi’s model
(the “M-model”) and show that it deserves more attention. In particular, it will
be demonstrated that the M-model has the potential to become a well-known
starting point for future Iranian macroeconomic modeling efforts, especially in
the area of energy–economy interactions. The M-model was created as a part of
Mashayekhi’s Ph.D. dissertation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Simulations of the M-model in the late 1970s revealed that Iran would face a
severe depression during the 1980s if its government pursued a policy of import-
ing intermediate goods purchased with revenue from oil exports. Fig. 1.1.1 is
a simulation run from the original formulation of the M-model that illustrates
this potential crisis. It presents the base run time paths for Iranian oil reserves
1This chapter is published in “Energy Policy Modeling in the 21st Century, Understanding
Complex Systems, pages 197–233. Springer New York, Jan. 2013. ISBN 978-1-4614-8605-3.”
edited by Hassan Qudrat-Ullah.
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Figure 1.1.1: Base simulation run of the M-model
(curve 1) in terms of billion barrels, oil production (curve 2) in terms of million
barrels per year, oil revenues (curve 3) in terms of million rials2 per year, gross
national product (GNP) (curve 4) in terms of million rials per year, and non-oil
outputs (curve 5) in terms of million rials per year.
The dynamics of this base simulation run are as follows. Iranian oil revenue
grows from the late 1950s to the early 1980s. In the middle of the 1980s,
however, they begin to decline due to the depletion of Iranian oil reserves.
Consequently, Iran’s stock of foreign exchange begins to shrink and it begins
to limit the importation of intermediate goods. The shortage of intermediate
goods causes the production capacity of the economy to fall and the growth
rate of non-oil output to approach zero, and even briefly turn negative, during
the 1980s. The stagnation of both oil and non-oil output leads to a severe
depression that lasts until beginning of the 1990s. In general, the M-model
demonstrated that the high dependency of the Iranian economy on imports of
intermediate goods, financed with oil revenue, would sooner or later cause Iran
to run into serious economic difficulty. Although the specific scenario shown
in Fig. 1.1.1 never occurred, the potential problems for the Iranian economy
suggested by the M-model still exist. For example, Fig. 1.1.2 shows that during
the period 1965–2008 the ratio of oil revenue to total revenue of the Iranian
government ranged from 25 to 86%, with an average value of 57% (CBI, 2012).
This situation was mitigated somewhat by a downward trend in the ratio during
the years 1999–2008, although its value is currently hovering around its historical
average.
2Rial is the Iranian currency unit.
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Figure 1.1.2: Oil’s share of total Iranian government revenue (CBI, 2012)
At the same time, Fig. 1.1.3 shows that Iranian imports of raw material and
intermediate goods have increased dramatically in recent years. From these data
it is clear that Iran continues to be dependent on oil revenue and must import
raw material and intermediate goods as aggressively as ever. As a consequence,
it makes sense to update the M-model and restate its message so that Iranian
policy makers can be reminded of the strategic issues it raises.
Although Mashayekhi was a pioneer in identifying the problems associated
with the dependency of the Iranian economy on oil revenue, his model and its
conclusions have arguably never received the attention they deserve. There are
several reasons for this including:
• The 1979 Revolution: The creation of the M-model coincided with the
birth of the 1979 Islamic revolution. The revolution led to fundamentally
different decision making processes within the highest levels of Iranian
political and economic institutions. As a consequence, the usefulness of
the M-model became ambiguous. Moreover, in 1980, a year after the rev-
olution’s success, an eight-year war began when Iraq invaded Iran. This
national emergency changed the Iranian government’s priorities from eco-
nomic reform to financing the war and stabilizing the political economy of
the country (Ahmadi Amouee, 2006). Not surprisingly, few policy analysts
paid attention to the oil-dependency issue during this period of time.
• Unfamiliarity with System Dynamics: The intellectual origin of sys-
tem dynamics is engineering and management, not economics. As a con-
sequence, most of economists in Iran were—and still are—unfamiliar with
the system dynamics methodology. In fact, during the late 1970s there
was virtually no one in Iran who could fully understand and appreciate
3
Figure 1.1.3: Iranian imports of raw materials and intermediate goods (CBI,
2012)
the M-model. Even now, there are few economists in Iran who know about
system dynamics and it is thus not surprising that the first effort to apply
system dynamics to the Iranian economy was largely ignored.
• Competing Obligations: Mashayekhi himself believes3 that the main
reason his model has failed to make a significant impact on Iranian policy
making is that his graduation from MIT and return to Iran coincided with
the rise of the Islamic regime and the new government asking him to help
reconstruct the Iranian higher education system. As such, he was left with
little time to publish, promote and extend his model.
Despite these set-backs, the M-Model has the potential to be updated and
used for energy-economy analysis in Iran. By reintroducing the M-model, top-
level Iranian political and economic decision makers can be reminded that oil
dependency can be a potential danger to the long-term economic growth and
stability of the country. Moreover, the model can provide a foundation and road
map for additional system dynamics modeling projects in the Iranian energy-
economy space. Finally, this chapter will show how system dynamics models can
be updated and expanded, which is a very important, yet often neglected, part
of the system dynamics modeling process. To achieve these goals, this chapter
presents an updated and revalidated version of the M-model. The updating and
revalidation process involves three main issues:
• Improvements in Software: The M-model was developed in 1978.
Since then there have been significant improvements in system dynam-
3Telephone interview with Ali Mashayekhi on May 12, 2011.
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ics validation methods and software tools. For example, the original M-
model was written in DYNAMO which is an obsolete tool for applying
modern methods of model validation. For this chapter the M-model was
reprogrammed in iThink4 which offers a wide range of validation and ver-
ification options.
• Structural Changes and Historical Data: In 1978 Mashayekhi simu-
lated the M-model forward in time to project the implications of various
policy choices on the growth and stability of the Iranian economy. In
the present day, of course, what was once the future is now the past. As
such, it is possible to determine how accurately the M-model predicted
the future. Not surprisingly, some inconsistencies between the projections
of the M-model and the historical data have been identified. Although,
system dynamicists believe that the point-by-point fit of a model to time
series data is a weak proof of model validity (Forrester and Senge, 1980;
Sterman, 1984; Radzicki, 2004) modelers such as Sterman (1984) argue
that it is an important consideration because it builds confidence in the
eyes of model users. Hence, in order to increase the M-model’s potential
for acceptance by Iranian policy makers it will be shown that updating
exogenous oil export and price data, along with some structural changes
and parameter recalibrations, can significantly improve the model’s ability
to reproduce the historical behavior of the Iranian economy.
• Model Revalidation and Publication: Mashayekhi never published a
comprehensive analysis of his model’s ability to pass a traditional list of
tests necessary to build confidence in a system dynamics model (Peterson,
1980). This was probably due to software and/or time limitations, and/or
to the level of knowledge of Iranian academics about the system dynam-
ics methodology at that time. As a consequence, revalidating the model
and publishing its results will potentially increase its creditability among
those economists who insist that valid models require the application of
statistical techniques to numerical data.
In the next section a revalidation of the M-model according to criteria that
are standard in the field of system dynamics (Sterman, 2000, ch. 21) will be
presented.
1.2 Revalidating the M-model
In the field of system dynamics, models are never considered to be purely “valid”
or “invalid.” Instead, they are evaluated according to their ability to generate
confidence in their users. A model never can be validated absolutely because
all models are wrong. All models are simplified and abstract versions of real
systems. So they can never be regarded exactly as corresponding real systems.
So, why do we look for validating a model? The answer is that you, as a leader,
4iThink Analyst v9.1.4, 1985-2010.
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have to use a model to make your decisions. You may use only your mental
models or a mathematical one, etc. Whatever you use, the question is which
model you want to use; not whether you can use a model or not (Sterman, 1991,
2000, 2002) Indeed, putting a model through a validation process helps decision
makers feel confident that the results they are seeing are legitimate and useful.
Over the years system dynamicists have assembled a comprehensive list of
tests to which a model can be subjected in an effort to build confidence among
its users5. These tests include:
• Boundary adequacy tests
• Structure assessment tests
• Dimensional consistency
• Parameter assessment
• Extreme condition tests
• Integration error tests
• Behavior reproduction tests
• Behavior anomaly tests
• Family member tests
• Surprise behavior tests
• Sensitivity analysis
• System improvement tests
The application of these tests to the M-model will now be described.
1.2.1 Boundary adequacy tests
A model’s boundary defines what is included in and excluded from its structure.
Boundary adequacy tests evaluate the appropriateness of a model’s boundary
vis-a-vis the purpose for which it was created. Fig. 1.2.1 presents a sector-level
view of the structure of the M-model. It consists of 325 variables and constants
embodied in 12 interacting subsystems of the Iranian socioeconomic system.
In addition, Table 1.2.1 lists some important macroeconomic variables that
are endogenous, exogenous, and excluded from the M-model. The relevant
question is whether or not this structure is still adequate for the M-model’s
purpose.
The endogenous variables can be examined first. Since the purpose of the
M-model is to analyze the effect of oil revenue on the Iranian economy, it makes
5See e.g. Forrester (1973); Peterson (1975, 1980); Mass and Senge (1978); Forrester and
Senge (1980); Sterman (1984); Barlas (1996); Oliva (2003); Radzicki (2004).
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Figure 1.2.1: Sector-level view of the structure of the M-model
Table 1.2.1: List of endogenous, exogenous, and excluded variables of M-model
Endogenous Exogenous Excluded
GNP Labor Market Oil Imports
Population Oil Exports Financial Market
Education Oil Prices Exchange Market
Capital Accumulation Alternative Energies
Energy Consumption
Foreign Trade
Technology
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perfect sense to have it calculate a major economic summary index such as GNP.
Furthermore, to replicate the dynamics of the aggregate production process in
Iran, it is crucial to model population (as generator of the labor force), edu-
cation (as an important input into the aggregate production function), capital
accumulation (as the process that generates capital, which is another impor-
tant production factor), and technology (again, an important input into the
aggregate production function) as endogenous processes. Energy consumption
is represented endogenously because it is a process that can limit oil exports
and thus Iranian oil revenue. Finally, foreign trade is modeled as an endoge-
nous process in order to capture the dynamics that drive the importation of
intermediate goods and to show how foreign exchange is utilized.
In terms of exogenous variables, the dynamics of the labor market in the
M-model are represented autonomously. More specifically, the model simply
assumes that 56% of the adult population is employed every year. This as-
sumption is employed in order to avoid the complexity of the Iranian labor
market. Since the main goal of the M-model is to reproduce the dynamics of
Iranian oil dependency, it appears that this simplification is reasonable. Al-
though including labor market dynamics can enhance the M-model’s capacity
to analyze a wider range of policies and scenarios, this capability is outside the
focus of both the original, and present, studies. If the social consequences of
oil dependency were the focus of the M-model, then a more sophisticated rep-
resentation of the labor market would be required. Oil exports are also largely
determined exogenously. More precisely, they are set to their historical value
for the years 1959–1978 and then determined endogenously thereafter. This is
arguably a weakness in the original formulation of the M-model as oil exports
are a key factor in generating the model’s internal dynamics. The good news is
that this problem can be eliminated by adding a comprehensive energy sector
to the original M-model6. Oil prices are also represented exogenously in the
M-model. As with oil exports, the price of oil is set to its historical value for the
years 1959–1978. However, unlike oil exports the price of oil is held constant
from 1979 to the end of each simulation. Although different assumptions about
the price of oil from 1979 forward can be tested, a superior formulation would
generate oil prices endogenously because they are a major determinant of oil
revenue.
The M-model’s endogenous and exogenous variables represent factors that
are part of its structure and are thus inside of its boundary. On the other
hand, there are some important variables that are entirely excluded from the
M-model’s structure and hence lie outside of its boundary. For instance, the
M-model assumes that the importation of oil to Iran is not possible. This
assumption is both a boundary inadequacy and a structural deficiency. It implies
that the Iranian economy has no source for oil other than its domestic supply.
Of course, this is not true and when domestic oil resources decline significantly
Iran will have to begin importing oil. Unfortunately, this scenario is impossible
6This has been done by Langarudi et al. (2011).
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to be generated in the original formulation of the M-model7. Langarudi et al.
(2011), nonetheless, present a remedy for this deficiency. Financial and exchange
markets are also excluded from the original version of the M-model. These
exclusions have reduced the model’s ability to fully analyze the impact of oil
revenue on the Iranian economy. For example, the dynamics of the so-called
“Dutch disease” cannot be explored. An economy aﬄicted with the Dutch
disease experiences an appreciation in real exchange rates due to an unexpected
increase in foreign exchange revenue generated by its natural resource exports.
This in turn causes a fall in total output and employment in the nonnatural
resource sectors (usually the manufacturing sector) as the stronger domestic
currency makes nonnatural resource exports relatively more (van Wijnbergen,
1984). Although this is clearly an issue with the boundary of the M-model,
this chapter will demonstrate that it still provides an excellent foundation for
a more complete model that can be used to analyze a wide range of Iranian
macroeconomic issues. Finally, another significant deficiency of the M-model’s
structure is its reliance on a single energy resource, that is oil. It can be argued,
however, that this assumption poses no significant threat to the model’s results
because it was not designed to analyze the impact of competing energy resources.
Nevertheless, adding alternative energy sources to the M-model, in particular
natural gas, can certainly improve its usefulness for strategic planning in the
energy sector8.
In sum, the M-model’s boundary is somewhat inadequate for the purpose
for which it was built. To better study the effects of oil revenue on the Iranian
economy, the M-model’s boundary must be expanded to include a financial
market, an exchange market, an energy market, and the process of energy pro-
duction. As these improvements are possible, the M-model is arguably still an
appropriate base platform for undertaking Iranian socioeconomic analysis.
1.2.2 Structure assessment tests
Structure assessment tests check to see if a model is consistent with knowledge
of the real system that is relevant to the purpose for which the model was
created. These tests are concerned with the level of aggregation in a model, the
fidelity of the model to basic physical facts, and the realism of the decision rules
utilized by the agents in the model. Structure assessment tests were performed
in all steps of reviewing, recalibrating, and analyzing the M-model9. The result
of this assessment is that, although the M-model has no egregious structural
deficiencies, it contains two structural imperfections. These imperfections will
be addressed after a detailed review of the M-model’s general structure.
7Mashayekhi employed this assumption because the simulation period for the original M-
model was 50 years and during this period domestic energy resources were sufficient for do-
mestic energy consumption (see Footnote 11).
8Langarudi et al. (2011) have also addressed this issue.
9For a comprehensive description of the model’s structure see Mashayekhi (1978).
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Figure 1.2.2: Resource allocation mechanism of M-model
Resource allocation mechanism
The M-model’s agricultural and nonagricultural production processes utilize
three inputs: capital, labor, and education. Capital is calculated by accumulat-
ing investment in both machinery and construction, and then adding-in the flow
of imported capital goods. Labor is supplied by the population sector while ed-
ucation is represented by the average number of years an Iranian citizen spends
in school. These three production factors are allocated between the M-model’s
two production sectors: agricultural and nonagricultural (industrial) sectors.
The resource allocation mechanism is based on the relative productivity of the
three factors of production and the availability of each sector’s output. The
availability of a sector’s output is a measure of demand relative to supply. To il-
lustrate how this mechanism works in the M-model, Fig. 1.2.2 presents a causal
loop diagram of the process10. The allocation mechanisms for the other factors
of production (labor and education) have the same structure.
Agricultural sector
The model agricultural sector supplies the food demanded by the population.
The production function in this sector utilizes the factors of production allocated
to it, as well as available farmland and the sector’s level of technology. The most
important interactions between food production and the rest of the model are
shown in Fig. 1.2.3.
Allocation of Production Capacity in the Nonagricultural Sector
Similar to the agricultural sector, a unique production function determines the
total production capacity of the industrial (i.e. nonagricultural) sector. This
production function utilizes the factors of production allocated to it, as well as
10A causal loop diagram presents only the essential feedback structure of a system dynamics
model so that the most important elements of cause and effect can be examined. The actual
resource allocation mechanism in the M-model is substantially more sophisticated.
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Figure 1.2.3: Food production system of M-model
the sector’s level of technology. The total production capacity of the sector is
allocated among four competing demands: capital goods production, intermedi-
ate goods production, consumption goods production, and educational capacity.
Fig. 1.2.4 presents a causal loop diagram of the major processes that determine
how the M-model allocates its nonagricultural (industrial) production capacity
to consumption goods production. From an examination of the figure it is clear
that the production capacity allocated to consumption goods depends on the to-
tal production capacity in the nonagricultural sector, the relative productivity
of the production factors in consumption goods, the availability of consump-
tion goods, and the availability of intermediate goods. Similar interactions are
used to allocate production capacity to the production of capital goods, the
production of intermediate goods, and educational capacity.
Education sector
The output of the education sector is people possessing person-years of school-
ing. Educational output increases when the M-model’s education production
capacity and the demand for utilizing this capacity, increase. Educational pro-
duction capacity depends on the demand for education and government policies.
The demand for education is a direct function of both personal income and the
educational level of Iranian adults. Fig. 1.2.5 shows the aggregate causal rela-
tionships in this sector.
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Technology sector
The technology sector determines how technical progress diffuses into the Ira-
nian economy. The M-model assumes that technical progress depends on tech-
nology transfer from developed countries. The transfer rate is determined by
two factors: (1) the availability of required technologies that have not yet been
transferred to Iran (i.e., the difference between the technology level in advanced
countries and the corresponding technology level in Iran) and (2) Iran’s abil-
ity to transfer technologies. Iran’s ability to transfer technology depends on
the education level of its work force and its level of foreign trade with devel-
oped countries. Fig. 1.2.6 illustrates this mechanism for the industrial sector.
Technical progress in the agricultural sector has a similar structure.
Allocation of income
The allocation of income sector determines the allocation of Iranian national
income among five competing demands: expenditures on (1) consumption goods,
(2) services, (3) food, (4) saving, and (5) investment. The structure of this sector
is based on standard microeconomic theory which specifies that the income
elasticity of the demand for food and consumption goods is lower than the
income elasticity of investment and saving.
Foreign trade sector
Any discrepancy between supply and demand in different sectors of the M-model
is addressed through foreign trade. A demand surplus would be imported and
a supply surplus would be exported. Imports and exports are also restricted by
the availability of foreign exchange and government policies. Fig. 1.2.7 depicts
the feedback structure that determines Iranian foreign trade in consumption
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Figure 1.2.7: Trade of consumption goods of M-model
goods. The M-model utilizes the same structure to generate the dynamics of
Iranian foreign trade in food, capital goods, and intermediate goods.
Oil sector
In the oil sector, oil is produced and exported to provide Iran with the foreign
exchange it needs for its imports. This sector also computes Iran’s domestic
energy consumption. The feedback structure of the oil sector is shown in Fig.
1.2.8.
Population sector
The population sector of the M-model supplies both the workforce for the econ-
omy’s production sectors and the consumers of the output from the production
sectors. The Iranian birth rate depends on the adult population, available food
per capita, the level of Iranian industrialization, and the level of Iranian edu-
cation. Similarly, the Iranian death rate depends on available food per capita
and the level of industrialization. Figures 1.2.9 and 1.2.10 show the feedback
structure of this sector.
Minor Structural Imperfections in the M-Model
Although the overall structure of the M-model is excellent, there are two areas
in which it is deficient. The first involves oil production; more specifically, oil
production in the original version of the M-model can be doubled in just 1 year.
Although this assumption might have been reasonable for the period before the
Islamic revolution of 1979, when the Iranian state was able to attract as much
foreign investment as it needed due to its good relationship with the developed
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world, it is not a valid assumption for the postrevolution era. Indeed, after the
1979 revolution the Iranian government could not persuade major oil companies
to invest in its oil and gas industry (Katouzian, 2009).
The second area in which the structure of the original M-model is deficient
involves energy supply. The original model assumes that there is only one
source of Iranian energy—domestic oil production. This assumption implies
that the importation of energy is impossible. Even if the domestic supply of
energy is sufficient for domestic energy demand, this assumption weakens the
robustness of the M-model vis-a-vis extreme conditions. In other words, good
system dynamics modeling practice requires that a model behaves correctly
under extreme conditions, even if those conditions have never occurred in the
actual system and/or will only occur in the model under extreme circumstances.
If a simulation run of the M-model depletes all Iranian energy resources, the
economy still survives. Of course, this is extremely unrealistic. Mashayekhi
(1978) argues that people will use wood when oil resources are scarce and the
M-model implicitly assumes that burning wood is costless—which is simply
not true. Despite these criticisms, available energy data shows that the net
export of energy for Iran will be positive for at least next eight decades11. As
a consequence, the structure of the M-model can be said to be adequate in
simulation runs shorter than fifty years in duration.
1.2.3 Dimensional consistency
Good system dynamics modeling practice requires that all of a model’s equa-
tions be dimensionally consistent. This means that all of a model’s equations
11Simulations by Langarudi et al. (2011) show that Iran’s net export of energy won’t become
negative until 2094. This result is yielded under this assumption that world demand for Iran’s
oil is infinitive so Iran can export that portion of its produced oil remaining after domestic
consumption.
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must produce stocks that are measured in “units” and flows that are measured
in “units/time.” All of the equations in the M-model were checked and no
dimensional inconsistencies were found.
1.2.4 Parameter assessment
The parameter assessment test determines whether a model’s parameter val-
ues are consistent with relevant descriptive and numerical knowledge of the
actual system, and whether all the model’s parameters have real world coun-
terparts. To answer these questions, all parameters of the model were checked
and no inconsistencies were found among them and their real world counter-
parts. Mashayekhi’s dissertation presents a comprehensive documentation of
the M-model’s parameters and how they were obtained.
1.2.5 Extreme condition tests
Tests of extreme conditions are designed to evaluate whether or not each equa-
tion in a model makes sense when its inputs take on extreme values. In other
words, they test whether or not a model’s equations respond reasonably when
subjected to extreme policies, shocks, and parameters. To test the M-model for
extreme conditions, each equation was evaluated, in isolation, for its response to
extreme values for each of its inputs, alone and in combination. In addition, the
overall M-model was subjected to large shocks and extreme conditions and then
inspected for conformance to basic physical laws (e.g. an absence of inventory
should mean there will be no shipments; zero labor should mean zero produc-
tion). All these tests revealed no serious problems with the M-model. However,
some minor defects were detected. For example, the birth rate in the population
sector was set to zero for all years after 2000. The result is shown in Fig. 1.2.11.
The Iranian population should have reached to zero in approximately 150 years.
However, Fig. 1.2.11 shows that the population is still positive at year 2700.
This implies that there are some individuals who can live for more than 700
years! This is a common problem that arises from high level of aggregation in
population modeling and could be resolved by employing specific programming
techniques (Eberlein and Thompson, 2013). The good news is that this defi-
ciency does not significantly influence the primary results of the M-model and
it can be corrected in a future version of the model.
1.2.6 Integration error tests
System dynamics models are continuous time models run on discrete machines
(digital computers) and are thus solved via numerical integration. As a re-
sult, modelers must choose both a numerical integration method, and a time
step, to approximate the continuous dynamics of the underlying system. Too
large a time step utilized in concert with a particular numerical integration
technique may yield too much integration error and thus simulated time paths
17
Population (Persons)
Page 1
1959.00 2107.20 2255.40 2403.60 2551.80 2700.00
Years
1:
1:
1:
0
40000000
80000000
1: POPULATION
1 1
1
1
1
Figure 1.2.11: Iranian population when the birth rate is set to zero after the
year 2000
that are too inaccurate for the problem at hand. Too small a time step uti-
lized in concert with a particular numerical integration technique may yield
simulated time paths that are unnecessarily precise for the problem at hand
and thus simulation runs that are needlessly computationally intensive (i.e.,
slow)12. Good system dynamics modeling practice, therefore, requires picking
a time step/numerical integration combination that is no more accurate than is
necessary for the problem at hand. This is typically accomplished by selecting
an initial time step/numerical integration technique combination, running the
model, cutting the time step in half, rerunning the model, and inspecting the
pre- and post-cut synthetic time paths for significant differences. When no sig-
nificant differences in dynamic behavior can be detected, the model is deemed
to be accurate enough for the problem at hand13.
The M-model was systematically tested with different numerical integration
methods and time steps14. Euler’s method (the default simulation method in
most system dynamics modeling packages due to its simplicity and computa-
tional ease) proved to be fine and a time step reduction to 0.1 year yielded no
significant change in model behavior.
12In the extreme, the smallness of a model’s time step is limited by the precision of the
digital computer being used.
13Mathematical rules of thumb relating a model’s time step to its smallest time constant
also exist in system dynamics modeling.
14Various numerical integration techniques have well-known strengths and weaknesses that
come into play under different circumstances.
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1.2.7 Behavior reproduction tests
Many system dynamicists believe that historical fit is a weak test for model
validity (Forrester, 1973; Forrester and Senge, 1980; Sterman, 1984; Radzicki,
2004). As (Forrester, 2003, p. 5) has written:
There is no reason that a generic model should reproduce any
specific historical time series. Instead, it should generate the kind
of dynamic behavior that is observed in the systems that are being
represented. If one runs the model with different noise sequences one
will get simulations that have the same character, but not the same
values at different points in time. Likewise, the time series from
an actual economy represent only one of a multitude of detailed
behaviors that might have occurred if the random effects in the real
system had been different. In other words, historical data from a
real economy should be interpreted as only one of a multitude of
possible data histories.
The consensus view in the field of system dynamics is that, although repro-
ducing historical behavior is only one of many tests required to build confidence
in a system dynamics model, it can often be essential. Failure to convince a re-
viewer that a model’s historical fit is satisfactory, for example, is often sufficient
grounds for him/her to dismiss the model and its conclusions (Sterman, 1984).
Sterman (1984) lays out a detailed example of how Theil’s inequality statis-
tics (Theil et al., 1966) can be used to analyze the fit of a system dynamics
model to historical data. These statistics are used in this chapter to examine
the fit of the modified M-model to historical data from Iran. Before applying
these statistics, however, the structural deficiencies of the M-model must be ad-
dressed and its behavior updated. The first step in this process is to update the
M-model’s exogenous variables with the latest available data. Recall that the
major exogenous variables in the M-model are oil exports and oil prices. Utiliz-
ing modern data, the initial value of Iranian oil reserves was updated from 100
to 221 billion barrels. Iran’s remaining proven reserves at the end of 2011 were
estimated to be 154.6 billion barrels (OPEC, 2012). The cumulative production
of oil in Iran since 1959—which is the starting date for M-model simulations—
until the end of 2011 was about 66.5 billion barrels (OPEC, 2010). This means
that Iran should have had 221.1 billion barrels of total proven reserves in 1959
(154.6 + 66.5 = 221.1 billion barrels). Of course, alternative values for initial oil
reserves also can easily be tested in the model. Fig. 1.2.12 presents a compar-
ison of actual and simulated Iranian non-oil output, from 1959 to 2007, after
updating the initial value of Iranian oil reserves in the M-model as described
earlier15. Other key variables from the M-model were monitored during this
recalibration process but are not presented here due to space limitations16.
15All real world data presented in this chapter comes from three main sources: (1) the
electronic database of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI, 2012), (2) OPEC Annual Statistical
Bulletin (OPEC, 2010, 2012), and (3) the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (BP, 2012).
16A summary of the M-model’s ability to replicate the dynamics of the key variables in the
Iranian economy is presented at the end of this section in Tab. 1.2.1.
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Figure 1.2.12: Actual and simulated non-oil output after updating the initial
value of oil reserves
Non-oil output was chosen as a more plausible index of general economic
output than GNP because GNP includes oil revenue. Since oil revenue is exoge-
nously determined by a historical time series from 1959 to 2007, a large portion
of the M- model’s ability to reproduce Iranian GNP would be attributable to
an exogenous input. Focusing on non-oil output, on the other hand, can bet-
ter illustrate the M-model’s ability to endogenously replicate the real system’s
behavior.
Fig. 1.2.12 shows that the updated M-model’s qualitative behavior, i.e.,
exponential growth followed by a peak, a decline, and the resumption of expo-
nential growth, is very close to the real system’s behavior. The point-by-point
fitness of the M-model, however, is clearly not acceptable. Therefore, it is
necessary to review the original assumptions of the M-model and if possible,
modify them in order to improve the model’s ability to replicate Iranian eco-
nomic history. The discrepancy between the behavior of the updated M-model
and Iranian historical data starts and expands after 1979 when the Islamic rev-
olution took place. As was previously mentioned, the revolution was followed
by an eight-year war with Iraq. The most likely cause of the divergence between
the actual and synthetic data presented in Fig. 1.2.12, therefore, is these events
and the changes they caused in Iranian political economy. To test this hypoth-
esis, structural changes representing the revolution and war must be introduced
into the M-model. Katouzian (2003) argues that Iranian society had to endure
the following impacts from the revolution and the war beginning in 1979:
• a reduction in oil exports,
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• a reduction in the utilization of production capacity in the economy,
• a high rate of capital flight,
• a high rate of brain drain,
• a reduction in the rate of investment, and
• a deep enmity between Iran and Western countries.
Here is an explanation of how these impacts are introduced into the M-model:
• Reduction in oil exports—since oil exports are treated as an exogenous
input into the M-model until 2007 no further action is required.
• Reduction in the utilization of production capacity in the economy—to in-
troduce this effect a new variable called the “economic security indicator”
(ESI) is introduced into the M-model. This variable is positively influenced
by the growth rate of Iranian GNP, but only after a significant asymmet-
rical delay. More precisely, when the Iranian GNP growth rate increases
the ESI increases, and when it decreases the ESI decreases. However, the
delay between a change in Iranian GNP and a change in the ESI is longer
when GNP is rising compared to when GNP is declining. Changes in the
ESI then influence the utilization of production capacity in the economic
sectors of the M-model. The rationality behind this assumption is that
after the 1979 revolution many business owners left or had to leave the
country because they were suspected to be in contact with the dethroned
Shah or his family (Katouzian, 2009). In addition, many factories were
underutilized due to an economic recession which was the natural result
of the 1979 political turmoil and the war with Iraq (Pesaran, 2000).
• High rate of capital flight—to introduce this effect into the M-model, the
ESI is also modeled to affect foreign exchange reserves.
• High rate of brain drain—the M-model assumes that a fixed percent of
highly educated people emigrate every year from Iran after the 1979 rev-
olution. The percent rate of emigration can be changed by the model
user.
• Reduction in the rate of investment—since investment rates in the model
are determined by desired investment rates, and desired investment rates
are based on the current utilization of a sector’s production capacity, the
effect of the ESI on the utilization of production capacity automatically
adjusts the M-model’s investment rates in response to the overall condition
of the Iranian economy.
• The enmity between Iran and Western countries—after the 1979 revolu-
tion some actions by radical Iranian revolutionists turned the governments
of many western nations against the new Iranian state. The response
of these governments was to implement political and economic sanctions
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Figure 1.2.13: Actual and simulated non-oil output after introducing the second
set of changes
against Iran. This forced Iran to pay higher prices for imported goods.
Another result of this hostility was an increase in the difficulty Iran faced
in transferring-in technology from developed countries. These facts are in-
troduced into the M-model by defining a “hostility effect multiplier.” This
multiplier is an autonomous number between zero to four. When it is zero,
it means that there is no hostility effect while “four” represents the highest
tension in Iranian foreign relationships. Then, this multiplier affects two
variables in the model: it has a negative impact on “technology transfer
rate” and a positive impact on the value of “imports” (it increases the im-
port expenses). Users of the M-model can manually change this multiplier
to see how it influences the system’s dynamics.
Fig. 1.2.13 presents a comparison of actual and simulated Iranian non-
oil output, from 1959 to 2007, after the next set of modifications (described
earlier) are introduced into the M-model. A quick visual inspection of the figure
reveals that the changes have significantly improved the ability of the M-model
to reproduce Iranian historical data.
A more rigorous analysis of the ability of the M-model to reproduce historical
data from the Iranian economy involves Theil’s Inequality Statistics. Tab. 1.2.2
presents the Theil Statistics for four key variables from the M-model. In this
table, r represents the correlation coefficient between simulated and actual data;
U represents the inequality coefficient and UM , US , and UC reflect the fraction
of the mean square error (MSE) attributable to bias, unequal variance and
unequal covariance, respectively.
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Table 1.2.2: Theil statistics for key variables after introducing the second set of
changes
Variables r U UM US UC
Gross National Product 0.985 0.057 0.192 0.101 0.707
Non-oil outputs 0.979 0.062 0.209 0.161 0.630
Oil production 0.930 0.090 0.175 0.013 0.812
Population 0.996 0.017 0.045 0.019 0.936
Inspection of Tab. 1.2.2 reveals that the correlation coefficient for all four
variables is quite high and the inequality coefficient is reasonably low. More-
over, the majority of the MSE for all four variables is concentrated in unequal
covariation (UC). (Sterman, 1984, p. 220) interprets this situation as follows:
If the majority of the error is concentrated in unequal co-variation
UC , while UM and US are small, it indicates that the point-by-point
values of the simulated and actual series do not match even though
the model captures the average value and dominant trends in the
actual data well. Such a case might indicate a fairly constant phase
shift or translation in time of a cyclical mode otherwise reproduced
well. More likely, a large UC indicates one the variables has a large
random component or contains cyclical modes not present in the
other series. In particular, a large UC may be due to noise or cyclical
modes in the historical data not captured by the model. A large UC
indicates the majority of the error is unsystematic with respect to
the purpose of the model, and the model should not be faulted for
failing to match the random component of the data.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the second set of revisions to
the M-model enable it to reproduce the actual system’s behavior reasonably
well. Not only are all the inequality coefficients from the Theil statistics small
but most of the errors are unrelated to bias or unequal variance between the
simulated and actual data.
1.2.8 Behavior anomaly tests
Data limitations often lead to difficulty in establishing the statistical significance
of many relationships in a model. The importance of these relationships can,
nevertheless, be examined by “behavior anomaly tests.” These tests involve de-
termining whether or not anomalous model behavior arises when a relationship
is deleted or modified. Anomalous behavior generated due to the elimination
of a relationship would be a sign of the importance of the relationship. Most
of the relationships in the M-model were tested and no unnecessary or useless
structure was found.
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1.2.9 Family member tests
The family member test examines a model’s ability to generate the behavior of
other cases within the same class as the system being modeled. The greater the
number of cases a model can mimic, the more general the theory the model rep-
resents. The M-model was developed to address Iranian macroeconomic issues.
Iran is an oil-exporting country and is highly dependent on its oil revenue. It also
has a relatively large population and a notable agricultural sector with about
16% average share of total GNP value (during 1959–2007) (CBI, 2012). In the
real world it is possible to identify clusters of nations that are somewhat similar
to Iran. Karl (1997, 1999), for example, argues that Iraq, Nigeria, Algeria, In-
donesia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Mexico possess many common characteristics
and refers to them as “capital-deficient” countries. To pass a family member
test, the M-model must be able to generate the macroeconomic behavior of at
least some of these countries after a reasonable amount of modification to reflect
each nation’s unique features. Although this sort of effort is beyond the scope
of this chapter, it can be argued that the M-model possesses a generic structure
that can be applied to all “capital-deficient” countries.
1.2.10 Surprise behavior tests
Inconsistency between a model’s behavior and its expected behavior reveals that
there are some deficiencies in the formal model, the modeler’s “mental model,”
or both. According to (Sterman, 2000, p. 882):
Often, of course, discrepancies between model output and our
understanding of the system’s dynamics indicate flaws in the for-
mal model. Occasionally, however, it is our mental model and our
understanding of the data that require revision.
The surprise behavior test is passed when a model generates a certain be-
havior, previously unrecognized, and it does indeed occur in the real system.
To test the M-model for surprise behavior it must be run under a variety of
scenarios and its results carefully examined. Fig. 1.2.14 presents a base run for
the M-model from 1959 to 2060 after the second set of modifications has been
introduced. The synthetic variables presented include: non-oil outputs (million
rials per year), disposable income per capita (rials per person per year), food
output per capita (rials per person per year), oil reserves (billion barrels), and
oil production (million barrels per year).
After the second set of modifications the M-model produces the following
behavior from the year 2007 forward. Oil production and oil exports grow ex-
ponentially causing Iranian oil reserves to deplete rapidly. The increase in oil
exports provides the Iranian government with an influx of foreign exchange.
This huge windfall of oil revenue makes it possible for Iran to import the goods
it needs. It also improves the people’s purchasing power, so the demand for con-
sumption goods rises. The urgent need for an increased supply of consumption
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Figure 1.2.14: Base run after the second set of modifications
goods shifts the economy’s production factors from its other sectors to the con-
sumption goods sector. As a result, the intermediate goods sector weakens. Of
course, the economy needs intermediate goods to keep the production capacity
of the consumption goods sector fully utilized. A quick response to this pressure
is to import intermediate goods. This would normally address the problem in
the short-term. However, over time Iran’s oil reserves deplete at a rapid rate
causing oil revenue to decrease and the importation of intermediate goods to
become limited. Since the economy cannot seamlessly substitute the production
capacity of the consumption sector for the production capacity of the capital
goods sector, this leads to a severe depression. Stated differently, the depletion
of Iranian oil reserves shown in Fig. 1.2.14 occurs so quickly that the economy
cannot react to it in a timely fashion.
Even though the modified M-model generates an internally consistent story,
some aspects of its behavior are surprising. For example, there is no way that
Iranian oil production could expand as quickly as is shown in Fig. 1.2.14. The
sharp increase in oil production is related to an unrealistic assumption embedded
in the model. More specifically, the M-model assumes that Iran is able to double
its oil production in a period as short as 1 year. An examination of the historical
data, however, shows that this cannot possibly be true, particularly in the post-
revolution era. Fig. 1.2.15 shows the history of changes in Iranian oil production
from 1965 to 2011.
From an inspection of the figure it is clear that Iranian oil production has not
been able to rise dramatically in any given year since the 1980s. Indeed, the last
extraordinary high growth rate (23%) occurred in 1989. Moreover, significant
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Figure 1.2.15: Historical changes in Iranian oil production (BP, 2012)
increases in oil production appear to occur in years following a deep fall in oil
production. This implies that high rates of growth are due to the reutilization
of an underutilized existing production capacity, rather than from an increase in
overall production capacity. After the 1979 revolution the expansion of Iran’s oil
production capacity became more difficult because of a dramatic change in the
new state’s foreign policies that made foreign investment problematic. Energy
economists believe that the main contemporary challenge in the Iranian energy
sector is the lack of funding and investment (Barkeshli, 2006). It is perhaps
reasonable to assume that the pre-revolutionary Iran could double its oil pro-
duction in 1 year, but it is not a realistic assumption for the post-revolutionary
Iran. Clearly, the surprise behavior of the M-model presented in Fig. 1.2.14
reveals a need to further modification of the M-model’s structure. The next
version of the model assumes that the maximum growth rate of Iranian oil pro-
duction is 14%17. The model is run again and the results are shown in Fig.
1.2.16.
Figure 19 reveals that there is no severe depression in the economy from
2007 to 2060, despite the egregious depletion of Iranian Oil reserves. The reason
is that Iranian oil production grows more slowly than in previous versions of
the M-model (compare to Fig. 1.2.14) and the model economy, therefore, has
enough time to wean itself from oil revenue. In other words, Iran’s inability to
attract enough investment to develop its oil industry leads to less dependency
on oil revenue. In fact, this was a policy originally proposed by Mashayekhi
(1978) to alleviate the economic recession he had predicted for the 1990s. He
had suggested that the Iranian government could slow down the production of
oil as a policy choice so that the economy could adapt to the difficulties that
17Except for 1981, the highest growth rate after the revolution is 10.98% in 1988 (BP, 2012).
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Figure 1.2.16: Base run after the final modification
would arise from the reduction in oil revenue he predicted for the 1990s. In
reality, the 1979 revolution and war with Iraq forced Iran to slow down the
production of oil. But, regardless of whether the slowdown was voluntary or
mandatory its results are consistent with Mashayekhi’s prediction.
1.2.11 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis reveals the robustness of a model’s results with respect to
changes in the values of its parameters over a reasonable range of uncertainty.
There are three types of model sensitivity: “numerical,” “behavior mode,” and
“policy.” A model is numerically sensitive when a change in the values of its pa-
rameters changes the numerical values associated with its behavior. Of course,
no mathematical model can be perfectly numerically insensitive. A model is
behaviorally sensitive when the patterns of behavior it generates change with a
change in the values of its parameters. For instance, a model would demonstrate
behavior mode sensitivity if reasonable alternative parameter values changed
its behavior from, say, overshoot and collapse to S-shaped growth. Policy sen-
sitivity exists when the impact or suitability of a suggested policy change is
significantly altered by a change in the values of a model’s parameters. Since
the purpose of the M-model is to determine whether or not Iran will experience
economic growth during its transition from an oil-rich to an oil-poor nation, the
focus of this section will be on behavior mode and policy sensitivity.
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Behavior mode sensitivity
The behavioral sensitivity of the modified M-model will be reported in this
section. To conduct the test, the values of important parameters in the M-model
were systematically varied over a range of uncertainty and an examination of
how the M-model’s behavior changed in response was conducted. “Disposable
income per capita” is chosen as the proxy for the model’s overall behavior and
as an example of the test18. Each of the parameter values was randomly altered
twenty times over a range of ±50% of their base case values, using a uniform
probability distribution. The overall results of the behavior mode sensitivity
test showed that, generally speaking, the modified M-model’s behavior is not
sensitive to changes in its parameters. However, a few parameters did prove
to be more influential than others. The sensitivity test for five of the model’s
parameters is shown later.
Consider the modified M-model’s two Cobb–Douglas production functions—
one for the industrial sector and the other for the agricultural sector. Sensitivity
testing revealed that the model is numerically very sensitive to the elasticity pa-
rameters for the inputs to the two functions. For example, Fig. 1.2.17 presents
the sensitivity of the modified M-model to changes in “exponent of labor in
agricultural sector production function” (ELA). The base value of this param-
eter is 0.45 and the range for the sensitivity test was 0.225–0.675. Although the
modified M-model is numerically very sensitive to the value of ELA, its behav-
ior mode does not change significantly. Sensitivity analysis for the parameters
of the other production function in the modified M-model yields similar results.
The next parameter examined is “fraction of investment in capital equip-
ment” (FICE). This parameter determines the portion of domestic demand
that is allocated to capital goods production and the portion that is allocated
to construction. The base value for FICE is set to 0.317 and the range for
the sensitivity test was 0.158–0.475. Fig. 1.2.18 presents the results. From a
visual inspection of the figure, it is obvious that the M-model’s behavior is not
sensitive to the changes in FICE.
Another parameter which was selected for examination is “normal reserve
coverage time” (NRC). This parameter determines how quickly the government
depletes Iranian oil reserves. The base value for this parameter is set to 15
years. This means that the Iranian government adjusts its oil production rate
such that existing oil reserves will last 15 more years. The range of values for
the sensitivity test was chosen to be between 8 and 22 years. The results of
the test are shown in Fig. 1.2.19. Again, from a visual inspection of the figure,
it is obvious that the modified M-model’s behavior is insensitive to changes in
NRC.
The next parameter selected for presentation is “normal industrial output
per capita” (NIPC). In the population sector, the birth and death rates de-
pend on the level of industrialization in the country. NIPC provides a base
value against which industrial output per capita generated by the model can be
18The behavior of all of the M-model’s key variables was examined during the behavior
mode sensitivity test but space limitations prevent their presentation in this chapter.
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Figure 1.2.17: Behavioral sensitivity of disposable income per capita in the
modified M-model to changes in ELA
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Figure 1.2.18: Behavioral sensitivity of disposable income per capita in the
modified M-model to changes in FICE
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Figure 1.2.19: Behavioral sensitivity of disposable income per capita in the
modified M-model to changes in NRC
compared. This comparison provides an indication of the rate of Iranian indus-
trialization. The base value of NIPC is 1,015,272 rials and the range of its value
during the sensitivity test is 507,636–1,522,908 rials. Fig. 1.2.20 presents the
results of the test. Once again there is no evidence that the modified M-model
is behaviorally sensitive to changes in NIPC.
The next test of model sensitivity involves the parameter “non-oil output per
capita normal” (NOOPCN), which provides a base value against which non-
oil output per capita (NOOPC) can be compared. If the ratio of NOOPC to
NOOPCN is greater than 1 Iranian education capacity expands. Alternatively,
if the ratio is less than 1 Iranian education capacity shrinks. The default value
of NOOPCN is 3,555,739 rials per year per person (RPY PP ) and the range of
values explored during the sensitivity test is 1,777,870–5,333,608 RPY PP . The
results of the sensitivity test are shown in Fig. 1.2.21. Clearly, the behavior of
the modified M-model is insensitive to this parameter.
For the last example presented in this chapter, all five of the parameters
discussed earlier are varied simultaneously. Fig. 1.2.22 shows that the modified
M-model is numerically sensitive, but behaviorally insensitive, to the combined
set of changes. Indeed, all but one of the simulation runs generates exponential
growth in disposable income per capita.
Policy sensitivity
If decision makers are to have confidence that the policy prescriptions gener-
ated by a system dynamics model are likely to yield the same results in the
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Figure 1.2.20: Behavioral sensitivity of disposable income per capita in the
modified M-model to changes in NIPC
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Figure 1.2.21: Behavioral sensitivity of disposable income per capita in the
modified M-model to changes in NOOPCN
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Figure 1.2.22: Behavioral sensitivity of disposable income per capita in the
modified M-model to simultaneous changes in all five parameters
real system as they do in the virtual world, the policy prescriptions have to be
robust. That is, the policy prescriptions should not change when a model’s pa-
rameters are varied over a reasonable range of values. This section will present
the results of policy sensitivity tests run on the modified M-model. As a pre-
requisite, however, some policy conclusions need to be drawn from the model.
Recall that, although the M-model has the potential to be a foundational plat-
form for Iranian macroeconomic modeling, its current structure is quite limited.
More specifically, its current structure is appropriate for examining issues related
to the oil dependency of the Iranian economy, but not for answering broader
macroeconomic questions in the areas of fiscal, monetary, or income redistri-
bution policies. Recall also that one of the counterintuitive conclusions drawn
from simulations of the M-model is that slowing down or limiting investment in
Iranian energy production will yield long-term benefits for the economy. This
conclusion is in sharp contrast to the viewpoint held by many energy experts
who believe that the Iranian government should attract more investment to
speed-up Iranian oil and gas production (Barkeshli, 2006).
The “more investment now” viewpoint is principally based on two percep-
tions. First, most of Iran’s proven oil reserves are in the second half of their life
cycles (MOE, 2008). As a result, if secondary or tertiary oil recovery methods
are not brought on-line, it will become increasingly difficult to exploit these
reserves in the future (Ahmed, 2006). To bring these methods on-line, however,
Iran will have to invest more in its energy sector. Second, Iran shares some of its
oil and natural gas fields with its neighbors (e.g., Qatar). If these jointly-owned
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Figure 1.2.23: Time paths for disposable income per capita under the “slow
investment down” and “more investment now” strategies (2010-2020)
reserves are not exploited in a timely fashion, they will impose some opportunity
costs on the Iranian economy. Investing more in its energy sector now, rather
than later, will increase the probability that the jointly-owned reserves can be
utilized by Iran. The implications of the “more investment now” versus the
“slow investment down” strategies can be tested with the modified M-model by
simulating a change in Iranian foreign policy.
To test the “more investment now” strategy, the assumption is made that
the Iranian government improves its relationships with the developed countries
and, as a result, is able to accelerate its production of oil. More precisely,
it is assumed that this about-face in foreign affairs will allow Iran to double
its oil production in as little as 1 year19. The simulation run embodying this
assumption can be compared with an earlier one in which the maximum oil
production growth rate was assumed to be 14%. This is the “slow investment
down” strategy. The short-term and long-term implications of these strategies
can be compared separately. Fig. 1.2.23 shows the time paths for “disposable
income per capita” in the short-term (2010–2020). Curve 1 represents the “slow
investment down” strategy and curve 2 represents the “more investment now”
strategy. Over this narrow period of time it is clear that increasing Iranian oil
production capacity at a faster rate can yield higher economic welfare.
Fig. 1.2.24, on the other hand, shows that the story is different in the long
run. Although superior in the short-term, the “more investment now” strategy
leads to an economic depression in the long-term because the economy cannot
19Recall that this was an assumption in the original M-model.
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Figure 1.2.24: Time paths for disposable income per capita under the “slow
investment down” and “more investment now” strategies (2010-2060)
adjust to a lack of oil revenue caused by depletion.
The robustness of this policy conclusion can now be examined. To conduct
this sensitivity test the protocol from section “Behavior Mode Sensitivity” will
again be utilized. Further, the same parameters that were varied in the previous
section will be changed with the only difference being that, for each sensitivity
run, each parameter is given only one new value. Similar to the results presented
in Fig. 1.2.22, all of the parameters will be altered simultaneously. Figures
1.2.25 and 1.2.26 show representative results from the policy sensitivity test
in both the short and long runs, respectively. In both cases, curves 2 and 4
repeat the same results shown in Figures 1.2.23 and 1.2.24 while, curves 1 and
3 show the time paths generated by the modified M-model with new, randomly
chosen, parameter sets. In both, the short and long runs, the behavior modes
are insensitive to the parameter changes. The overall conclusion of the test
is that the modified M-model’s policy recommendations are robust—that is,
insensitive to changes in model parameters.
1.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, a classic system dynamics model developed by Ali Mashayekhi
in 1978 was resurrected, updated and revalidated. The goal of the model is to
investigate the issue of Iranian oil dependency. The original model had predicted
that Iran would face a harsh economic recession during the 1980s due to a steep
fall in oil revenue caused by natural resource depletion. Thirty-five years later,
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Figure 1.2.25: Sensitivity of time paths for disposable income per capita under
the “slow investment down” and “more investment now” strategies (2010-2020)
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Figure 1.2.26: Sensitivity of time paths for disposable income per capita under
the “slow investment down” and “more investment now” strategies (2010-2060)
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however, Iran’s oil reserves remain intact and the country has not encountered
the sort of severe depression that was predicted.
An examination of the original M-model showed that it did not contain the
structure necessary to capture the dynamics of the Islamic revolution or the
war with Iraq that occurred during the 1980s. Updating the M-model’s exoge-
nous variables, modifying some of its assumptions, and recalibrating some of
its parameters significantly improved its ability to reproduce Iranian economic
history. Revalidation of the M-model has shown that it is fairly robust and gen-
erally reliable. Although it is an excellent tool for analyzing questions directly
related to the issue of Iranian oil dependency, however, due to its relatively nar-
row boundary it is an inadequate platform for analyzing many contemporary
Iranian macroeconomic policies. Broadening the boundary of the M-model by
adding sectors such as a financial market, a foreign exchange market, a labor
market, and an energy market would greatly enhance its versatility. As such, it
can be argued that the M-model can serve as a foundational platform for future
Iranian macroeconomic modeling efforts.
Finally, this chapter can serve as a starting point and archetype for those
who wish to develop a system dynamics macroeconomic model of a resource-
dependent developing nation. Future research involving the use of the M-model
for this purpose should, therefore, address the following issues:
• As previously mentioned, the boundary of the M-model should be broad-
ened to include a financial market, foreign exchange market, labor market,
and an energy market.
• The energy sector of the M-model should be revised to address energy–economy
interactions. For example, the original M-model and its current modified
version contain only one source of energy—oil. The boundary of the en-
ergy sector needs to be broadened to include alternative sources of energy
and the economics of their substitutability.
• The importation of energy is impossible in both the original M-model and
its current modified version. This is not acceptable, particularly when the
purpose of the model is to analyze energy–economy interactions.
• The production functions in both the original M-model and its current
modified version are very sensitive to their elasticity parameters.
• The formulation of these functions should be modified to eliminate this
fragility.
• The modified M-model should be recalibrated to see if it can reproduce the
behavior of other “capital-deficient” oil exporting nations such as Nige-
ria, Algeria, Indonesia, Venezuela, Ecuador, or Mexico that have large
populations and significant agricultural sectors.
36
Chapter 2
A Simulation Model of
Katouzian’s Theory of
Arbitrary State and
Society1
2.1 Introduction
Over the last century, Iran’s economic growth has been fairly unstable, primar-
ily due to the dynamics of its political atmosphere (Bharier, 1971; Issawi, 1971;
Floor, 1998). The unsteadiness of Iranian economic growth can be seen in the
time series data presented in Fig. 2.1.1. In this figure, Iranian GNP data are di-
vided into two periods—1900 to 1960 and 1960 to 2010—so that the instabilities
in the Iranian economy can be clearly identified2.
An inspection of the figure reveals that the same qualitative pattern of be-
havior exists in both time periods—i.e., GNP initially grows exponentially until
a political disruption takes place. During the period 1900 to 1960, Reza Shah
was forced to abdicate during the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941, which
was followed by a coup d’e´tat against the democratic governance of Mohammad
Mossadegh in 1953. In the period 1960 to 2010, the political system endured a
crisis in the mid-1970s that precipitated the 1979 revolution. In both cases, the
1This chapter is published in “Langarudi, Saeed P., and Michael J. Radzicki. 2015. A
Simulation Model of Katouzian’s Theory of Arbitrary State and Society. Forum for Social
Economics, June, 1–38. doi:10.1080/07360932.2015.1051076.”
2Fig. 2.1.1 was created from a combination of two datasets. The first source of data,
shown in the left-side diagram, comes from the work of (Bharier, 1971, p. 59), who provides
a realistic estimate of Iran’s real GNP from 1900 to 1960 in constant 1959 prices. The second
source, shown in the right-side diagram, comes from the online portal of Iran’s Central Bank
(CBI, 2014), which provides data on Iran’s real GNP from 1959 to 2010 in constant 1997
prices.
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Abdication of Reza Shah (1941)
SIS/CIA coup against Mossadegh  (1953)
Revolution (1979)
Figure 2.1.1: Real Iranian GNP—in billion Rials at constant prices
Iranian economy collapsed after a period of political instability and it took a
while for it to return to its previous pattern of growth. In terms of a more generic
and simplified pattern of behavior, the dynamics inherent in Fig. 2.1.1 can be
portrayed by the growth–stagnation–growth time shape presented in Fig. 2.1.2.
Arguably, a useful theory of Iranian socioeconomic development should be able
to replicate this qualitative mode of behavior3. In system dynamics modeling,
the “target” dynamic behavior mode that is to be replicated or mimicked is
known as a “reference mode.”
Since the 1970s, there have been many attempts to explain the distinctive
dynamics of Iran’s macroeconomy4. The literature on Iranian economic devel-
opment is vast and can be broadly divided into two major groups: quantitative
analyses and qualitative (descriptive) studies. Quantitative analyses5, mostly
econometric models, are highly dependent on numerical data and thus intrinsi-
cally unable to explain Iran’s long-term economic dynamics because most Ira-
nian time series data only goes back to 1959. The reliability of these data is
also suspect (Amuzegar, 1997). Moreover, the effect of political factors such
as revolution and war is normally represented as exogenous inputs into these
econometric models, which implies that these phenomena are created by exter-
nal forces. In fact, the very nature of the methods employed in these studies
3Saeed (1992) argues that complex dynamic behavior modes should be “sliced” into simpler
qualitative time shapes (i.e., reference modes) so that a system dynamics modeling effort can
be directed toward capturing the feedback processes that generate them.
4See Esfahani et al. (2013) for a comprehensive review of Iranian macroeconomic modeling
efforts.
5See for example Habib-Agahi (1971); Beharie (1973); Heiat (1987); Valadkhani (1997);
Becker (1999).
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Year
Reference Iranian GNP
Figure 2.1.2: Reference mode for the qualitative behavior of Iranian GNP
prevents a modeler from integrating Iran’s socio-political system into a model
of its economic system. As a consequence, most of the modeling studies under-
taken by mainstream Iranian economists have been unable to incorporate those
features of Iran’s socioeconomic system that are key to understanding its dy-
namics. Stated differently, most quantitative analyses have utilized factors that
are merely the result of the complex interrelationships that comprise the Ira-
nian socioeconomic system, rather than the root causes that define the system’s
complex interrelationships and that generate its dynamics.
Qualitative studies of the Iranian economy, on the other hand, go far deeper
into the very complicated and interrelated feedback structures that define the
Iranian socio-political system. Some of these studies are more general and try
to explain the causes of relative economic underdevelopment in eastern soci-
eties6, while others are case studies that specifically focus on Iran’s socioeco-
nomic system7 and explain “why Iran lagged behind while the west moved
forward.”8 Although these studies provide more detailed—and thus, more
realistic—explanations for the system’s behavior, they lack two important fea-
tures that are crucial for rigorous scientific work. First, they cannot generate
synthetic data that can be formally compared to numerical data from the actual
system. Second, rigorous policy analysis is not possible because they cannot be
used to run controlled experiments. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a
rigorous explanation for Iran’s pattern of unstable economic growth. The sys-
tem dynamics model put forth in this chapter is based on the work of Katouzian
(1978, 1981, 1997, 2003, 2004, 2009, 2010, 2011), an economist and historian
who created a well-known socio-political-economic theory of Iranian economic
6Some of the most well-known theories in this area are “the Asiatic mode of production”
of Karl Marx (Shiozawa, 1966), Max Weber’s “theory of social and economic organization”
(Weber, 1947), and Wittfogel’s “oriental despotism” (Wittfogel, 1957).
7See for example, Alamdari (2010); Arianpour (2003); Ashraf (1980); Katouzian (1978,
1981, 1997, 2003); Peyman (2003); Piran (2005); Tabatabaei (2001).
8This question is the title of a popular book in Iran written by Alamdari (2010).
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development. The approach taken in this chapter is to retain the richness of a
qualitative study of the Iranian socio-political-economic system and combine it
with the rigor of a quantitative analysis.
System dynamics has already been used to test complex, nonlinear, and
feedback-rich descriptive economic theories9. In the case of Iran, the first and
arguably most important application of system dynamics to economics was put
forth by Mashayekhi (1978). As described in Chapter 1 Mashayekhi developed
a system dynamics model to analyze Iran’s long-term economic development
options made possible by its oil revenue. Since the focus of this model was oil
revenue and its use in economic development, and not the more general issues
associated with Iranian political economy, it cannot be used to explain Iran’s
long-run socioeconomic dynamics10. That said, beyond Mashayekhi’s work,
there has been no serious system dynamics modeling effort aimed at analyzing
the dynamics of the Iranian socio-political-economic system.
This chapter represents an initial effort to model the dynamics inherent in
Iran’s socio-political-economic system. More specifically, Homa Katouzian’s the-
ory of arbitrary state and society11—a very well-established descriptive theory
of Iran’s unstable economic development—is translated into a system dynamics
model12, tested for internal consistency, and used for policy analysis13. Initially,
the model’s ability to mimic the irregular dynamics of the Iranian economy is
presented. Then, the model is used to test different scenarios and policy pre-
scriptions aimed at improving the behavior of the Iranian socioeconomic system.
In this regard, Section 2.2 describes Katouzian’s theory of arbitrary state and
society. Section 2.3 presents the base run of the system dynamics model of
Katouzian’s theory and shows how it can mimic the fundamental behavior of
Iran’s macroeconomy. Section 2.4 reports the results of model validation tests.
Section 2.5 explores the implications of altering a couple of key assumptions
in the model to determine if its ability to mimic Katouzian’s theory is robust
or fragile. Section 2.6 outlines some policy experiments tested with the model,
while Section 2.7 presents the chapter’s conclusions.
9Radzicki (2009) reports some of these efforts in his chapter.
10For a detailed and updated review of Mashayekhi’s model which explores its capabilities
and limitations, see Chapter 1 or Langarudi and Radzicki (2013)
11The causal relationships that underlie Katouzian’s theory will not be justified here as
this evidence exists in Katouzian’s numerous works (Katouzian, 1978, 1981, 1997, 2003, 2004,
2009, 2010, 2011). The interested reader can easily refer to them for additional information.
12A system dynamics model is essentially an institutionalist pattern model. See Radzicki
(1988, 1990a,b) for a comprehensive discussion of economic methodology and its relationship
to system dynamics modeling.
13For a lively discussion on the challenges inherent in translating someone else’s descriptive
theory into a system dynamics model, see Wittenberg (1992); Sterman (1992); Radzicki (1992);
Barlas (1992); Wittenberg and Sterman (1992).
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2.2 Katouzian’s Theory of State and Society
This section describes Katouzian’s theory14 in a very concise form using the
conceptual tools of system dynamics15. The structure of the Katouzian model
is shown in Fig. 2.2.1. An explanation of this structure begins with the model’s
simple engine of economic growth in which a portion of Iran’s disposable income,
determined by the marginal propensity to save (MPS), is saved. This flow of
saving is accumulated in the model’s stock of Society Savings and is available
for investment. A flow of society investment spending builds up the model’s
stock of Society Capital16, which in turn is used to generate output. Higher
levels of output provide the Iranian citizenry with a higher flow of disposable
income, some of which is again invested in Capital. This defines a self-reinforcing
feedback loop that drives economic growth17. A balancing feedback loop that
creates fiscal drag through taxes also exists. Higher output generates higher tax
payments which, in turn, lowers disposable income and limits saving, investment,
and economic growth.
Katouzian argues that the primary mechanism preventing Iran from expe-
riencing the same sort of economic development enjoyed by Western countries
is the low rate of saving and investment that is mostly due to the constant
insecurity surrounding property rights, as well as the overall unpredictability of
the Iranian socioeconomic system caused by the systematic state confiscation
of property. Throughout history, Iran has endured a very low level of security
for those who own private property. The state could confiscate the property of
its citizens at any time, without any legal justification. In fact, the will of the
ruler was sufficient to make any procedure legal. This insecurity with respect to
property rights was often exacerbated by lawless behavior that occurred during
and after episodes of political unrest. Katouzian asserts that people will save
and invest less if they feel economically insecure. So, in the Katouzian model,
while the flow of confiscation transfers some of the private sector’s Capital to
the state, it also discourages saving.
The flow of confiscation in the Katouzian model depends upon two factors:
Political Power and the government’s level of Corruption. The more Political
Power the government has and the more corrupt it is, the more likely it will
be that Confiscation will take place18. Corruption, in turn, depends on the
amount of respect for the law19 shown by the nation’s citizenry. Respect for
14The structure described here represents a synthesis of the ideas presented in numerous
publications written by Katouzian. See Footnote 11.
15Readers who are unfamiliar with the conceptual tools of system dynamics modeling are
encouraged to consult a basic primer on the subject such as: http://www.systemdynamics.
org/DL-IntroSysDyn/index.html.
16In the model, “capital” includes all types of income-generating assets including land,
commercial and industrial capital, plant and equipment, etc.
17Of course, this type of basic economic growth mechanism is found in many models in
modern economic growth theory.
18The literature on the causes and consequences of corruption or kleptocracy in developing
nations is vast and a comprehensive survey is beyond the scope of this chapter. The interest
reader should consult Søreide (2014) for an excellent overview.
19Here, the law means a written and constitution-based law, which remains constant over
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Law (or, in short, lawfulness) is an indicator of the “arbitrariness” of a society.
In other words, lawlessness is a key characteristic of an arbitrary culture. Higher
levels of an arbitrary culture mean less respect for the law, and vice versa. An
arbitrary culture grows faster in a society that is suffering from lawlessness.
An arbitrary ruler prefers an arbitrary environment since respect for the law is
a threat to his power. In other words, an arbitrary ruler instinctively knows
that he should restrain the power of the law, otherwise the law will limit his
power. This mechanism—i.e., more arbitrary power leading to less respect for
the law, which in turn facilitates the additional accumulation of power, and thus
more arbitrary power—creates a self-reinforcing feedback loop that is one of the
fundamental substructures of Katouzian’s theory. In Fig. 2.2.1, this positive
feedback loop works its way through Political Power, state controlling power,
Corruption, Respect for Law, Chaos, desired power, and back to Political Power.
Respect for Law can be damaged by social Chaos. In a chaotic socioeconomic
system, the law may easily be ignored or broken by individuals. But, Chaos will
also be affected by lawfulness. Since lower Respect for Law will increase chaotic
acts, this chain of cause and effect creates a self-reinforcing feedback loop that
can produce a vicious cycle. Similar mutual relationships exist between Respect
for Law and Corruption. That said, the main driving force behind Corruption
is the amount of respect for the law possessed by the citizenry. A society with
little respect for the law is a breeding ground for Corruption. If the level of
lawfulness is high (low), the level of Corruption will be low (high) because
people will be less (more) inclined to engage in unlawful actions such as bribery
and fraud. If significant levels of Corruption persist in a society, people start to
feel that they are losing socioeconomic benefits by adhering to the rule of law.
As such, they gradually follow the same path as lawless people so as to gain
some of the advantages of Corruption and lawlessness. This negative linkage
from Corruption to Respect for Law creates another positive feedback loop that
can generate a destructive—or constructive, depending on which way the loop
is working—impact on the Iranian socioeconomic system.
In the Katouzian model, Corruption is driven by state controlling power,
which is a measure of the state’s political-economic power. The economic power
of the state is measured by the ratio of the state’s economic resources to the total
economic resources of the country. When the state controls a greater share of
economic and political power, it is inclined to restrict more and more personal
freedom, particularly freedom of speech, which leads to a weaker system of
checks and balances over the state’s performance. Weaker checks and balances,
in turn, lead to a higher level of Corruption in Iranian society.
As was previously mentioned, in Katouzian’s theory, Iran’s marginal propen-
sity to save and Respect for law are influenced by the level of social Chaos. This
begs the question as to what generates Chaos. Chaos in Katouzian’s theory
emerges whenever the central government is weak—that is, when Iran’s state
control efficiency is low. State control efficiency is determined by the amount of
financial resources the state possesses versus the amount of financial resources
time and place.
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that are required to control the current level of Chaos. Chaos is also influenced
by Respect for Law and public utility. The latter is an indicator of short-term
public satisfaction and negatively impacts Chaos since unsatisfied citizens may
participate in violent activities or breach social norms.
Public utility plays a key role in the accumulation of power by the arbitrary
ruler. Higher public utility allows the arbitrary ruler to accumulate more power,
while lower public utility will limit the growth rate of Political Power or even
reduce it when it goes negative (i.e., negative public utility generates Public
Anger).
In the Katouzian model, there are several inputs to the public utility function
including disposable income, Chaos, Corruption, and freedom, the latter of which
is inversely associated with state controlling power. While disposable income and
freedom have a positive impact on public utility, Chaos and Corruption have a
negative impact.
Higher levels of Chaos, ceteris paribus, generate a need for more resources
so that the state can still control the socioeconomic system. This increases the
flow of state expenditure and drains State Reserve. A decline in State Reserve,
in turn, causes the tax rate to increase. Of note is that tax rate goes up if
Chaos increases, but this pressure does not necessarily translate into a higher
flow of tax revenue. This is because the amount of revenue the state can actually
collect is also determined by the economy’s annual output, as well as the amount
of state controlling power and state control efficiency. In other words, better
control by the government and/or a higher level of national economic output
can generate higher tax revenue.
The flows of tax revenue and, since 1903, oil revenue add to the stock of State
Reserve. In the Katouzian model, the State Reserve is used for state investment
and for controlling Chaos (via spending on measures that enhance state control
efficiency). In addition to the flow of confiscation, state investment builds up
the State Capital, which contributes to the production of Iran’s total economic
output. State Capital, along with State Reserve is part of Iran’s state resources,
which are an important determinant of Iran’s state controlling power.
It is important to note that in the Katouzian model, the flow of oil revenue is
directly linked to Political Power. In fact, it is assumed that a relatively powerful
central authority is necessary to effectively export oil. Historical data justify
this assumption. Fig. 2.2.2 shows how major political incidents have influenced
the stream of Iranian oil revenue over time. Slightly before, during, or after each
incident, there has been a steep decline in the export of oil. Experimentation
with the Katouzian model, however, shows that its dynamic behavior and policy
implications are insensitive to this assumption20.
Continuing with the explanation of the model structure presented in Fig.
2.2.1, higher taxes reduce disposable income and hence decrease public utility.
As mentioned earlier, public utility determines the amount of Political Power an
arbitrary ruler can accumulate. The other factor that helps the arbitrary ruler
gain Political Power is the level of Chaos in Iranian society. As Chaos grows,
20See Section 2.5.2 for details of this simulation experiment.
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the public demands a more powerful ruler who can bring stability and security
to society. The arbitrary ruler uses this opportunity to seize more power. As
his Political Power grows, his state controlling power increases, which helps
him to better control Chaos. A decline in Chaos increases the popularity of
the arbitrary ruler even further, which leads to an even greater accumulation
of Political Power. This positive feedback loop helps arbitrary power grow
rapidly, but it also limits the amount of freedom in Iranian society. A decrease
in freedom weakens public utility and also weakens the Iranian system of checks
and balances. As a result, Corruption starts to increase.
Higher levels of Corruption cause public utility to decline further and the
flow of confiscation, which reduces disposable income and thus public utility, to
increase. It also reduces state control efficiency which, in turn, causes Chaos to
increase. Since the state now needs more financial resources to boost its control
measures, it increases tax rate, which reduces public utility even further. As
this vicious cycle unfolds, people save less due to their insecurity with respect
to Iran’s socioeconomic atmosphere. Eventually, the government loses its power
since it cannot provide Iranian society with socioeconomic security.
The completion of the Katouzian cycle occurs when the government loses
its power, Chaos grows to a very high level, and the public begins to demand a
new, powerful, ruler to bring peace and stability to society. Katouzian calls this
vicious and repetitive cycle “arbitrary rule-chaos-arbitrary rule.” This reference
pattern of behavior is shown in Fig. 2.2.3. The Political Power of the arbitrary
ruler (dotted line) and the level of societal Chaos (solid line) are shown in this
figure. In order to satisfactorily represent Katouzian’s theory, the oscillatory
behavior of these variables, with the correct phase lag, must be replicated by
the simulation model.
2.3 Base Run of the Katouzian Model
In this section of the chapter, the base run behavior of the Katouzian model
is explored to determine whether or not its dynamics are consistent with the
historical behavior of the Iranian socio-political-economic system. In particular,
the model’s behavior is compared against the “arbitrary rule-chaos-arbitrary
rule” cycle described in Fig. 2.2.3 and the qualitative behavior of Iranian time
series data presented in Fig. 2.1.2. Since Katouzian’s theory takes a historical
perspective going back as far as the nineteenth century, the Katouzian model is
simulated for a 200-year time period.
To generate the base run simulation, the Katouzian model is initialized with
mid-range levels of Political Power, Chaos, and Corruption, relatively low levels
of Public Anger and public utility, and a very low level of Respect for Law.
These initial values, along with the maximum possible variation of each variable,
are reported in Tab. 2.3.1. Political Power, Corruption, and Respect for Law
are scaled variables with a possible range of variation between 0 and 1. For
example, when Political Power is 0.2, it means that 20% of the political power
of Iranian society is under the control of an arbitrary ruler, and when Respect
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Revolution (1979)
SIS/CIA coup against Mossadegh (1953)
Abdication of Reza Shah (1941)
Figure 2.2.2: Historical behavior of Iran’s oil revenue marked by major political
incidents (CBI, 2014)
Year
Reference Socio-Political Behavior
Political Power
Chaos
Figure 2.2.3: Reference modes of behavior of Iranian socio-political system
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Table 2.3.1: Initial values and potential variation range of key variables for base
run simulation
Variable Minimum Base value Maximum Unit
Political Power 0.00 0.50 1.00 Dimensionless
Chaos 0.00 0.50 +∞ Dimensionless
Public Anger −∞ 0.10 +∞ Util/Year
Corruption 0.00 0.50 1.00 Dimensionless
Respect for Law 0.00 0.05 1.00 Dimensionless
for Law is 0.9, it can be interpreted as meaning that 90% of Iranian society
follows the rule of law. Chaos can theoretically vary from 0 to infinity, where 0
indicates no chaotic action in Iranian society at all and larger numbers indicate
greater levels of chaos in Iranian society. Despite a theoretical maximum value of
infinity, experimentation with the Katouzian model indicates that Chaos rarely
goes beyond a value of 3. Public Anger is a stock that accumulates public
dissatisfaction over time. Anger is measured in Utils21 and the stock of Public
Anger can theoretically fill without limit, although a dissipation flow called
forgetting rate helps to prevent this from occurring. When this variable is zero,
it means that Iranian society is indifferent toward the government’s status and
actions. However, as the stock of Public Anger fills the probability of an uprising
occurring increases. Public utility reflects the short-term satisfaction of Iranian
society originating from four major factors: the economy, chaos, corruption,
and freedom. It is measured by Utils/Year and it can vary from -1 to +1.
When the stock of Average Public Utility turns negative, it activates the flow
of anger accumulation while a positive value of Average Public Utility causes
anger accumulation to deplete.
Fig. 2.3.1 shows simulated Iranian total economic output from the Base run
of the Katouzian model. An inspection of the figure reveals that the model’s
behavior mimics the qualitative long-run time shape defined by the reference
mode of Fig. 2.1.2 reasonably well. In other words, during each cycle, Total
Economic Output grows exponentially, reaches a peak, and then stagnates for
a period of time before resuming its path of exponential growth.
Although it is clear that the Katouzian model can mimic the long-run qual-
itative behavior of Iranian macroeconomic data, it is also important that it
captures the qualitative dynamics of the socio-political system described by
Katouzian. Fig. 2.3.2 presents the base run dynamics of Political Power and
Chaos generated by the model. An examination of the figure reveals that the
model can indeed “tell the story” of Iranian economic development in a manner
consistent with Katouzian’s theory.
21In the Katouzian model, as in neoclassical microeconomics, Utils represent units of sat-
isfaction/dissatisfaction. Of course, because utility is not a characteristic that is directly
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To have a better understanding of the results, only one cycle of “arbitrary
rule-chaos-arbitrary rule” (the period 50 to 10022) is presented in Figures 2.3.3
and 2.3.4. Fig. 2.3.3 includes disposable income, Chaos, Corruption, and free-
dom, while Fig. 2.3.4 presents Political Power, Public Anger, and public utility.
Public Anger is initially declining during this period because public utility is
still positive. Public utility is positive because Corruption and Chaos are de-
clining and because the level of freedom is still high. This atmosphere allows
arbitrary power to start growing. As Iranian state power grows, it can better
control chaos, so Chaos starts to decline further. The success of the state in
controlling chaos helps it to attract more public support. With this support
in hand, the state gains additional power, which enables it to further suppress
Chaos (and thus make the citizenry even happier), which in turn results in an
even greater level of Political Power. As arbitrary power increases, Corruption
increases and freedom declines. This has a destructive impact on public utility.
Increased Corruption, which harms the efficiency of the state’s controlling power
while reducing public utility, generates higher levels of Chaos (which was de-
clining until time period 70). Lower public utility, lower control efficiency, and
higher levels of Chaos not only make it difficult for the state to collect taxes
but also increase its spending. As a result, the state’s financial resources decline
and its controlling power becomes even weaker. In other words, even though
the state is very powerful at this time, its efficiency is low because it cannot
effectively control the socioeconomic chaos. This creates a significant sense of
dissatisfaction in Iranian society. The decline in public utility, and hence rising
Public Anger, exacerbates Chaos, which brings public utility down to even lower
levels. This creates a vicious circle, which finally causes the ruler to lose his
power.
Of particular interest in this base run is the behavior of disposable income.
It declines while Political Power increases and it starts to grow when arbitrary
rule reaches the end of its era. This behavior is primarily due to the long time
delays in capital accumulation and depreciation. In summary, simulation of
the Katouzian model indicates that it is internally consistent. In other words,
its structure is sufficient to endogenously generate behavior that mimics the
reference mode that it is supposed to explain (i.e., Figures 2.1.2 and 2.2.3).
2.4 Model Validation
Over the years, system dynamicists have assembled a comprehensive list of
tests to which a model can be subjected in order to build confidence among its
users23. The Katouzian model has been subjected to these tests. Some of the
measurable, Utils do not represent an actual unit of measurement such as inches or pounds.
22The dynamic behavior over any particular period of time in Figures 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 does
not necessarily correspond to actual historical periods or events. Rather, dividing the sim-
ulation run into different time periods makes it easier to understand the model’s pattern of
behavior.
23See for example Forrester (1973); Peterson (1975, 1980); Mass and Senge (1978); Forrester
and Senge (1980); Sterman (1984); Radzicki (2004); Barlas (1996); Oliva (2003).
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test results have already been reported in previous sections of this chapter24.
Some of the other tests have been conducted automatically with the simulation
software as part of the model construction process—e.g., testing the dimensional
consistency of each equation and testing the impact on model behavior arising
from integration error25. This section summarizes the results of other important
tests of model validity.
2.4.1 Boundary adequacy
Strictly speaking, system dynamics modelers do not model systems but rather
problems from a systems perspective. As a consequence, system dynamicists
must choose what aspects from the actual system to include, and what aspects
to exclude, from their models. The conceptual fence that separates the variables
that are included from those that are not is called the model’s boundary. The
criterion that is normally used to help a system dynamicist decide on which
side of the fence a particular variable should reside is whether or not it can
contribute to an endogenous, closed-loop, explanation for the problem to which
the model is being addressed.
The boundary of the Katouzian model can be said to be adequate because
it generates its behavior endogenously via closed feedback loop structures and
its behavior mimics the reference mode. In other words, it does not rely on
exogenous variables to “drive” its behavior and “fit the data.” In fact, the
Katouzian model’s only exogenous variable is oil revenue which, ironically, can
be considered as both an endogenous and exogenous variable. More specifi-
cally, oil revenue is endogenous because it is influenced by Political Power. As
was previously discussed, the model assumes that a more powerful government
has better control over oil exports and, as such, can gain more revenue from
this source (see Section 2.2—particularly Fig. 2.2.2—for more details). On the
other hand, oil revenue is also exogenous because its growth rate depends on
an exogenous ramp function, which creates an artificial growth pattern to repli-
cate the expansion of oil production and exports over time. The good news is
that the exogenous portion of the behavior of oil revenue does not detract from
the model’s validity because, as will be shown below, simulation experiments
indicate that Katouzian’s “arbitrary rule-chaos-arbitrary rule” cycle is not sig-
nificantly influenced by it. Moreover, those factors that may impact oil revenue
(e.g., the global demand for oil, oil prices, etc.) are outside of the scope of the
model and its boundary.
In terms of factors that have been excluded from the Katouzian model that
may be significant, two leap to mind. The first, Iran’s population, may also be
the most important as the inclusion of a demographic sector would enable the
24That is, the causal structure of the model has already been described in Section 2.2 and
the behavior reproduction tests have been reported in Section 2.3.
25The complete documentation of the Katouzian model, along with all variable defini-
tions and complete equation specifications, is available in electronic form from the author.
The model was created in Vensim and a free version of this software (http://vensim.com/
download/) is available so that interested readers can reproduce the simulations presented in
this chapter and run simulation experiments of their own choosing.
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model to be used for a significant amount of additional policy analysis. The
second is factors that influence public utility and Public Anger such as income
inequality would almost certainly alter the model’s behavior and increase its
explanatory power. Of course, the only way to know for sure how the effects
of these factors would ripple their way through the system is to include them
within the model’s boundary and run simulation experiments.
2.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
One way to determine the robustness of the results from a simulation model
is to perform a formal sensitivity analysis. To determine the robustness of the
Katouzian model, its important parameters and initial values were subjected
to Monte Carlo sensitivity testing. The values chosen for the analysis, and the
ranges over which they were tested, are summarized in the Appendix A. Gener-
ally speaking, the model’s fundamental behavior is insensitive to a wide range
of variations in its parameters and initial values. Fig. 2.4.1 presents the results
of one of the univariate sensitivity simulation runs for the main variables of
the Katouzian model including disposable income, Political Power, Respect for
Law, Corruption, Chaos, and public utility. In this sensitivity test, each of the
selected parameters and initial values was randomly varied 200 times for a total
of 5,800 simulation runs. An inspection of Fig. 2.4.1 shows four levels of confi-
dence in each time series plot: 50%, 68.4%, and 95.4%. Each level of confidence
indicates the percentage of the simulation runs that lie within the corresponding
area shown on its graph. Of note is that 95.4% of the simulation runs behave
qualitatively similar to the base case simulation. The model exhibits an oscil-
latory behavior mode for majority of simulation runs. Most importantly, the
pattern of periodically interrupted economic growth, as well as the oscillations
in Political Power, appears in all of the simulation runs.
Even multivariate sensitivity simulations show that the model’s behavior is
very robust. Fig. 2.4.2 illustrates the result of 200 sensitivity simulations in
which all the selected parameters and initial values were randomly varied simul-
taneously over their selected ranges. The results at the 90% level of confidence
show that the model’s pattern of periodically interrupted economic growth per-
sists irrespective of the values chosen for parameterization and initialization.
Additional sensitivity experiments run on the Katouzian model that are not
presented here reinforce the conclusion that its behavior is very robust. Indeed,
the only parameters that were found to significantly alter the model’s behavior
when varied over a large range of values were: Initial Corruption, Initial Respect
for Law, Society Memory, and Time to Change Power26.
2.4.3 Other validation tests
The Katouzian model was also tested for extreme conditions, behavior anoma-
lies, and surprise behavior, which are all part of the comprehensive list of tests
26The model’s behavior was only significantly altered when the parameters and initial values
were pushed beyond the ranges that are reported in the Appendix A.
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to which system dynamics models are routinely subjected. Of note is that early
versions of the Katouzian model did not pass all of these tests. These failures
were extremely valuable in helping to reveal and understand the system’s fun-
damental dynamics and hence in evolving the model toward its current state.
Fortunately, the version of the model presented in this chapter could pass all
these validation tests successfully.
2.5 Altering Some Key Assumptions
This section presents the results of two simulation experiments run on the Ka-
touzian model which were aimed at determining how sensitive the model’s be-
havior is to changes in some of its fundamental assumptions. The two scenarios
that were examined are: (1) increasing the initial level of Respect for Law from
the base simulation run to determine whether Iran’s arbitrary characteristics
are indeed the major reason why it has historically lagged behind the Western
world’s pace of development and (2) eliminating oil revenue from the base simu-
lation run to determine whether the “arbitrary rule-chaos-arbitrary rule” cycle
exists without oil revenue as Katouzian claims.
2.5.1 Simulation with higher initial Respect for Law
As mentioned earlier, lawfulness in society is one of the fundamental drivers
of economic development in Katouzian’s theory. Stated differently, Katouzian
theorizes that an arbitrary society, and particularly one ruled by an arbitrary
ruler, discourages respect for the law, which in turn impedes economic develop-
ment. The beauty of having a formal simulation model of Katouzian’s theory
is that this central hypothesis can be tested. If Katouzian’s theory is valid,
then an initial model condition in which Iran’s arbitrary power characteristics
are weak should be able to generate a significantly greater pattern of economic
development. To perform this test, the initial value of Respect for Law is in-
creased from 0.05 to 0.2 and the model re-simulated. The new simulation run
is named Higher Initial Respect for Law (HIRL) and its results are shown in
Fig. 2.5.1. An inspection of the figure reveals that compared to the base case
simulation run: (1) Political Power is more stable and political downfalls are
less severe. (2) Respect for Law shifts upward with less frequent oscillations.
(3) The oscillatory behavior of Corruption has a smaller amplitude and a longer
rate of expansion. (4) Chaos declines significantly and is more stable. (5) Fluc-
tuations in public utility are smoother with less frequent oscillations and smaller
amplitudes. (6) Disposable income grows exponentially at a higher rate.
The results of this simulation experiment appear to support Katouzian’s
hypothesis that Iran’s arbitrary characteristics are the major reason why it has
historically lagged behind the Western world’s pace of development.
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2.5.2 Simulation without oil revenue
Another interesting test that can be performed on the Katouzian model in-
volves the well-known theory of the “natural resource curse.” According to
this theory, natural resource abundance is negatively correlated with economic
growth27. Sachs and Warner’s (1995; 2001) cross-sectional data analysis, which
supports this inverse relationship between natural resource abundance and eco-
nomic growth, is one of the most widely cited source. There is also an emerg-
ing literature, including Brunnschweiler (2008) and Brunnschweiler and Bulte
(2008), which argues that the natural resource curse does not exist and, in
fact, resource abundance positively affects economic growth. Thus, as Stijns
(2005) asserts, there is no clear-cut answer in the empirical literature as to
whether natural resource abundance is a “blessing” or a “curse.” Finally, the
resource/growth literature is also saturated with lively debates over the impact
of resource abundance on a society’s political regime28.
The Katouzian model can be used to examine the interactions among oil
revenue and economic, social, and political development in Iran. Since the base
simulation run already includes oil revenue, it can be used as a benchmark
against which a “non-oil” simulation run can be compared. In order to have a
better understanding of the impact of oil revenue on the model’s behavior, it
is necessary to know the magnitude of oil revenue that is incorporated into the
base settings of the model. Fig. 2.5.2 shows that oil revenue starts to grow at
time 100 and continues to grow to about 28% of total State Revenue at time
200.
Fig. 2.5.3 presents a comparison between model simulations in the base run
and in a non-oil revenue run. Although oil revenue clearly makes an enormous
difference to the economic development of Iran (i.e., Iran’s disposable income
is much higher in the base case), the overall behavior of the Katouzian model
stays the same (i.e., Political Power, Respect for Law, Corruption, Chaos, and
public utility all behave essentially the same way in each simulation run). The
salient point is that this simulation result corroborates Katouzian’s claim that
oil revenue does not change the overall behavior of Iran’s socio-political system.
In other words, the same “arbitrary rule-chaos-arbitrary rule” cycle exists with
or without oil revenue.
In order to test the possibility that the simulation results presented in Fig.
2.5.3 are only due to an amount of oil revenue, that is too small to make a
difference, the Non-Oil test was repeated with the base of the Ramp function
increased by a factor of 10. The results of this experiment are shown in Fig.
2.5.4.
Likewise the previous simulation experiment, increased oil revenue has no
significant influence on the long-term oscillatory behavior of the socio-political
system. It does, however, increase Corruption and Chaos. It also reinforces
Political Power, though not decisively. This result is consistent with Katouzian’s
27For recent surveys on this issue, see van der Ploeg (2011); Frankel (2012).
28See for example, Aslaksen (2010); Basedau and Lacher (2006); Brunnschweiler (2008);
Cesari (2011); Karl (1997); Ross (1999, 2001, 2008); Tsui (2011).
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Figure 2.5.1: Ssimulation results of Katouzian’s model (base vs. HIRL)
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Figure 2.5.3: Simulation results of Katouzian’s model (base vs. non-oil)
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Figure 2.5.4: Simulation results of Katouzian’s model (base with tenfold oil
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claim that although oil revenue may strengthen Iranian despotism, it is not
a fundamental cause of it (Katouzian, 1981, pp. 242-243). In terms of the
resource curse, these tests appear to indicate that the “curse” does not exist in
a “Katouzian world.”
2.6 Predictive Scenario Analyses
This section presents the results of three “what-if” controlled experiments tested
on the Katouzian model. The goal is to explore the implications of several
well-known proposals that are aimed at improving the Iranian socio-political-
economic system when applied within a Katouzian framework. The first ex-
periment simulates the consequences of economic sanctions imposed on Iran by
Western nations. The second tests “civil resistance” as a means of socio-political
transformation—a solution widely advocated by Iranian opposition groups. The
third explores the implications of educating the Iranian citizenry so that they
develop a higher level of respect for the law. To perform these tests, the simula-
tion time horizon is extended an additional century, i.e., to time 300. The new
policy changes are applied in year 200 and their impacts traced over the years
200 to 300.
2.6.1 Economic sanctions
The economics literature is awash with theoretical and empirical contributions
that examine the impact of economic sanctions on a nation’s socio-political-
economic system29. Although the majority of the studies conclude that eco-
nomic sanctions do not work as intended, some scholars believe that they can
destabilize a targeted state (Marinov, 2005). In the case of Iran, Amuzegar
(1997) believes that US economic sanctions have had meaningful, although
not decisive, impacts on the Iranian economy. Fayazmanesh (2003), on the
other hand, thinks that sanctions have both harmed the Iranian economy and
strengthened the Iranian state. Torbat (2005) has a different view in that he be-
lieves economic sanctions have hurt the Iranian economy and had only a modest
impact on Iran’s political structure.
Given the mixed results in the literature about the effectiveness of economic
sanctions, it would be interesting to see what the Katouzian model has to say
on the matter. To test economic sanctions, an exogenous limit on Iranian oil
exports is introduced into the model in the simulated year 200. Although quite
simple, this change captures the overall impact of economic sanctions reasonably
well. More specifically, economic sanctions affect the economy through several
channels including financial markets, international trade, internal banking, etc.
29See for example Hoffmann (1967); Daoudi and Dajani (1983); Nincic and Wallensteen
(1983); Tsebelis (1990); Hufbauer et al. (1990, 1997); Elliott and Uimonen (1993); Martin
(1993); Morgan and Schwebach (1997); Pape (1997); Cortright and Lopez (2000, 2002); Mari-
nov (2005); Lektzian and Souva (2007); Peksen and Drury (2010); Escriba`-Folch and Wright
(2010); Bapat et al. (2013).
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Fundamentally, however, economic sanctions limit Iran’s ability to import inter-
mediate goods (i.e., goods that are used in the production of both consumption
and capital goods). This hinders Iran’s domestic industries and increases its rate
of inflation. Combined together, these impacts reduce the purchasing power of
the Iranian people. Given the current level of aggregation in the Katouzian
model, however, these effects are captured by a single factor—a significant de-
cline in the government’s revenue stream due to a loss of oil revenue. This not
only reduces the state’s financial resources, but also decreases the total output of
the economy. One important impact of a reduction in the government’s revenue
that is not explicitly accounted for in the Katouzian model is any social unrest
that might be caused by higher rates of inflation and/or the relative scarcity of
some essential goods such as medicines or specific nutritional products. These
effects are simulated in this experiment by an exogenous decrease in public util-
ity. A more comprehensive analysis of the impact of economic sanctions on the
Iranian socio-political-economic system would require explicit inclusion of all
the aforementioned factors, which is a task that goes far beyond the scope of
this chapter.
The impact of economic sanctions on the Iranian system of political economy
is shown in Fig. 2.6.1. The results of the economic sanctions experiment are
named Sanction in the time series graphs. The comparative plots in Fig. 2.6.1
show that economic sanctions have a considerable impact on the disposable
income of Iranians. They also have a noticeable impact on the behavior of
the socio-political system. Although they have shifted the Political Power of
the state and its stock of Corruption downward, they exacerbate socio-political
instability by increasing Chaos reducing the level of public utility, and increasing
the frequency of the cycle in public utility. The good news, however, is that
economic sanctions have increased Respect for Law, which might be beneficial
in the future.
In sum, the simulation experiment presented in Fig. 2.6.1 indicates that
economic sanctions do not appear to be effective in changing the fundamental
behavior of Iran’s socio-political system. Although they might be able to weaken
Iran’s economy, they appear to be very costly as they generate higher instability.
However, lower average levels of Political Power and Corruption, along with
higher average level of Respect for Law, suggest a generally less arbitrary society
over time.
2.6.2 Civil resistance
It is widely believed that “civil resistance” can facilitate the democratization
of a nation (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). According to this belief, citizen
activism in form of protests, boycotts, civil disobedience, etc., can separate
oppressive regimes from their main sources of power and weaken them over time.
Based on this argument, those who oppose the Iranian government frequently
encourage Iranian citizens to engage in various forms of civil resistance. As
in the case of economic sanctions, the Katouzian model can be used to test
the effectiveness of a civil resistance strategy in changing the socio-political-
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economic dynamics of Iran. This test can be performed by exogenously reducing
the model’s Respect for Law after time 200 and examining the results30. Fig.
2.6.2 shows what happens when this change is introduced into the model.
Results clearly indicate that a reduction in Respect for Law has no favor-
able impact on the Iranian socio-political-economic system. It shifts Chaos
to higher levels and disposable income to lower levels, while at the same time
generating more overall instability by reducing the period of the system’s oscilla-
tions. In fact, by encouraging people to disobey the rule of law, Iran’s culture of
arbitrariness is strengthened. This arbitrariness persists even after the state is
overthrown and, through the mechanisms discussed earlier, it undermines Iran’s
socioeconomic performance in the long run.
2.6.3 Improved respect for law
It is also instructive to look at the problem of Iranian underdevelopment from
the viewpoint of the state. To the state, a favorable system is the one that
performs well economically while at the same time exhibiting political stability
over the long run. Experimentation with the Katouzian model shows that there
are few things that the state can do to sustainably improve the future behavior of
the system in these areas. The one thing that does seem to work to some degree,
however, is to improve Iranian citizens’ respect for the law by, for example,
investing in primary education so as to strengthen this cultural characteristic
in younger generations. In Section 2.6.2, it was shown that a decline in respect
for the law can exacerbate Iran’s culture of arbitrariness. Thus, it makes sense
to check to see if an increase in respect for the law can generate a decline in
arbitrariness. Although it might be seen as paradoxical to assume an arbitrary
state would fight against a culture of arbitrariness, experimentation with the
Katouzian model shows that the state may benefit from this fight. This policy
intervention is tested by exogenously increasing Respect for Law for 10 years
(see Respect for Law in Fig. 2.6.3 from time 200 to time 210). This policy can
be operationalized by, say, increasing investment in primary education with the
focus on the importance of respect for the rule of law. The impact of improving
respect for the law by the citizens of Iran is shown in Fig. 2.6.3.
The economic benefits of this policy emerge after a significant delay (about
20 years). Disposable income starts to take off at about time 220 and grows
significantly faster thereafter. Moreover, this economic growth rate is steadier
than the base case simulation. The political system is also more stable as Chaos
declines significantly, Corruption shifts downward and is steadier, and public
utility is, for the most part, higher and with smaller volatility31. It is also
30In practice, it is difficult to convince a large percent of a nation’s people to engage in
civil resistance. Indeed, respect for the law is a cultural characteristic that cannot be changed
quickly. Nevertheless, it is still worthwhile to see what would happen if increased civil resis-
tance were to occur in Iran because negative results would indicate that this approach should
not be pursued.
31Although at first pass this scenario appears to be the “magic bullet” that fixes everything,
some caution is in order. According to research by Saeed (1986), high economic growth rates
provide the state with financial resources that will mostly be invested in national defense,
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Figure 2.6.1: Impact of economic sanctions on political economy
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Figure 2.6.2: Impact of civil resistance on political economy
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Figure 2.6.3: Impact of policy intervention (improving Respect for Law)
notable that public utility remains below zero until the end of simulation, which
is mostly due to lower levels of freedom since the state is very powerful in this
scenario.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents a system dynamics interpretation of Homa Katouzian’s
theory of Iranian economic development. Katouzian uses a descriptive histori-
cal “case study” to explain the origins and causes of the underdevelopment of
Iran’s socioeconomic system. The model described in this chapter adds value to
Katouzian’s theory by translating it into a quantitative simulation model that
enables it to be formally tested for internal consistency and used for controlled
“what-if” experiments and policy analysis.
In terms of building confidence in the Katouzian model, validation tests
show that its dynamic behavior is consistent with the qualitative behavior of
both Iranian historical data and Iran’s socio-political-economic dynamics as
described by Katouzian in his theory. In terms of simulation experiments, the
effects of both oil revenue and the citizenry’s respect for the rule of law on
Iranian economic development were examined.
As shown in Section 2.5.1, periodic episodes of significant arbitrary power
are key to understanding the historically less-than-optimal behavior of the Ira-
which in turn can hinder future economic growth. This can create a cyclical of political
instability that is fairly common in developing countries. It can be a good exercise for the
future research to see if the inclusion of the mentioned structure can distort the results of this
chapter.
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nian socioeconomic system. Simulation results indicate that if Iran was a less
arbitrary system, it could experience a greater pattern of economic, social, and
political development. The results also show that although oil revenue has
had a substantial impact on the economy, it has had little effect on the over-
all behavior of the Iranian socio-political system. Oil revenue helps the state
to accumulate more power but does not change the generic cycle of “arbitrary
rule-chaos-arbitrary rule.”
Additional simulation experiments examined the impact of economic sanc-
tions and civil resistance on the political economy of Iran. The experiments re-
vealed that, although economic sanctions can influence the economy and weaken
the political system, they are ineffective at reforming the long-term behavior of
the socio-political system or, even worse, might increase the system’s instability.
Civil resistance, which is often advocated by Iranian opposition groups, also
was shown to have an adverse impact on the system. More specifically, it was
shown to have a negative influence on the Iranian economy, while at the same
time reducing the state’s power and thus generating more instability in the
long-term behavior of the system. In fact, by encouraging people to disobey the
law, civil resistance strengthens Iran’s culture of arbitrariness. This arbitrari-
ness persists even after the state is overthrown and undermines socioeconomic
performance in the long run.
From simulations of the Katouzian model, it was possible to generate some
insight into the types of policies that might be effective in improving the dy-
namics of Iran’s socio-political-economic system. The primary finding was that
Iran should invest in improving social norms so that its citizens pay more re-
spect to the rule of law. It was hypothesized that this can be operationalized
by, perhaps, additional investment in primary education.
The purpose of this chapter was to shed some light on the issue of the
underdevelopment of a nation with an unstable socio-political environment using
Katouzian’s theory of Iranian political economy. Therefore, the boundary of the
model was limited to Katouzian’s theory of Arbitrary State and Society. The
analytical capabilities of the model are thoroughly explored and reported in this
chapter. In particular, it is shown that the model—if customized and elaborated
appropriately—can be applied to address the impact of socio-political-economic
factors such as resource abundance, economic sanctions, civil resistance, cultural
transformation, etc., on the system as a whole.
Since the structure of the model presented in this chapter is an interpretation
of Katouzian’s theory of Arbitrary State and Society, the results of any “what-
if” experiments or policy tests are only applicable to a “Katouzian world.” As
such, care must be taken to not apply them to Iran (or any other family member
systems) until a rigorous structural assessment test—considering all available
theoretical and experimental sources of knowledge—has been performed on the
model. In other words, the Katouzian model would need to be enriched with
all of the structural detail necessary to examine any particular issue, irrespec-
tive of whether or not the additional structure is directly part of Katouzian’s
theory, before more general policy conclusions can be reached. The most im-
portant structural enrichment that should be added to the current version of
63
the Katouzian model is most probably social and economic inequality, which is
likely to substantially influence Iran’s socio-political instability. Additionally, a
demographic system, labor markets, educational systems, and financial markets
are among the subsystems that would need to be added to enable the model to
answer additional policy-related questions.
Finally, the results presented in this chapter, even if it is acknowledged that
they are only applicable to a “Katouzian world,” rest on the assumption that
the model accurately and comprehensively captures the richness and uniqueness
of Katouzian’s original work. Since the model was built by reading Katouzian’s
voluminous works, identifying the most important factors, and then translating
those factors into mathematical equations, the possibility exists that this process
was performed imperfectly. In fact, the possibility exists that this process was
performed so imperfectly that the model does not accurately capture the salient
parts of Katouzian’s theory nor does it accurately portray a “Katouzian world.”
Although care was taken to minimize the possibility of a mischaracterization of
Katouzian’s views, confidence in the model can only be achieved over time
as those familiar with the theory of Arbitrary State and Society examine the
model’s structure and run simulation experiments of their own.
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Chapter 3
A System Dynamics Model
for Political Economy of
Natural Resource Curse
3.1 Introduction
Resource curse—negative impact of resource abundance1 on economic growth
rate in a national economy—is still an open question in the literature of eco-
nomic development. Although most papers in the resource curse literature tend
to follow Sachs and Warner’s (1997; 2001) finding that economic growth is neg-
atively associated with the size of resource abundance in a country, but there is
an emerging literature (Brunnschweiler, 2008; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008,
2009; Cavalcanti et al., 2011a,b; Mehlum et al., 2006; Mohaddes and Pesaran,
2013) which argues that not only the so-called resource curse paradox does not
exist, but on the contrary, in some situations resource abundance may positively
affect growth2. Thus, from the empirical literature, there is no clear cut answer
to whether natural resource wealth is a “blessing” or a “curse” (Esfahani et al.,
2014; Frankel, 2012).
1“Resource abundance” in the literature refers to subsoil natural resource wealth. In
contrast, “resource dependence” refers to actual extraction and export of that wealth. In
this chapter we assume that there is a stock of subsoil natural resource wealth which will
be extracted and exported with a given rate. This assumption allows us to use the words
“abundance” and “dependence” interchangeably throughout the chapter because “abundance”
will always lead to “dependency” in our case.
2Variation in the results mainly arises from differences in methodologies and types of data
that each study uses. For instance, some studies perform a cross-country analysis while others
conduct a panel data analysis. See van der Ploeg (2011) for a comprehensive discussion over
this issue.
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3.1.1 Problem significance
The question of natural resource curse may seem to be more of a theoretical
one rather than to be practical. Nevertheless, its implications have significant
influence on real world decisions of policy makers at national, regional, and even
global level. As Keynes writes:
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when
they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is
commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Prac-
tical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intel-
lectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.
Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their
frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure
that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared
with the gradual encroachment of ideas . . .. But, soon or late, it
is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil
(Keynes, 1936, p. 239).
As Davis and Tilton (2008) point it out, based on the lessons learned from
the natural resource curse hypothesis many interventions have been applied
to developmental plans of underdeveloped and developing countries aiming at
limiting resource extraction simply because it was believed that the revenues
from these resources would slow the pace of economic growth down. It should
not be difficult to imagine how destructive this policy could be if the resource
curse hypothesis was wrong. Resource curse also has significant impact on
the global state of socioeconomic welfare. Hypothesized destructive effects of
natural resource abundance such as corruption, civil conflict, under-development
of economic, social, and political systems, in geopolitically important areas such
as Middle East are serious threats to global peace and sustainability. Better
understanding of natural resource curse dynamics will be useful to people of
resource-rich countries as well as to those who may be directly or indirectly
affected by socio-political-economic instability of those countries3.
The problem is meaningful especially when it comes to major oil exporting
countries such as Iran or Saudi Arabia. Having over 157 billion barrels of proven
crude oil and 34 thousand billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves [as of
2014] (OPEC, 2015), Iran is one of the richest countries in terms of fossil fuel
abundance. Average dependency of the Iranian government to oil export during
this period has been about 56%4. Total export value of Iran in 2014 has been
about 99.0 billion dollars. Oil export has been valued 53.6 billion dollars during
the same period i.e. share of oil in total exports of the country has been about
54%. And, this is only a diluted, misleading rate because oil revenue has been
declining significantly during recent years due to targeted sanctions. Data that
3To learn about negative effects of instability on economic performance of societies see
Alesina and Perotti (1994); Alesina et al. (1996); Aisen and Veiga (2013).
4This is based on our calculation from formal data published by Iran’s Central Bank (CBI,
2015).
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Mohaddes and Pesaran (2013) have collected show an average of about 80% for
the share of oil in total exports of Iran from 1960 to 2010. Farzanegan (2009)
reports this rate to be around 90%. Average share of oil revenues in Iranian
GDP, during 1959-2010, has been about 19%5.
These figures, in general, show a chronical dependency of Iranian economy
to oil revenues. Many other resource-rich nations follow similar patterns6. Nev-
ertheless, this size of dependency on oil revenues may or may not be beneficial
to socio-economic welfare of citizens. While oil revenues could fuel development
programs through investment in infrastructure and financing public welfare ini-
tiatives such as expansion of free higher education, funding modern health-care
systems, improving transportation network, etc., they might also bring with
themselves corruption, dictatorship, inflation, destruction of domestic indus-
tries, and so on. In other words, the question here is that “are the resource
revenues worth it or not?” This is, in fact, the question that this chapter tries
to address.
3.1.2 Urge for a fresh look
One important issue with the current literature is the narrow—and sometimes
ambiguous—definition of “curse” that is usually employed by researchers. It
is na¨ıve to decide that natural resource wealth is “bad” only because it may
hinder economic growth. Recent studies in the fields of behavioral economics
and psychology has revealed that social utility (happiness) is a more complex
function than what conventional macroeconomic models tend to use (Layard,
2005; Frey and Stutzer, 2010).
Another issue is that the current methodologies—mainly econometrics—are
inadequate to address such a nonlinear, feedback-rich, and dynamically complex
problem7. Lucas (1976) argues that econometric models are not accurate repre-
sentation of the current economic structure, nor appropriate for policy analysis
in a dynamic environment. If, for any reason, policies change, economic agents
would adjust their behavior accordingly. Econometric models cannot take such
feedback mechanism into account effectively. Sims (1980) also believes that
macroeconometric models are prone to identification problem and their policy
recommendations must be treated with care. Leamer (1983), shows that how
prior opinion about a particular identification can distort the outcome of an
econometric estimation. He concludes that while econometric approach is ef-
fective for experimental analyses, it is not so for non-experimental (natural)
settings. But, it is almost impossible to create an absolutely controlled exper-
imental environment to test hypotheses about “natural resource curse” prob-
lem in a natural setting over long-term periods. Furthermore, even carefully
designed econometric studies could still suffer from lack of reliable data8. Un-
5See footnote 4.
6See e.g. historical data from OPEC (2015) for the case of oil and natural gas.
7For a summary of fundamental fallacies of econometrics in addressing socioeconomic prob-
lems, see (Solheim, 2005) and (Hollanders, 2011).
8Some even believe that measurement of economic variables is not accurate enough for a
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reliable data, especially in underdeveloped—-and many developing—-countries,
may pervert the results of these analyses (Griliches, 1984; Amuzegar, 1983,
1997). Without reliable data, econometrics will be futile. Quantity of data is
also an important limitation for the problem of “natural resource curse” if one
wishes to perform a comprehensive analysis. Scale of this particular problem
is large and it requires a relatively large system of simultaneous equations. To
estimate such a system, considerable degrees of freedom will be lost inevitably.
Alternatively, one could estimate a reduced form of the equation system but
then the connection between the model and the real world policy space would
be broken.
Indeed, the problem of “natural resource curse” is dynamically complex and
a systems perspective to the issue is desperately needed. Most of research efforts
in this area deploy an static approach by assuming many relevant factors to be
constant over time. However, this is not an effective approach. As (Katouzian,
1979, p. 13) writes:
Other things remaining equal, the oil countries are in the most
favourable position for the transformation of their socio-economic
entities within a reasonable period of time. But it was postulated
that other things are unlikely to remain equal, so that there may
be better and worse ways of achieving this; or, indeed, completely
missing the boat!
System dynamics—or simulation, in general—seems to be a superior ap-
proach for this dynamically complex problem. It allows us to include a large
set of simultaneous equations in the analysis without being worried about lost
degrees of freedom. System dynamics models generate macro behavior from
a micro structure which resolves Lucas’ and Sims’ critiques (Forrester, 1989).
Moreover, reliance of system dynamics—or simulation—models on formal data
is not significant. Therefore, lack of formal data in developing countries will not
affect the analyses.
But, system dynamicists have paid little attention to this particular problem
so far. Although many energy-economy modeling efforts have been made using
system dynamics approach9, there have been only four studies relevant to the
problem of “natural resource curse.” Ali Naghi Mashayekhi in his Ph.D. disser-
tation (1978) investigates dependency of the Iranian economy to oil revenues.
Erling Moxnes, also in his Ph.D. dissertation (1983), addresses the same issue
for the Norwegian economy. Both of these studies are focused on the Dutch
Disease as the main impact of resource revenues10. Arif and Saeed (1989) ad-
dress the transition of Indonesia from an oil-dependent economy to one that is
scientific study (Morgenstern, 1963).
9For recent reviews of the literature see (Kiani et al., 2010; Leopold, 2015).
10Mashayekhi does not include real exchange rates explicitly in his model. So, one may argue
that Dutch Disease is not reflected in his work. However, the core mechanism in his theory
that—through import of intermediate goods—makes the economy addicted to oil revenues
and weakens domestic industries, is considered to be a manifestation of the Dutch Disease
theory.
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independent of such non-renewable natural resources. Mashayekhi (1998) in-
vestigates the dynamics of government financial structure and public services in
the course of economic development based upon oil exports. All these models
focus exclusively on pure economic factors ignoring socio-political aspect of the
resource curse.
3.1.3 Scope
Although purely economic aspects of the problem such as Dutch Disease and
volatility of commodity prices are widely investigated, but softer facets of the
issue such as socio-political consequences of natural resource wealth are not fully
understood. Therefor, this chapter is focused on the socio-political-economic
effects of resource abundance11. It contributes to the literature by providing
a unique comprehensive dynamic model that endogenously captures different
facets of the natural resource curse phenomenon in one single package. These
facets are:
• Dutch disease—appreciation of real exchange rate due to natural re-
source windfall which eventually leads to deindustrialization of the econ-
omy (Corden, 1984; Forsyth and Kay, 1981);
• Temporary loss in learning by doing as a result of declining traded
sector (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Gylfason et al., 1999; Torvik, 2001);
• Corruption—natural resource windfall could corrupt the political sys-
tem and consequently hinders the economic growth (Ades and Di Tella,
1999; Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Isham et al.,
2005). This is particularly significant in nondemocratic regimes (Collier
and Hoeﬄer, 2009);
• Volatility of commodity prices—instability of natural resource wealth
due to sudden changes in commodity prices or resource discoveries leads
to boom and bust cycles (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; van der Ploeg and
Poelhekke, 2009, 2010);
• Rent seeking—natural resource wealth could encourage rent seeking be-
havior leading to a less productive economic state (Gelb, 1988; Lane and
Tornell, 1996; Auty, 2001);
• Conflict—natural resource windfall may lead to socio-political turmoil
or even armed conflict (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004; Fearon, 2005; Basedau
and Lay, 2009; Lujala, 2010);
11We approach the “natural resource curse” problem primarily from a social-political econ-
omy point of view and thus, even though we realize that many economists address the problem
by way of the “impossible trinity” (Mundell-Fleming trilemma) (Dornbusch, 1976), our model
does not include a detailed monetary sector and hence is not able to approach the problem
this way.
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• Suboptimal policies—short-sightedness of state actors causes excessive
borrowing, over-generosity in public welfare expenditures, and abuse of
resource wealth (Ross, 1999).
In addition, the concept of “natural resource curse” is revisited and a new,
more comprehensive definition of the term is provided. Based on the new defi-
nition and the explanations provided above a dynamic hypothesis is developed
and tested with a large set of Monte Carlo simulations. Simulation results show
that the curse is unlikely—not impossible though—to happen in most of socio-
political-economic settings. Finally, aggregate level strategies that can mitigate
the significance of the resource curse is explored. In this regard, Section 3.2 de-
scribes the model structure. Simulation results and model analyses are reported
in Section 3.3. And, Section 3.4 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Model Structure
Model that is developed here is indeed an eclectic theory which stands on the
shoulder of several other well-established theories. In other words, different
pieces of the puzzle are put together to provide a more comprehensive, reli-
able theory for understanding the dynamics of natural resource curse. It is
recognized that economists may address the problem by way of the “impos-
sible trinity” or “Mundell-Fleming trilemma” (Fleming, 1962; Mundell, 1963)
However, our model approaches the problem from a social-political economy
perspective. Moreover, due to the relatively short-term nature of monetary
policies, including them in our system of equations may cause the system to
become stiff. Therefore, the model excludes a detailed monetary sector.
This section reveals the model’s structure in an aggregate manner12. Based
on the theories mentioned in Section 3.1.3 a dynamic hypothesis is developed.
The most immediate impact of oil export is the appreciation of real exchange
rate. This causes a decline in the utility of exports while imports are encouraged.
As a result, private sector production of traded goods will stagnate. Higher rates
of unemployment force the government to employ unemployed workforce with
a greater pace than it otherwise would do. This results in an over-expansion
of government sector relative to the private sector. Greater state control over
economic resources of the society generates an unusually powerful state which
limits socioeconomic freedom. Decline of freedom undermines system of checks
and balances, hence, creating a corruption-prone environment. Corrupt gover-
nance, weakens domestic production, and lack of socioeconomic freedom ruins
economic and political legitimacy of the state and creates sociopolitical unrest.
Social chaos discourages private investment and worsens the economic perfor-
mance. Economic recession declines wage rates that reduces economic power of
the middle class. This harms development of the civil society and worsens the
problems of corruption and chaos. Higher corruption and chaos, as described
12Details of the equations and their references are reported in Appendix C.
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earlier, exacerbate the economic difficulties even further. To maintain the de-
clined level of social welfare, government increases public expenditures either as
government investment or transfer payments. Overspending in public services
pushes the burden on government financial resources and leads to foreign debt
which puts stress on the political system. This feeds back to the sociopolitical
system and triggers a vicious cycle that could be called the “natural resource
curse.” However, what is usually underestimated in many natural resource
curse theories is existence of balancing feedback mechanisms in social systems.
For example, as population of rent-seekers and corrupt government agents in-
creases, rent per capita that could be grabbed by each of them declines. This
reduces financial incentives for both current and potential rent-seekers and cor-
rupt agents. Indeed, there is always a limit to growth. Another less appreciated
mechanism is the relative growth of middle class power due to expansion of pub-
lic expenditure, especially through free or low cost higher education provided by
the resource revenue. This mechanism helps the process of democratization in
the long-term and alleviates some negative aspects of the resource dependency.
Theory that is developed in this chapter includes all of these facets as en-
dogenous components of the model. The only exogenous variable is the volatility
of commodity prices. Different scenarios, however, could be tested to capture
the impact of commodity price instability. In fact, the emphasis of the model
is on socio-political aspect of the natural resource curse problem. As George
Soros puts it:
The resource curse is a complex phenomenon. Three different
processes come into play . . ., Dutch Disease . . ., fluctuation in
commodity prices and its disruptive effects . . ., and the effect on
political conditions. The first two are purely economics and have
been studied extensively. It is the third factor that needs to be
better understood, especially as its impact is far greater than that
of the other two.” [George Soros, on the foreword of “Escaping the
resource curse” (Humphreys et al., 2007)]
The model consists of 8 modules which dynamically interact with each other,
as shown in Fig. 3.2.1. The modules are employment, private investment, gov-
ernment investment, income, price and wage, foreign exchange, [state political]
power and control, and oil. “Employment” module determines the allocation of
workforce to different production sectors. Resource allocation scheme depends
on private and government investment. Capital (calculated in the “investment”
modules) as well as labor (calculated in the “employment” module) are main
inputs to the “income” module which determines total output of the economy,
national income, and its distribution. “Price and wage” module yields the wage
rate of the working class as well as price indexes for both traded and non-traded
goods and services. Price and wage are then used in the “investment” modules
to indicate profit of capital owners. This will affect the private investments.
“Foreign exchange” module includes international trade system as well as a
simplified international financial market. This module is also responsible for
attractiveness of imports and exports. Economic condition, in addition to some
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other factors, affect the political power of the government which is presented
in the “state power and control” module. This module also determines the
state’s controlling power. The state controlling power then influences quality of
governance as well as allocation of resources. “Oil” module includes exogenous
scenarios of export of oil. Oil revenues flow into the “foreign exchange” and
“government investment” modules to feed the system’s dynamics. Following
sections look inside of each module.
Employment:
- social mobility
- workforce adjustment
- corruption
- civil institutions
Private Investment:
- capital accumulation
- consumption
- savings
Government Investment:
- capital accumulation
- budget allocation
- transfer payments
- tax collection
Income:
- allocation of production factors
- traded goods production
- non-traded goods production
- income allocation
State Power & Control:
- economic performance
- governance quality
- state popularity
- social chaos
- freedom
Oil
Price & Wage:
- traded goods price
- non-traded goods price
- working class wage rate
Foreign Exchange:
- exports
- imports
- exchange rate
- foreign debt
Figure 3.2.1: Overview of the natural resource curse model structure
3.2.1 Employment
There are two major production factors in the model: labor and capital13 This
module is responsible for allocation of labor to different production sectors in-
cluding private and government sectors.
Three main employment states in the model are: “private workforce,” “gov-
ernment workforce,” and “unemployed” workforce. This selection is important
because first, unemployment needs to be tracked. Second, the private sector
13More recent economic growth models usually include other factors such as “education”
too. For the sake of simplicity, only labor and capital are chosen to be included in this
first version of the model. Future modeling effort could add other factors to examine what
difference they can make.
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must be distinguished from the government sector for the movement of pro-
duction factors to the government sector—which is assumed to be less efficient
than the private sector—due to greater state political and economic power that
is made possible from natural resource wealth could be an explanation of the
natural resource curse.
Some theories attribute the natural resource curse to development of cor-
ruption and rent-seeking behavior which leads to sub-optimal policies regarding
the extraction and export of natural resources (Auty, 2001; Isham et al., 2005).
To capture dynamics of corruption and rent-seeking behavior, two additional
employment states are included: “corrupt officers”—a subdivision of govern-
ment workforce that is engaged in corrupt activities—and parasites—a division
of workforce population that is engaged in rent-seeking behavior14. To control
corruption and rent-seeking behavior, societies must strengthen their civil in-
stitutions that are the most effective system of checks and balances (Acemoglu
et al., 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Mehlum et al., 2006). The sixth
and final employment state of the model is “civil activists” as representative of
civil institutions. More precisely, civil activities are defined here to be non-profit
activities in order to improve citizen’s social life and to correct social injustice.
There is no such sharp contrast between different employment states in the
real world. If we think of these employment states as fractions of time an indi-
vidual spends on them, then the deployed division makes sense. For example, a
government employee might do his/her job very well and within the boundaries
of law but accepts bribes once in a while—say, 1% of the time. A government
with 100 of such employees could be represented in our model with 99 persons
in the state of “government workforce” and 1 person in the state of “corrupt
officers.” Same logic applies to the other states15. Few of us—if any—might
work full-time as a civil activist. A fraction of our time, nonetheless, may be
spent on civil activities.
The model starts in equilibrium so none of the employment states change
until some exogenous factors disturb the equilibrium—a natural resource wind-
fall is perhaps the best case of disturbance that we could think of. As distur-
bance occurs, employment states could change in order to reach a new balance.
“Private workforce” depends on private investment rate. As the private sec-
tor increases its investment, more workforce would be required. The same rule
applies to “government workforce” i.e. more “government investment” would
require more “government workforce.” The government, however, requires hu-
man resource for two different purposes: production and control. In addition to
its main responsibility (control) the government allocates some of its resources
to production of goods and services which could include both public and traded
goods and services. Level of human resources the government needs for control
depends on the condition of national security. If sociopolitical chaos is signif-
icant, the government would need more resources so it tries to recruit more
14Saeed et al. (2013) call this division of population as “bandits.” “Bandits” do not have a
normal job but earn income by participating in illegal, criminal, or corrupt activities.
15Another way to think of this division is to consider the content of each employment state
as FTEs (full-time equivalents).
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workforce. The government decision for hiring workforce is also affected by the
government financial situation. A government with limited budget would hire
less than a government with ample financial resources would do. Different gov-
ernments may respond differently to a budget constraint. Some might be more
frugal and hence have higher sensitivity to the budget limitations. Others might
be more careless in this regard. The model is able to test different policy rules
to capture this variation. Fig. 3.2.2 demonstrates an example of such variation
in hiring policy by different governments.
Corruption is defined here as an aggregate measure of all sorts of illegal ac-
tivities practiced by government officials that could lead to distortion of normal
distribution of scarce resources16. Corruption rate in the model depends on two
factors: attractiveness of corrupt activities and transparency. Attractiveness
of corruption is assumed to be equal to attractiveness of illegal activities. An
incentive for such activities generates incentives for government officials to get
involved in corruption. For instance, if there is a considerable stake in drug
trafficking then dealers may be willing to offer notable bribes to border patrol
agents. All other factors remaining unchanged, likelihood of corruption increases
in such cases.
Transparency is another factor affecting the rate of corruption (Kolstad and
Wiig, 2009). A transparent society is less susceptible to corruption. Some
scholars believe that a broader set of factors aggregated in the concept of “good
institutions”17 are responsible for the magnitude of corruption (Mehlum et al.,
2006; Robinson et al., 2014). More generally, “good institutions” help to make
better policies. Central banks, for example, are very important social institu-
tions and their decisions may impact consequences of natural resource wealth
through the channels described by the Dutch Disease theory. Good central
banks may implement policies that help resource rich societies harvest the ben-
efits of natural resource wealth18. Magnificence of good institutions, on the
other hand, is determined by the level of civil right activities.
Good institutions are developed and maintained by the civil society. Benev-
olent dictatorship could also help to develop good institutions but those insti-
tutions may not last for long if the civil society has not developed to maturity
(Langarudi and Radzicki, 2015). Civil activities, nonetheless, could be bounded
by level of freedom and economic welfare of the working class. Freedom is an
indicator for coercion of the state. High levels of freedom show relatively high
tolerance of the government towards the society and its activism. A coercive
government limits the space for civil activism19(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005).
16See Søreide (2014) for a comprehensive conceptual overview.
17Good institutions are those social settings which foster socio-political-economic growth
while bad institutions encourage rent-seeking and other harmful social behavior (Mehlum
et al., 2006).
18Central bank policies are intertwined in the “impossible trinity” or “Mundell-Fleming
trilemma” but our model does not go into such level of details. The assumption, however,
is that “good central banks” pick those combinations of the “trilemma” that have the best
short-term and long-term impact on the economy
19One may argue that lack of freedom may also encourage civil activism. That might be true
if we limit the definition of civil activism to be relevant only to political matters. Nevertheless,
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Economic welfare of the working class is important for civil activism. A poor
working class struggling with economic difficulties hardly could allocate time
and resources to civil activities (Oliver, 1999).
Parts of workforce population become “parasites” depending on how attrac-
tive it is to become a “parasite”20(Saeed et al., 2013). This can happen to
any of the employment states explained above but unemployed workforce have
more incentives than the employed people to become parasites. Attractiveness
of being parasite is an indicator of potential financial gains of getting involved
in illegal activities—more on this in Section 3.2.4.
3.2.2 Private Investment
This module simulates the process of capital accumulation in the private sector.
It also includes the private sector’s consumption. Investment of the private
sector depends on availability of financial resources, profitability of production
within the sector (discussed in Section 3.2.4), and level of sociopolitical chaos.
Financial reserves are fueled mainly from private savings. A fraction of dis-
posable income will be saved every year and the rest will be consumed. A
nonlinear consumption function determines this income allocation process en-
dogenously. Fig. 3.2.3 e.g. shows that how different levels of income could
affect the consumption—and thus, saving—under different scenarios. As we
will see all these scenarios will be tested in a comprehensive set of sensitivity
simulations.
Chaos harms private investment. Here the term “chaos” is defined as unlaw-
ful behavior of citizens in all levels of a society. This includes, theft, violence,
arbitrary government actions, tax evasion, or any other kind of action that
breaks the rule of law. As chaos increases average cost of investment increases
which leads to lower rates of investment (Alesina et al., 1996; Dixit, 2007; Hag-
gard and Tiede, 2011; Aisen and Veiga, 2013).
3.2.3 Government Investment
Government investment is a little different from the private investment. Gov-
ernment does not take profitability into account when it comes to investment.
Instead, it considers public needs and availability of public funds. Government
reacts to unemployment rate as an indicator for health of the economy. For
example, Neary and Wijnbergen (1985) describe how the Dutch government
responded to high unemployment rates by injecting natural resource revenues
into the economy which ultimately led to the “Dutch Disease.” As unemploy-
ment rises the government increases its investment in order to compensate for
the term “civil activism” here refers to a broader concept that encompasses other areas such
as environmental, cultural, economic, and social issues. It is assumed that in presence of
a coercive government total “civil activism” becomes less significant, distribution of forces
within the body of civil activist community may align towards political issues though.
20We define the variable “parasites” as a part of human resources that is allocated to
extraction and consumption of the society’s resources without contributing to its production
or to any engagement that might be harmful—one way or another—for the rest of the society.
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the shortage of private investment. If unemployment rate declines, government
funds will be used differently. The module is formulated to provide a wide range
of alternative state policies for the case of government investment in response
to the unemployment. Fig. 3.2.4 depicts some examples of these alternative
policies.
Beside investment, the government has to spend on transfer payments and
wages of its workforce. Wage payments will be discussed in Section 3.2.5. It
is assumed that governments—particularly in developing countries—increase
transfer payments in case of a natural resource windfall. However, they do not
react symmetrically when the opposite happens i.e. when government revenues
decline for whatever reason (Karl, 1997, 1999). It is because citizens become
accustomed to a certain level of consumption and any reduction in that level of
consumption could cause a significant decline in public satisfaction which may
not be very desirable for any government21. Transfer payments mainly depend
on availability of government financial reserves. Another factor, however, is the
government’s perception of its own popularity. If the government realizes that
the citizens are not satisfied with the current state of governance, a compensa-
tion in the form of transfer payments may be launched (Karl, 1997). Different
transfer payments adjustment policies in reaction to popularity of the govern-
ment could be tested by the provided experimental tools in the model. Some
governments might be more responsive while others may be reluctant to change.
Although financial restriction may force governments to limit their public ex-
penditures and transfer payments, but it is assumed that higher than normal
popularity will not cause a decline in such payments i.e. government popularity
might have an asymmetric impact on transfer payments.
Another factor influencing the transfer payments is financial status of the
government. Although the government can have budget deficit for short- and
mid-term but expenditure and investment must be covered by stream of revenues
in the long-term22. Government revenues consist of tax and revenues from
production of goods and services23 which includes production and export of
natural resources24.
An important property of a natural resource bonanza aftermath—in par-
ticular, for the case of developing (or underdeveloped) nations with democratic
political system—is that authorities receiving these revenues spend them to gain
short-term political benefits (Robinson et al., 2006). For instance, they cut tax
rates, or—as mentioned earlier—increase public expenditures. Thus, tax rate
in the model is a function of financial status of the government. If government
financial status improves, tax rate declines. The opposite could also happen but
a rise in the tax rate does not necessarily translate into higher tax revenues. In
21Popularity is particularly crucial for democratic governments in which politicians seek
people’s votes(Andersen and Aslaksen, 2008).
22Despite Post-Keynesian theory of money which relaxes this assumption considering no
limit for authorities to issue money (Wray, 2015), we believe that in reality, governments try
to achieve—at least a long-run—balance for their budget.
23While this may not be significant for capitalist economies, resource-rich developing coun-
tries usually have a large government-owned production sector.
24Government production is discussed in Section 3.2.4
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Figure 3.2.5: Effect of government popularity on transfer payments
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fact, it requires a powerful, legitimate government to collect taxes (Katouzian,
1997). Again, the model provides a flexible set of tools to examine a wide verity
of scenarios and policy approaches in this regard.
Another important determinant of government tax revenues is total taxable
economic output. Taxable output includes those economic activities that could
be traced and taxed by the government. Underground economy or those activ-
ities performed by the parasites are naturally excluded from this definition.
3.2.4 Income
“Income” module calculates production of goods and services in both private
and government sectors. It then distributes income and generates a rough mea-
sure of income equality. Although income equality might not be a complete
measure of equality in general (Allison, 1978), but it is certainly a crucial fac-
tor. The goal of this chapter is not to investigate the inequality issues, so, only
a simple measure of equality is used here. This sacrifice has been made for com-
pactness of the model. Equality measure in this model is shown by the ratio
of wages paid to the working class to total income of the society (wages, profit,
and parasite exploitations)25.
Income of parasites depends on how much they can exploit the economy
which is in turn a function of three other factors: (a) availability of economic
resources for exploitation, (b) the extent to which exploitation are tolerated (or
controlled) by authorities, and (c) level of corruption26. As (effective) controlling
power of the government increases, parasites will have less freedom to exploit
the economy. As economy becomes richer, ceteris paribus, a greater opportu-
nity would be provided for parasites to exploit it. Corrupt government agents
have stake in the exploitation of parasites—e.g. through bribes (Søreide, 2014).
Therefore, corruption also helps the expansion of exploitation. Finally, natu-
ral resource revenues are extra bonus for parasites. According to Karl (1997,
1999), these rents are even easier to be captured by parasites, thus, providing
significant incentives for the rent-seekers.
For the sake of simplicity, the only source of income for the capital owners
is assumed to be profit from production. Profit is simply the difference between
production value and total wage that is paid to the labor. Total output of
the economy consists of government and private production given by a Cobb-
Douglas function. Goods and services produced in the economy are classified
into two categories: traded and non-traded. This is to capture the impact of
25For simplicity, it is assumed that wage is the only source of income for the working class
while profit is the only source of income for the capital owners. For a more precise computation
of income equality, a per capita index must be used. Nevertheless, the model does not trace
class population so at this stage it is not possible to have an equality index based on income
per capita of different classes. Instead it is assumed that relative population of classes remain,
more or less, constant over the simulation period. With this assumption total income of classes
could be sufficient to yield a rough approximation of income equality.
26The factors (a) and (b) are adopted from Saeed et al. (2013). The factor (c) is added
in order to capture the quality of institutions and its impact on political economy of natural
resource curse which is one of the most important explanation of the “curse” phenomenon.
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natural resource windfall on reallocation of production factors which results in
the decline of production of traded goods and service in favor of non-traded
goods and services. Relative price indexes in traded and non-traded sectors
determine the fraction of production capacity that must be allocated to each
sector.
One important aspect of the Dutch Disease theory which has been particu-
larly highlighted in the system dynamics literature (Mashayekhi, 1978; Moxnes,
1983) is that a reallocation of resources from traded goods to non-traded goods
sector could significantly harm the economy due to the lost experience in the
production of traded goods. This is one of the explanations for the natural
resource curse (Gylfason et al., 1999; Torvik, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 2001)
and a simple mechanism of experience accumulation/decumulation is employed
to capture it.
Finally, the more the parasites earn the more attractive it becomes for others
to follow their footsteps (Saeed et al., 2013). The attractiveness of such activities
including rent seeking could be given by the comparison between parasite income
and average income earned by the working class.
3.2.5 Price & Wage
“Price & Wage” is the module that yields wage rate of the society’s working
class as well as prices of goods and services. Wage rate is affected by unem-
ployment rate which is used as a proxy for the labor demand-supply ratio. As
unemployment increases wage rates decline. In contrast, a decline in unemploy-
ment rate puts pressure on wage rates to increase. These adjustments happen
after a delay though. All sorts of wage stickiness could be examined in the
model.
This module also includes the mechanism of changes in price index in two
markets: traded and non-traded goods and services. This mechanism which
takes a delay is based on a supply-demand ratio and is similar in both markets.
Different scenarios for price stickiness could also be applied.
Demand is a simple equation based on Keynesian national accounting includ-
ing non-oil exports (only for traded goods and services), private and government
investment, and consumption. Supply of goods and services includes domestic
supply. This also includes imports for traded goods.
3.2.6 Foreign Exchange
Foreign exchange rate could be affected by many political and economic factors.
Mashayekhi (1991), particularly, examines the dynamics of foreign exchange in
an oil exporting country. In our model, however, the main factor influencing the
exchange rate is the balance between supply and demand of foreign exchange
in the domestic economy. Any other factor will be exogenous according to the
model’s boundary so must be excluded from the analysis. Stickiness of foreign
exchange rate could also be implemented in the model.
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While imports and other international payments create demand for foreign
exchange, exports and other international earnings constitute foreign exchange
supply. An appreciation (depreciation) of real exchange rate encourages (dis-
courages) imports and discourages (encourages) exports. International trade
is also limited by trade capacity. International trade requires various types of
transportation infrastructure including harbors, airports, transit highways, etc.
as well as facilities such as border customs and trade institutions. These take
time to develop. In addition to trade capacity constraints, adequacy of foreign
exchange reserves impose limitation on imports.
According to Mashayekhi (1998), societies could become accustomed to cer-
tain levels of imports. While dependency to imports could expand easily, it
would be relatively difficult to reduce that level of dependency.
Finally, if the country is short of foreign exchange they can borrow from in-
ternational financial markets. Nevertheless, interest must be paid on the funds
that are borrowed. These funds add to the foreign exchange reserves, so that
imports or other obligations could be financed. Borrowing depends on avail-
ability of foreign exchange and on the level of debt. If the availability is low,
the country borrows more and vice versa. High level of debt is another limiting
factor. As the level of debt increases it becomes more and more difficult to
borrow. It is assumed that interest rate in international markets is constant.
Of course, it is not constant in the real world. However, factors that affect this
rate are outside of the model’s boundary. Thus, its inclusion only adds to the
model’s complexity but not much value to our analysis.
3.2.7 State Power & Control
“State power” module computes magnitude of the political power that is con-
trolled by the government. This is an index between 0 an 1 where 0 represents
no political power at all while 1 represents absolute power of the government.
State power depends on popularity of the state and utility of political power in
the society. It also depends on controlling power of the state. These assump-
tions should be adequate for representing democratic as well as non-democratic
political systems. Elasticity of political system, frequency and pace of political
change, all can be modified exogenously to test different situations. In fact,
this module of the model can take a wide range of assumptions in order to fit
different political agendas.
Government here could be a ruling individual, family, tribe, or party. The
model does not distinguish between different rulers at different times and places
because individual characteristics of the ruling class is not of importance for the
analysis of this study. In other words, form of the state does not matter. Rather,
its political power matters the most. Consequently, simulation results do not
show explicit competition between political parties. It only shows dynamics of
incumbent ruler’s political power which is called here as “state” or “government”
interchangeably.
According to the Katouzian’s theory of arbitrary state and society (Lan-
garudi and Radzicki, 2015), popularity of the government provides it with the
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opportunity to gain more political power. So, higher state popularity makes a
political rise more likely. Utility of political power is another factor affecting the
state power. As symptoms of social chaos, say crime rates, increase in a society,
utility of a powerful government who could control the chaos increases27. This
could generate a space for the government to seize more power. Chaos works
as a double edged sword, though. Beside its positive impact on the utility of
power, it could reduce political power by damaging political legitimacy of the
government, and hence undermining its popularity. Controlling power of the
government is also important to protect its political power. A government with
significant controlling power could stay longer at helm. Finally, it is assumed
that foreign debt increases pressure on the government and reduces its domes-
tic and international negotiation—and thus, political—power (Thompson, 2007;
Dyson, 2014).
Chaos is an indicator of arbitrariness in the society (Katouzian, 1997). Here
chaos is defined as any form of activity that breaks the rule of law in a society or
any phenomenon that considerably undermines the social order. Chaos in the
model depends on population of people who may break the rule of law. That
includes parasites and corrupt government officers. If their population increases,
chaotic incidents become more likely to happen. The state popularity also plays
a role in chaos. A less popular state is more likely to experience chaotic behavior
of citizenry (Katouzian, 1997).
Popularity of the state originates from a function that tracks performance of
the government. If a government fails to function at a reasonable level, its pop-
ularity declines. Good governance should maintain social welfare and security
(Wolff, 2006). Classical political philosophers like Bentham and Mill believe that
people should expect the government to provide the public good which consists
of these elements: providing subsistence, producing abundance, favoring equal-
ity, and maintaining security (Held, 1990, p. 24). Classical macroeconomics, in
contrast, is founded on an implicit premise that social welfare function includes
only inflation and unemployment. As we will see in Section 3.3, based on re-
cent advancement in sciences such as behavioral economics and psychology, the
model here assumes more components including freedom, justice, income equal-
ity, consumption, public safety and security, and leisure. Here, the government
performance is divided into two broad categories: economic performance and
political performance. These are not indicators of actual performance of the
state but rather perception of the public of how the government is performing.
This perception may be right or wrong.
Economic performance of the government consists of three different elements.
First element is unemployment. Government, especially in the resource-rich
countries, is expected to lead the national economy towards full employment.
Any unemployment rate above the natural level would cause social discontent.
Second element affecting the image of the state popularity is the real consump-
tion. Government can change level of consumption in the society through trans-
27Many political philosophers believe that the most crucial function of the state is to provide
safety and security for its subjects and to ensure protection of all things held within its territory
(Held, 1990).
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fer payments or other public expenditures and investments. In a real-world case
this can also contain a wide variety of public services such as health, education,
etc. Considering the model’s level of aggregation, all these government expen-
ditures are reflected in the real consumption per capita. At the same time,
this variable represents the effect of inflation too. As prices increase, real con-
sumption declines, ceteris paribus. Subsequently, economic performance of the
government declines. People either compare their situation with their past or
with others’ situation (Frey and Stutzer, 2010). So, the next element is income
equality. A decline in equality negatively impacts social welfare (Easterlin, 2001;
Oishi et al., 2011) and thus, ruins the state popularity.
As mentioned earlier, providing peace and safety is considered to be the
most important political functionality of the government. Freedom must not be
sacrificed though. In fact, the government needs to control chaos for maintain-
ing public satisfaction but this control should not reduce freedom since it is a
crucial factor affecting happiness of the society (Frey and Stutzer, 2000, 2010),
otherwise, the governance quality declines. The perception of security, freedom,
or any other political performance measures could adapt to new circumstances
(Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; Frey and Stutzer, 2010; Saeed et al., 2013).
Hence, political performance is a comparison of current and remembered level
of governance quality.
A positive interpretation of political freedom is used here to define the term
“freedom” as free exercise of social and group political rights without the fear of
coercion or oppression28. From this perspective, freedom is mainly constrained
by the coercive force of the government, thus negatively related to the state
controlling power. However, a powerful government does not necessarily limit
freedom. The coerciveness of the government could be affected by the extent to
which it relies on taxes as a source of revenue. A government with considerable
revenues from external sources such as natural resources is less reliant on—thus,
less accountable to—the public (Ross, 2001, 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson,
2005). The significance of each of these effects might differ for different political
systems. The model provides tools to capture these differences.
Controlling power of the state is a function of the government’s share of
the society’s resources. The more the government owns of total resources of
the society the more powerful it becomes. This power is also affected by the
government decision on how these resources are used. The more the resources
are allocated to control (vs. production) the more controlling power the state
would have.29(Saeed et al., 2013). Political power of the government is another
crucial factor to determine controlling power of the state. A government with-
out effective political leadership will not be able to elicit full potential of its
controlling resources (Held, 1990).
The way the government allocates its resources is based on comparison be-
tween its own economic and political performance. If political performance is
relatively low, i.e. (based on our definition) government is not very successful
28see Berlin (1990) for a philosophical discussion on the issue.
29Only non-corrupt government workforce contribute to the control resources.
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in maintaining stability, peace, safety, and security, then more resources will be
allocated to control. In contrast, if economic performance is relatively low, less
resources will be allocated to control which means that more resources will shift
towards production30.
Receiving feedback from the society to evaluate the state performance is
a challenge per se. It is not uncommon that governments fail to perceive the
situation correctly, and at best, they perceive it with a delay.
3.2.8 Oil Export
Oil export is selected to be exogenous in the model so that controlled scenario
analyses become possible. All sorts of scenarios could be applied to this variable
in order to test the model. The following scenarios are included in the default
version of the model:
• base case—a S-shape behavior over time for oil export.
• cycle—an oscillatory oil export representing an unstable resource revenue
case;
• bell—a bell-shape oil export representing a temporary resource revenue
case; and
• flat—a constant (stable) level of oil export.
Fig. 3.2.6 illustrates these scenarios. Functions that are used in the oil
module to replicate these modes of behavior are flexible to a great extent so
that a wide verity of scenarios could be examined.
The only difference between these cases is their behavior over time. All of
them generate an equal amount of accumulated revenue at the final simulation
time (t = 100):
R =
∫ t=100
t=0
αY0dt = 100αY0 (3.2.1)
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 (3.2.2)
R = accumulated oil revenue
Y0 = normal (initial) GDP
α = resource dependency parameter
In equation 3.2.1 α represents the level of resource dependency. Base value
of this parameter is 0.4 but it varies randomly in the simulations between 0 and
1 so that a wide range of dependency scenarios could be tested.
30This government resource allocation mechanism is adopted from Saeed (1986).
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3.3 Results
The model presented in this chapter is a generic theory of natural resource curse.
It is not customized for any of the real world cases. All the inputs are hypo-
thetical but mainly rooted in the literature. To build confidence in the model’s
outputs, it has been subject to most of the conventional system dynamics valida-
tion tests31—including boundary adequacy, structure assessment, dimensional
consistency, parameter assessment, extreme condition, integration error, behav-
ior reproduction, behavior anomaly, and surprise behavior test. The current
model can pass these tests successfully32. To deal with the uncertainty regard-
ing the numerical value of inputs, all experimentations have been conducted
through Monte Carlo simulations with 5,000 simulation runs per experiment.
Most of the model parameters including those responsible for shape of the func-
tions have been varying simultaneously with a uniform distribution function
during the simulations. As reported in Appendix B, wide ranges of variation
are selected for the parameters so that almost all situations that could possibly
happen in a real world case are replicated.
3.3.1 Curse or Blessing?
The main goal of the chapter is to answer the questions of natural resource
curse. Does it exists? How can it be controlled? To have a meaningful discus-
sion around these questions we first need to agree upon a precise definition of
natural resource curse. Classic definition of natural resource curse is the nega-
tive correlation between natural resource abundance and economic growth rate
(Sachs and Warner, 1995). And that is a static picture of reality. However, this
definition seems to be inadequate, particularly for a systems perspective of the
issue which is also dynamic. In fact, economic growth rate is not a sufficient
measure of social well-being and happiness (Easterlin, 1974, 1995; Blanchflower
and Oswald, 2004). Thus, here we take a more inclusive social utility measure
(U) which could paint a clearer picture of a socio-political-economic “curse” or
“blessing.”
Jones and Klenow (2016) advocate a social utility function that includes
“mortality,” “consumption,” “leisure,” and “inequality.” Our model takes “in-
equality” and “consumption” into account explicitly. “Mortality” could not be
accounted for explicitly because population growth is outside of the model’s
boundary. However, “chaos,” “unemployment,” and “consumption,” which
might affect “mortality” directly or indirectly are included in the social welfare
31There is a comprehensive list of confidence building tests for system dynamics models
which have been developed over years. See e.g. Forrester (1973); Mass and Senge (1978);
Peterson (1980); Forrester and Senge (1980); Sterman (1984); Barlas and Carpenter (1990);
Barlas (1996); Oliva (2003).
32Some of the confidence building tests such as, dimensional consistency or integration
error, could be performed by the automated features of modern system dynamics software
packages like Vensim, Stella, etc. Other tests have been conducted as the major part of model
development. In fact, the current model has gone through about a hundred revisions each of
which aimed at resolving issues that had been arisen due to the confidence building tests.
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measure. “Leisure” also cannot be addressed explicitly because the model does
not follow the time allocation of individuals. Instead, share of private sector in
the labor market is used as a proxy to account for the magnitude of “leisure.”
The private sector is the most productive force of the model so, it is reasonable
to assume that the more the society’s production factors are concentrated in this
sector the less “leisure” time they would have to enjoy. Therefor, “ratio of pri-
vate sector workforce to total population” enters the social welfare measure as a
negative factor. According to recent literature on the concept of happiness [e.g.
Layard (2005)] the social utility measure could also include less tangible factors
such as “justice” and “freedom.” “Freedom” is an explicit factor in the social
utility measure while “justice” is represented by “freedom,” “inequality,” and
“corruption.” In fact, the social utility measure in the model is an integration
of utilities gained from income equality, freedom, real consumption per capita,
employment, safety and security, justice, and leisure. The utility measure ut at
each point of time is a weighted average of these qualities:33.
33To get the final value of average total utility over time, we integrate over all the uts, so
basically, a lot of utility in one period compensates people for very little utility in another
period. It may appear that the society has no preference for a consistent level of utility over
time (known as “consumption smoothing”). In fact, they do but the way this is modeled
here is different from the way economists usually do it. The model does not assume utility
maximization i.e. consumers do not try to maximize their ultimate utility simply because
its value is not known. That is, individuals do not know about the U which is accumulated
utility of the society at time 100. This is consistent with what happens in reality. Economists
usually assume people follow the utility maximization behavior only because of methodological
limitations. In contrast, resource allocation problem in system dynamics models is usually
addressed by goal seeking mechanism. For example, the government expenditure is controlled
in the model by a factor named, “government reserve coverage.” This is basically a time
constant that indicates how far ahead a government plans for the economy. If the financial
reserves are at low levels the “coverage” time would be low meaning that fewer years in the
future could be covered considering the current level of reserves, revenues, and expenditures.
This coverage time then will be compared with the standard the government has. If this is
lower than the standard then the expenditures must be controlled more strictly or revenues
must be increases—borrowing from outside is also a possibility. This way, the consumption
between now and future will be smoothed.
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U =
∫ t=T
t=0
utdt (3.3.1)
ut =
wcct
c0
+
wnn0
nt
+
wqqt
q0
+
wpp0
pt
+
wfft
f0
+
whh0
ht
+
wrr0
rt
(3.3.2)
0 ≤ wi ≤ 1 (3.3.3)∑
wi = 1 (3.3.4)
i = c, n, q, p, f, h, r
U = accumulated social utility
ut = social utility at time t
ct = real consumption per capital at time t
nt = unemployment rate at time t
qt = income equality index at time t
pt = share of private sector in total employment at time t
ft = level of freedom at time t
ht = level of social chaos at time t
rt = level of corruption at time t
wi = weight of factor i in the social utility function
Note that the utility measure is not discounted over time. This is because
function of ut is not for individual decision making in the model. It only serves
as a measure that will be used by the observer (model user) to make judgment
about the model’s performance under different scenarios. To have a fair judg-
ment one should not discriminate between past, present, and future. All time
periods must be valued equally.
To answer the question of “natural resource curse” we compare simulation
runs that include natural resource wealth with those that exclude such wealth.
Accumulated social utility yielded from a simulation run that includes oil rev-
enue is shown by Uo while accumulated social utility yielded from a simulation
run that excludes oil revenue is represented by Uz. In equilibrium no oil wealth
is included, so U = Uz. In addition, each of element of the social utility measure
is normalized to 1 at the equilibrium state. Thus, ut = 1 at any period of time.
Since the simulation time period is 100 years, final value of the average utility
(U =
∫ 100
0
Utdt) is equal to 100 in the equilibrium state (i.e. U
z = 100). Other
features of the initial setup that produces the equilibrium state is as follows34:
• productive forces = 80%
• corruption = 5%,
34Full documentation of the model along with the initial values of parameters is included
in the Appendix. Here, we only focus on qualitative interpretation of different settings.
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• illegal activities = 5%,
• good institutions = 50 (normal)
• no oil revenues.
This “equilibrium” case represents a normal society without any outstanding
resource revenues. How does natural resource revenue affect the equilibrium
then? To answer this question we compare Uz (accumulated social utility in a
zero oil scenario) with Uo (accumulated social utility in a oil scenario). In this
regard a normalized index is defined as follows:
ρ =
Uo − Uz
Uz
(3.3.5)
For any simulation run, if ρ is positive, then we can argue that resource
revenue is a “blessing” for that particular simulation. Otherwise, that simula-
tion result could be considered as a manifestation of “resource curse.” Since
U is constant (Uz = 100) for all the equilibrium state simulation runs, this
comparison would be easy because we only need to compute Uos.
Four different scenarios for the case of oil revenue have been defined as
explained in Section 3.2.8. Monte Carlo simulation is performed for each of
these scenarios and outputs are analyzed. For each scenario a set of 5,000
simulations are conducted. Each simulation has a unique set of parameters
that is randomly chosen. These random sets are reproducible since they are
generated from a given seed by the software. For each simulation run Uo and
thus, ρ is computed.
Results revealed that most of the simulation runs resulted in a “blessing”
(i.e. ρ > 0). Fig. 3.3.1 shows histograms of simulation runs that produce
different levels of ρ. From 5,000 simulation runs that are conducted for each
scenario only few occurred to produce a result worse than equilibrium showing
a case of natural resource “curse,” that is Uo < Uz. More precisely, percentage
of simulation runs with Uo < Uz is 0.02%, 0.20%, 1.02%, and 0.60% for S-
shape, bell-shape, cyclical, and flat scenarios of oil revenue respectively. This
shows that natural resource revenue could hardly be a “curse.” This also shows
that the cyclical oil revenue—among others—is the most likely case to cause a
natural resource “curse.” It is in compliance with the commodity price volatility
theory of natural resource “curse.”
Detailed dynamic behavior of the model reveals some interesting points. Fig.
3.3.2 shows components of the social utility measure over time for the case of
cyclical oil revenue. Results show that natural resource revenue could cause
a “short-term social curse.” Until the year 5-10, social factors of the utility
function (the top row diagrams) are reflecting a situation that is worse than the
equilibrium state. “Chaos” and “corruption” increase while “freedom” declines.
This is consistent with the most recent literature that asserts natural resource
wealth corrupts social systems. It is, nevertheless, very likely that problems
of chaos and corruption are mitigated (relative to the equilibrium state) in the
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Figure 3.3.1: Histograms of simulation runs with different levels of accumulated
social utility
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Table 3.3.1: Initial setting of the model (base vs. low institution)
Setting Base Case Low Institution
productive forces 80% 75%
corruption 5% 10%
illegal activities 5% 10%
good institutions 50 45
long-term35. This finding is consistent with studies that employ a historical
(long-term) perspective. For instance, Katouzian (1981) argues that oil revenue
is not a fundamental cause of social problems in the long-run, at least for the
case of Iran. Simulation analysis of the Katouzian’s theory corroborates this
argument (Langarudi and Radzicki, 2015).
These results are achieved with a particular initial specification which was
mentioned earlier. Nonetheless, institutional theories of natural resource curse
suggest that initial condition of a society significantly affects resource-base de-
velopment patterns (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Bulte et al., 2005; Mehlum et al.,
2006; Luong and Weinthal, 2006, 2010). It is almost a common wisdom now
that natural resource wealth could become a “curse” in societies with bad in-
stitutional and societal settings. Bad institutional setting here means a social
system that hinders growth by encouraging rent-seeking and corrupt behavior
(Mehlum et al., 2006). In order to examine this claim an experiment is designed
and tested. The aforementioned initial societal setting is altered as shown in
Tab. 3.3.1. The new case is called “low institution” and has lower productive
forces, greater levels of corruption and illegal activities, and lower number of
good institutions.
Will natural resource wealth exacerbate the situation—in contrast to a non-
resource-wealth case—with this new setting? To answer this question the Monte
Carlo simulations are repeated for the “low institution” case, once without oil
and once with oil revenues. Since the initial composition of workforce is changed,
initial equilibrium no longer exists. Thus, Uz will not be 100 at the final sim-
ulation time. Therefore, more computations are needed for the analysis. As
mentioned earlier, parameter set of each of the 5,000 simulation runs is repro-
ducible, thanks to the given computer random seed36. Each run is performed
twice, once including resource wealth (yielding Uo), and once excluding resource
wealth (yielding Uz). Then, ρ is computed for each of these 5,000 simulation
pairs. Fig. 3.3.3 summarizes the outcome of our experiment.
Again, majority of simulation pairs in all cases of oil revenue (S-shape, bell-
35Long-term here means any time frame longer than 60 years.
36Random distribution function of the simulation software we use (in this case Vensim DSS)
can take a given random seed and hence all the parameter sets generated for the Monte Carlo
simulation could be easily replicated. As a result, every simulation run across different oil
revenue cases has exactly the same parameter set and hence, absolutely comparable.
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case of cyclical oil revenue
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Figure 3.3.3: Distribution of simulation runs for the case of lower initial social
setting for different oil export scenarios
shape, cyclical, and flat) generate a positive ρ. Only 2.59% of simulation runs
(for the S-shape oil case) generate a U lower than the one in the non-oil case.
This figure has been 6.44%, 4.69%, and 4.92% for the cases of bell-shape, cycli-
cal, and flat oil revenues, respectively. In other words, chance of natural resource
wealth to cause a “curse” is narrow. This chance increases slightly when resource
revenue is temporary (bell-shape) which attests to Robinson et al. (2006) who
claimed that temporary natural resource revenue does worse than a permanent
one.
As mentioned earlier, oil revenue is also a varying parameter—in terms of
a fraction of normal (initial) domestic economic output—in our Monte Carlo
simulations. It would be interesting to see how the accumulated social utility is
affected by different levels of oil dependency. Fig. 3.3.4 shows this for different
oil scenarios. Diagrams on the left column depict the results for the normal
model settings while the right column diagrams show the results for the “low
institution” settings. Positive correlations between U and “oil revenue” confirm
the aforementioned finding that natural resource revenues is more likely to be
“blessing” than being a “curse.” The intriguing result, however, is that like other
(normal) goods—or even individual income—natural resource revenue complies
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to the rule of diminishing marginal utility. In fact, resource revenue is good,
but more of it does not add much to the social utility.
Most papers in the literature take “economic growth” as the main indica-
tor of “curse” or “blessing.” Even those who consider other factors such as
“corruption,” or “freedom,” do so because they assume these factors directly
or indirectly affect “economic growth.” Thus, it would be interesting to see
what our model has to say about the impact of resource wealth on “economic
growth.” Will the result change if we dismiss our comprehensive performance
measure? Answer is “no.” Effect of oil revenues on average GDP growth rate
is illustrated in Fig. 3.3.5. As before, left column presents the results with
“normal” model settings while left column diagrams show the results when the
settings are set to “low institution.” Positive correlation between GDP growth
and oil revenue exists in all the diagrams.
3.3.2 Leverage Points
The preceding section showed that deterioration of socio-political-economic con-
dition of a nation due to natural resource abundance is an unlikely case to hap-
pen. Does it mean that we cannot improve the situation then? The answer
is “no,” but it is not an easy task. A comprehensive experimentation with
the model under different conditions (parameter sets) revealed that the system
is behaviorally insensitive to most of policy interventions. Here, few leverage
points that were discovered through experimentation are discussed.
Stabilizing wage rates
One of the model leverage points is the wage stickiness. Wage stickiness refers
to the speed of wage adjustment in response to changes in the labor market.
High (low) wage stickiness means that wages adjust relatively slowly (quickly) to
any disturbance in the labor market. Fig. 3.3.6 depicts the accumulated social
utility against the wage stickiness which varies between 0 (no wage stickiness
at all) and 0.8 (80% wage stickiness)37. Results for the case of “normal” initial
social condition are shown in the left column of Fig. 3.3.6 while the right column
shows the results for a “low institution” setting.
As we can see, higher wage stickiness generate greater accumulated social
utility. One can imply from this outcome that wage stabilization might be a
good policy to enhance resource-based development. The reason why this is hap-
pening in the model follows this feedback mechanism: natural resource revenue
inevitably strengthens the government sector relative to the private sector. The
government investment is not affected by the wage rates. Thus, employment
rate increases. Higher and more stable wage rates (largely because of natural
resource revenues) improve economic welfare of the middle class which leads to
their higher participation in civil activities. This helps the good institutions
to develop and the corruption to be controlled. Increasing and steady wage
rates also reduce parasites’ incentives to exploit the economy which also helps
37100% wage stickiness means that wages do not change at all.
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Figure 3.3.4: Relationship between “accumulated social utility” and “average oil
revenue” discovered from synthetic data (left column: “normal initial setting”;
right column: “low institution” initial setting)
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Figure 3.3.5: Relationship between “average GDP growth” and “average oil
revenue” discovered from synthetic data (left column: “normal initial setting”;
right column: “low institution” initial setting)
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Figure 3.3.6: Relationship between “accumulated social utility” and “wage stick-
iness” discovered from synthetic data (left column: “normal initial setting”;
right column: “low institution” initial setting)
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the chaos to decline. Lower corruption and chaos provides a safe environment
for the private sector to invest. This helps the economy to flourish and gen-
erate even more social utility. A healthy socio-economic development reduces
the needs for strict control—because of the low level of chaos. Therefore, the
government allocate more resources to economic investment relative to invest-
ment in control means. All these improvements help the wage stabilization even
further. This ignites a powerful reinforcing feedback loop that helps the society
to develop on a healthy trajectory.
Facilitating social mobility
Another leverage point of the system turned out to be the degree to which
the society is mobile. Social mobility here is defined as the speed with which
citizenry could change their social status. As Fig. 3.3.7 shows, in both initial
settings (“normal” and “low institution”) the more difficult the social mobility
is the lower accumulated social utility would be.
Greater social mobility works simply because it strengthens the negative
(balancing) feedback loops discussed in the dynamic hypothesis presented in
Section 3.2. Now, productive forces of the society adjust faster to the changes
in social settings, thus gaining the advantage of staying in sub-optimal condi-
tions of disequilibrium state for a relatively shorter time period. These results
implies that an attempt to facilitate social mobility could improve resource-
based development.
Privatization of natural resource revenues
One external policy intervention that could leverage the system is privatization
of natural resource revenues. This policy is tested by allocating a fraction (ran-
domly from 0% to 100%) of oil revenue directly to the private sector. Results
which are illustrated in Fig. 3.3.8 show that there is an optimal allocation frac-
tion that generates highest level of accumulated social utility. Until a certain
threshold, privatization of resource wealth have positive correlation with the ac-
cumulated social utility. As the fraction transcends this threshold38 the social
utility tends to decline.
In other words, it will benefit the society if the private sector receives a
fraction of natural resource wealth. This wealth strengthens the private sector’s
economic condition which finally leads to a greater civil society and so on.
However, if the allocation fraction exceeds the optimum level—which is indeed
unknown—parasites, who are strong in this particular case, would become even
stronger through such great source of exploitation. In other words, privatization
must happen to strengthen the private sector production but should not be
overwhelming to attract parasites.
38For our model, this turning point resides around 40% but it can be very different in a real
world case. In fact, the numerical value of this fraction is not as important as its existence
would be.
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Figure 3.3.7: Relationship between “accumulated social utility” and “social
mobility delay time” discovered from synthetic data (left column: “normal initial
setting”; right column: “low institution” initial setting)
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Figure 3.3.8: Relationship between “accumulated social utility” and “privatiza-
tion of natural resource revenues” discovered from synthetic data (left column:
“normal initial setting”; right column: “low institution” initial setting)
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Experimentation with the model confirms the findings of recent research
on the matter of natural resource curse: there is no definitive answer for the
question that whether natural resources are “curse” or “blessing.” Either could
happen depending on the initial condition of the system. However, our results
show that natural resource abundance is more a “blessing” than a “curse.”
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we developed a generic system dynamics model for the prob-
lem of natural resource curse on the basis of well-established theories in this
area. The goal has been to decide if natural resource wealth should be con-
sidered as “blessing” or “curse” for a particular society. To achieve that goal
the concept of “curse” has been revisited and redefined based on modern the-
ories of behavioral economics and psychology. Then a social utility measure
has been developed that provides a more comprehensive performance measure
for the model. Results show that natural resource curse is unlikely to happen
in a controlled environment. This is not because of the new definition of the
term “curse.” It is shown that even with “economic growth” as a single per-
formance measure, the results will still be robust. In other words, it is very
likely that natural resource wealth improves economic growth in the long-run.
This is mainly due to the superior methodology that has been deployed in this
study. Many factors addressed in the literature are conflicting by nature. For
instance, higher growth may lead to worse income equality. When these aspects
are studied in isolation results could be misleading, if not wrong.
This study, in contrast, takes a dynamic, feedback-rich, holistic, and long-
term approach which enables it to provide a more complete picture of the reality.
It also relies on all kinds of available information not only on numerical databases
that are largely suspect, especially in developing countries. The model provides
an absolutely controllable environment so that pure effect of natural resource
wealth could be examined. These characteristics make this study unique and
this is perhaps why the results might be different from what the readers may
have seen in the past.
Since the model represents a hypothetical social system, there is uncertainty
regarding the assumptions and numerical value of the model’s parameters. To
solve this problem, for every experiment, a multivariate Monte Carlo simulation
is conducted with 5,000 runs. In these simulation runs parameters are randomly
selected using a uniform distribution function from a wide range of variation
[see Appendix B]. Simulation time frame is chosen to be 100 years so that both
short-term and long-term effects of natural resource wealth are captured.
Simulation results show that in the long-term “blessing” is a more likely
outcome of natural resource wealth than “curse.” Having a worse initial social
and institutional setting—which is called “low institution” case here—increases
likelihood of the “curse” but it does not affect the previous statement. That is,
“blessing” is still a more likely outcome of natural resource wealth. In the short-
term (less than 10 years), nonetheless, chaos and corruption usually increase.
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And, freedom is almost always sacrificed. These results have been robust under
many different circumstances. They also show that cyclical natural resource
revenue—as a manifestation of unstable stream of revenues—is more likely than
other cases of resource revenue (S-shape, bell-shape, and flat) to cause a “curse.”
In the “low institution” case, however, this is the bell-shape resource revenue—
a manifestation of temporary revenue—that is more likely to cause a “curse.”
Another interesting finding is that natural resource revenue is good for the
society but it follows the law of diminishing marginal utility: any additional
unit of natural resource revenue increases the social utility but with a decreasing
rate.
Experimentation with the model revealed that there are few strategies that
could improve the system’s behavior. One is stabilization of wage rates. Another
is facilitation of social mobility. It is also shown that privatization of natural
resource revenues could improve the social utility in a “low institution” case.
But there is a threshold for the private sector’s direct share of natural resource
revenues. Beyond that threshold, privatization may become harmful for the
society. Finding that threshold level, thus, could be crucial.
The natural resource curse model we developed in this chapter has gone
through a comprehensive series of validation tests. Nevertheless, any model is
only a simplified representation of reality and could be subject to errors. There
are some limitations that need to be addressed in future research. First, this is a
generic model so its behavior does not represent any particular case or country.
However, it can replicate different modes of behavior that could be relevant to
experiences of some resource-dependent nations. For example, cyclical oil export
case could generate an oscillatory behavior which is relevant to experience of
countries such as Iran or Iraq. Reducing sensitivity of “state political power”
could reproduce a stable behavior mode that is close to experience of countries
such as Saudi Arabia. A declining economy could also be replicated by tweaking
the model’s parameters—e.g. by reducing quality of institutions as well as
normal saving and investment rates—which relates to cases such as Nigeria.
To achieve a more precise explanation of real world cases we need to classify
parameter sets that are responsible for each of them. Considering the long list of
parameters, this classification could be an onerous task and deserves a separate
study. Any specific and precise policy recommendation for a particular case
requires careful calibration of the model for that case. That is beyond the scope
of this study.
Second, majority of the model’s economic modules are simplified in favor of
socio-political aspect of the problem. For instance, money and foreign exchange
flows are included in the model but at very aggregate levels. This reduces the
model’s capability in analyzing monetary policies which require more elabora-
tion. We acknowledge that central banks are very important social institutions
and their decisions are intertwined in the “impossible trinity” or “Mundell-
Fleming trilemma.” Current model needs more elaboration in these area which
is open for future research.
Third, many believe that it is hard, if possible at all, to design an aggregate
social welfare function (Arrow, 1950; Coleman, 1966). However, considering the
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magnitude of the problem at hand, it is almost impossible to track utility of
individuals. Maybe a hybrid simulation modeling could solve the issue to some
degree but it is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Fourth, population growth is assumed to be zero throughout the simulation
time. We believe that this does not affect the model’s implications but only ex-
perimentation could prove us right or wrong. Exclusion of population dynamics
also reduces model’s capability to account for dynamics of socioeconomic equal-
ity. Socioeconomic equality is addressed only at aggregate level in the model.
Perhaps a hybrid modeling is required to take further details of population and
inequality dynamics into consideration.
Finally, there are also other factors—rather than those seven included in the
model—that contribute to social utility. For example, advancement in technol-
ogy, quality of relationships at individual or community level, religious beliefs,
etc. impact social utility (Layard, 2005). It might be interesting to see how
natural resource wealth affect these factors. But this is way beyond the current
model’s boundary.
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Appendix A
Initial Value and Variation
Range of the Katouzian
Model Parameters
Parameter Description Min Base Max
Capital Formation Delay Time delay for capital
under construction to be-
come complete and ready
to use.
3 5 20
Capital Life Average time that phys-
ical capital work before
being discarded. This
parameter is set to 25
years in Mashayekhi’s
model of Iranian eco-
nomic growth.
15 22 30
Capital Output Ratio The ratio of investment
to growth which is equal
to 1 divided by the
marginal product of cap-
ital. The higher the
ICOR, the lower the pro-
ductivity of capital. The
ICOR can be thought of
as a measure of the inef-
ficiency with which capi-
tal is used. In most coun-
tries the ICOR is in the
neighborhood of 3.
2.5 3.0 3.5
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Parameter Description Min Base Max
Cost per Chaos Cost per unit of Chaos. 50 100 200
Initial Anger Initial value of stock of
Public Anger
-0.2 0.1 0.2
Initial Chaos Initial value of stock of
Chaos
0.3 0.5 1.0
Initial Corruption Initial value of stock of
Corruption
0.4 0.5 0.6
Initial Power Initial value of stock of
Political Power
0.2 0.5 0.8
Initial Reserve Initial value of stock of
State Reserve
500 1,000 10,000
Initial Respect for Law Initial value of stock of
Respect for Law
0.01 0.05 0.10
Initial Society Capital
under Construction
Initial value of stock
of Society Capital under
Construction
500 2,000 10,000
Initial Society Savings Initial value of stock of
Society Savings
500 2,000 10,000
Initial Society Capital Initial value of stock of
Society Capital
500 2,000 10,000
Initial State Capital un-
der Construction
Initial value of stock of
State Capital under Con-
struction
500 2,000 10,000
Initial State Capital Initial value of stock of
State Capital
500 2,000 10,000
Initial Utility Initial value of stock of
Utility
-0.2 0.1 0.2
Investment Fraction Fraction of stock of sav-
ings that will be invested
each year
0.1 0.3 0.4
Max Confiscation Frac-
tion
Ultimate fraction of
capital that the state
can confiscate each year.
This level of confiscation
will be achievable only
when the state is at
its maximum political-
economic power and
when the corruption is
at its maximum as well.
0.1 0.3 0.4
Perception Time Time delay for the so-
ciety to perceive a phe-
nomenon such as Cor-
ruption
3 5 10
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Parameter Description Min Base Max
Regulation Delay Time delay in decision
making at the govern-
ment level
Reserve Coverage Time Benchmark time period
during which the govern-
ment should survive with
its current level of rev-
enues and expenditures
10 15 30
Society Memory Averaging time to
smooth historical con-
cepts
3 5 7
Time to Change Chaos Time delay for Chaos to
grow or to be suppressed
3 5 10
Time to Change Power Time delay for an arbi-
trary power to consoli-
date its Political Power
or to lose power dur-
ing a non-violent politi-
cal transition
3 10 12
Time to Change Respect
for Law
Time delay to change the
arbitrary culture
20 30 40
Time to Change Utility Averaging time for
smoothing Public Utility
3 5 10
Time to Corrupt Time delay for Corrup-
tion to grow or to decline
3 5 10
Time to Forget Time delay for a society
to forget its good/bad
memories
20 30 40
Time to Smooth Proba-
bility of Uprising
Time delay for Public
Anger to be actively
organized and lead to
a successful uprising or
revolution.
10 15 20
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Appendix B
Initial Value and Variation
Range of the Resource
Curse Model Parameters
Parameter Description Min Base Max
NCRF Initial (normal) fraction of government re-
sources allocated to control means
0.1 0.3 0.8
NFTP Initial (normal) fraction of government fi-
nancial reserves to be spent on transfer
payments
0.01 0.10 0.40
NIF Initial (normal) investment fraction 0.1 0.3 0.6
NMPC Initial (normal) marginal propensity to
consume
0.6 0.7 0.8
NNTPF Initial (normal) fraction of production ca-
pacity allocated to non-traded goods sec-
tor
0.2 0.6 0.8
NTAXR Initial (normal) tax rate 0.05 0.08 0.16
PCE Output elasticity of capital 0.3 0.4 0.7
PCEC Capital elasticity of state control 0.01 0.10 0.50
PCEE Consumption elasticity of government
economic performance
0.1 1.0 2.0
PCH Natural chaos 0.01 0.02 0.05
PCHIM Minimum of the function FCHI (effect of
chaos on investment C.2.15)
0.01 0.10 0.20
PCHIS Slope of the function FCHI (effect of chaos
on investment C.2.15)
1 2 5
PDSER Down stickiness of exchange rate 0.0 0.0 0.8
PEA Concaveness of the function FEA (foreign
exchange availability indicator C.6.20)
0.1 0.5 1.0
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Parameter Description Min Base Max
PECC Parameter to set convexness of the func-
tion of exploitability from control (FCFE
C.4.13)
1 3 5
PECVR Parameter to set range of variation for
the function of exploitability from control
(FCFE C.4.13)
0.2 0.8 1.0
PEEC Parameter to set concaveness of the func-
tion of exploitability from adequacy of
economic output (FEFE C.4.18)
0.5 1.0 2.0
PEPC Concaveness of the function FEPC (effect
of state economic performance on fraction
of resources allocated to control C.7.47)
1.0 1.2 5.0
PESC Elasticity of state control 0.1 0.5 0.9
PGRCTM Minimum of the function FGRCT (effect
of government financial reserve coverage
time on tax rate C.3.34)
0.65 0.80 0.95
PGRCTS Slope of the function FGRCT (effect
of government financial reserve coverage
time on tax rate C.3.34)
1 2 5
PLE Output elasticity of labor 0.3 0.6 0.7
PMCAF Maximum fraction of private workforce
who are involved in civil activities
0.20 0.25 0.40
PMGIF Maximum government investment frac-
tion
0.4 0.8 0.9
PMPCS Slope of the MPC (C.2.24 function 1 2 5
PNTPDS Down stickiness of non-traded goods price
(0 indicates no stickiness; 1 indicates ab-
solute stickiness)
0.0 0.0 0.8
PNTPS Stickiness of non-traded goods price (0 in-
dicates no stickiness; 1 indicates absolute
stickiness)
0.0 0.0 0.8
POILC Fraction of initial level of total output as
constant oil export multiplier
0 0 1
POME Concaveness of the function FOME (effect
of good institutions on exploitability of oil
revenues C.4.23)
1 2 4
PPPC Political performance elasticity of control
resource fraction
1 2 5
PPW Weight of profitability (vs. effect of chaos)
in the private investment function (RPI
C.2.8)
0.1 0.5 0.9
PQEE Equality elasticity of government eco-
nomic performance
0.1 1.0 2.0
107
Parameter Description Min Base Max
PRCGE Concaveness of the function FRCGE (ef-
fect of reserve on government employment
rate C.1.11)
0.1 2.0 3.0
PRFE Corruption elasticity of exploitability 1.0 1.5 2.0
PSER Exchange rate stickiness 0.0 0.0 0.8
PSPE Elasticity of state political power 0.1 1.0 2.0
PSTPR Parameter to change variation range of
the function FSTP (effect of government
popularity on transfer payments C.3.22)
1 2 5
PSTPS Slope of the function FSTP (effect of gov-
ernment popularity on transfer payments
C.3.22)
1.0 1.5 5.0
PTAXRM Maximum tax rate 0.3 0.4 0.5
PTCA Convexness of the function FTC (effect of
transparency on corruption C.1.23)
1.0 1.5 3.0
PTCC Convexness of the function FTC (effect of
transparency on corruption C.1.23)
0.0 0.5 1.0
PTCM Concaveness of the function FTCM (Mul-
tiplier for adequacy of trade capacity
C.6.14)
0.1 4.0 10.0
PTPDS Down stickiness of traded goods price (0
indicates no stickiness; 1 indicates abso-
lute stickiness)
0.0 0.0 0.8
PTPS Stickiness of traded goods price (0 indi-
cates no stickiness; 1 indicates absolute
stickiness)
0.0 0.0 0.8
PUEE Unemployment elasticity of government
economic performance
0.1 1.0 2.0
PUGIA A parameter that adjusts minimum of the
function FUGI (C.3.7)
0.5 1.0 2.0
PUGIS Slope of the function FUGI (effect of un-
employment rate on government invest-
ment C.3.7)
0.5 1.0 2.0
PWA Concaveness of the workforce availability
function
0.1 0.5 2.0
PWCH Weight of chaos in the social utility func-
tion
0 1 5
PWCN Weight of consumption in the social utility
function
0 1 5
PWCO Weight of corruption in the social utility
function
0 1 5
PWDS Wage down stickiness (0 indicates no
stickiness; 1 indicates absolute stickiness)
0.0 0.0 0.8
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Parameter Description Min Base Max
PWEAE Weight of economic constraints in ex-
ploitability function (AE C.4.10)
0.1 0.4 0.5
PWEC Weight of economy in government re-
source allocation policy (ACRF C.7.42)
0.1 0.5 0.9
PWEQ Weight of income equality in the social
utility function
0 1 5
PWES Weight of economy in government popu-
larity function (APS C.7.16)
0.1 0.5 0.9
PWFR Weight of freedom in the social utility
function
0 1 5
PWL Weight of leisure in the social utility func-
tion
0 1 5
PWRAE Weight of corruption in exploitability
function (AE C.4.10)
0.1 0.4 0.5
PWS Wage stickiness (0 indicates no stickiness;
1 indicates absolute stickiness)
0.0 0.0 0.8
PWUR Weight of unemployment in the social util-
ity function
0 1 5
TCF Capital formation time delay 3 6 12
TCL Capital life 10 15 20
TCRF Time delay for reallocation of state control
resource
2 5 10
TDP Foreign debt payment time 10 20 30
TEMP Employment adjustment time delay 2 5 6
TEPP Time to average economic output that a
parasite could exploit
2 5 10
TFREE Time delay for freedom to be established 1 2 5
TLBD Time delay to accumulate experience from
production
5 10 20
TNID Time delay for normal imports to decline 1 5 10
TNII Time delay for normal imports to rise 1 2 10
TP Perception time delay 2 5 10
TPA Time delay for prices to adjust 1 5 10
TPCH Time delay for political power to change 2 5 10
TPM Length of time people can remember 2 5 10
TPSD Time delay for government popularity to
decrease
1 2 10
TPSI Time delay for government popularity to
increase
1 5 10
TRPF Time delay to reallocate production fac-
tors
1 5 10
TSTF Time to smooth effect of tax on freedom 1 5 10
TTCA Time delay to adjust trade capacity 2 5 10
TTPD Time delay to decrease transfer payments 1 5 10
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Parameter Description Min Base Max
TTPI Time delay to increase transfer payments 1 2 10
TWA Time delay for wage rates to adjust 2 5 10
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Appendix C
The Resource Curse Model
Equations
Since the number of model variables is relatively large a unique naming system
is implemented to facilitate readers’ comprehension of this long equation list.
First character in a variable name shows its type. There are 6 variable types
in the model: levels, rates, auxiliaries, functions, (constant) parameters, and
time (constants). Levels are variables that accumulate over time. Name of a
level starts with L, e.g. LU represents stock of unemployed workforce. Initial
values of levels start with the letter N . Rate variables directly change the
value of levels. Name of such variables starts with an R. Auxiliary variables
conserve computations that are usually used in rate variable. These start with
the letter A. Functions are a special type of auxiliaries that contain more
complex formulas. Initial character of such variables’ name is F . Parameters
are constant values that are used in computation of other variables. Name of
parameters start with the letter P . And finally, time constants are a particular
type of parameters that represent time delays in the model. Their initial is T .
Please note that some level variables have equations for their initial values
instead of constant numerics. This is to automatically calculate appropriate
values for the initial state of the model so that it always starts in equilibrium,
no matter how constant parameters of the model are set.
In general, equation references follow this format:
First line: equation
Second line: description [unit of measure]
Next line: name and description of variable(s) / parameter(s) that are used
in the equation (cross-reference for variable(s) / parameter(s)) [unit of measure].
Please also note that the Dollar sign ($) in the paper does not represent US
Dollar but is merely used as a generic unit of domestic currency.
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C.1 Employment
There are two major production factors in the model: labor and capital. This
module is responsible for allocation of labor to different production sectors in-
cluding private and government sectors. Three main employment states in the
model are: “private workforce,” “government workforce,” and “unemployed”
workforce. Some theories attribute the natural resource curse to the develop-
ment of corruption and rent-seeking behavior which leads to sub-optimal poli-
cies regarding the extraction and export of natural resources (Auty, 2001; Isham
et al., 2005). To capture dynamics of corruption and rent-seeking behavior two
additional employment states are included: “corrupt officers”—a fraction of
government workforce which is engaged in corrupt activities—and parasites—a
fraction of workforce population which is engaged in all sorts of illegal and/or
harmful (for the society as a whole) activities including rent-seeking behavior1.
To control corruption and rent-seeking behavior societies must strengthen their
civil institutions that are the most effective system of checks and balances (Ace-
moglu et al., 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Mehlum et al., 2006). The
sixth and final employment state of the model is “civil activists” as representa-
tive of the civil society. More precisely, civil activists are defined here to be a
fraction of workforce population which is involved in non-profit activities in or-
der to improve citizen’s social life and to correct social injustice. This part of the
population is responsible for development of “good institutions” which are con-
sidered to be the foundation of a steady socio-political-economic development
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).
There is not sharp contrast between different employment states in the real
world. If we think of these employment states as fractions of time an individual
spends on those particular social roles, then the deployed division makes sense.
For example, a government employee might do his/her job reasonably well and
within the boundaries of law but accepts bribes once in a while—say, 1% of the
time. A government with 100 of such employees could be represented in our
model with 99 persons in the state of “government workforce” and 1 person in
the state of “corrupt officers.” Same logic applies to the other states2. Few
of us—if any—might work full-time as a civil activist. A fraction of our time,
nonetheless, may be spent on things that contribute to development of the
civil society. Therefore, the model has “person” as a unit of measure for the
employment states but total population sums up to 100 in all situations so that
it could be easy to interpret each employment state as a percentage of total
workforce population.
LU is a stock of unemployed workforce that could be employed by either
private sector or government.
1Saeed et al. (2013) call this division of population as “bandits.” “Bandits” do not have a
normal job but earn income by participating in illegal, criminal, or corrupt activities.
2Another way to look at this division is to consider the content of each employment state
as FTEs (full-time equivalents).
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LUt = LU0 −
∫ t
0
(RPWAτ +RGWAτ +RUPτ ) · dτ (C.1.1)
LU0 = (NCW +NCO +NGW +NPW +NPAR) · PNUR
(1− PNUR)
LU = unemployed workforce [Person]
NCW (C.1.32) = Initial (normal) population of civil activists [Person]
NCO (C.1.18) = Initial (normal) population of corrupt officers [Person]
NGW (C.1.16) = Initial (normal) population of workforce employed in
the government sector [Person]
NPW (C.1.41) = Initial (normal) population of workforce employed in
the private sector [Person]
NPAR (C.1.43) = Initial (normal) population of parasites: part of work-
force who do not work but enjoy consuming others’
production [Person]
PNUR (C.1.49) = Natural unemployment rate [Person]
RPWA (C.1.3) = Workforce adjustment rate in the private sector [Per-
son/ Year]
RGWA (C.1.2) = Workforce adjustment rate in the government sector
[Person/ Year]
RUP (C.1.47) = Number of unemployed workforce who become para-
site every year [Person/ Year]
Please note that initial unemployed workforce (LU0) is a function of other
parameters. It is so because we want to make sure that unemployment rate
is always equal to natural unemployment rate (PNUR) at initial condition,
independent of the value of other parameters or initial states. This ensures that
the model always starts in equilibrium.
State of unemployed workforce can change mainly by private and/or gov-
ernment hiring (firing) activities. Here, this is called “workforce adjustment.”
Workforce adjustment could be positive or negative. When positive, workforce
are becoming employed. When negative, workforce are becoming unemployed.
Eq. C.1.2 represents government workforce adjustment rate. It simply tries
to reduce the gap between current and desired states of government workforce.
Same mechanism applies to the private sector workforce adjustment (see Eq.
C.1.3). It is assumed that workforce adjustment takes about 5 years to reach a
full balance due to intrinsic delays in the labor market.
RGWAt =
min(AGWGt, LUt)
3 · TEMP (C.1.2)
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RGWA = Workforce adjustment rate in the government sector
[Person/ Year]
AGWG (C.1.5) = Workforce gap in the government sector [Person]
LU (C.1.1) = Unemployed workforce [Person]
TEMP (C.1.4) = Employment adjustment time delay [Year]
RPWAt =
min(APWGt, LUt)
3 · TEMP (C.1.3)
RPWA = Workforce adjustment rate in the private sector [Per-
son/ Year]
APWG (C.1.6) = Workforce gap in the private sector [Person]
LU (C.1.1) = Unemployed workforce [Person]
TEMP (C.1.4) = Employment adjustment time delay [Year]
TEMP = 5 (C.1.4)
TEMP = Employment adjustment time delay [Year]
AGWGt = AGDWt − LGWt (C.1.5)
AGWG = Workforce gap in the government sector [Person]
AGDW (C.1.7) = Government desired workforce [Person]
LGW (C.1.15) = Workforce employed in the government sector [Person]
APWGt = APDWt − LPWt (C.1.6)
APWG = Workforce gap in the private sector [Person]
APDW (C.1.13) = Private sector desired workforce [Person]
LPW C.1.40 = Workforce employed in the private sector [Person]
Government workforce contributes to both production and control. As we
will see later, relative significance of this contribution is endogenously deter-
mined depending on several factors. So, government desired workforce is a sum
of desired workforce for control and for economic investments. This sum will
also be limited by the government financial constraints.
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AGDWt = (AGDWCt +AGDWIt) · FRCGEt (C.1.7)
AGDW = Government desired workforce [Person]
AGDWC (C.1.10) = Government desired workforce for the purpose of
control [Person]
AGDWI (C.1.8) = Government desired workforce for investment [Per-
son]
FRCGE (C.1.11) = Effect of government financial reserve coverage on
the government employment rate [Dimensionless]
Desired workforce from investment is proportionate to the investment rate.
This proportion is determined by the parameter shown in Eq. C.1.9. This is
a parametric solution that ensures initial value of desired workforce is equal to
the current workforce so that the model will start in equilibrium state.
AGDWIt = RGIt ·NGDWI (C.1.8)
AGDWI = Government desired workforce for investment [Per-
son]
RGI (C.3.6) = Government sector investment rate [$/ Year]
NGDWI (C.1.9) = Government sector desired workforce per unit of in-
vestment in the sector [Person-Year/ $]
NGDWI =
(1−NCRF ) ·NGW
RGI0
(C.1.9)
NGDWI = Government sector desired workforce per unit of in-
vestment in the sector [Year-Person/ $]
NCRF (C.7.36) = Initial (normal) fraction of government resources allo-
cated to control means [Dimensionless]
NGW (C.1.16) = Initial (normal) government sector workforce [Person]
RGI (C.3.6) = Government sector investment rate [$/ Year]
Government also needs workforce for the purpose of control. This require-
ment depends on the level of sociopolitical chaos3. Higher levels of chaos makes
the government to require more enforcement power and thus more workforce
will be needed.
AGDWCt = NCRF ·NGW · LPCHt
LPCH0
(C.1.10)
3The concept of “chaos” will be discussed later in Section C.7.
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AGDWC = Government desired workforce for the purpose of con-
trol [Person]
NCRF (C.7.36) = Initial (normal) fraction of government resources allo-
cated to control means [Dimensionless]
NGW (C.1.16) = Initial (normal) government sector workforce [Person]
LPCH (C.7.8) = Perceived chaos [Dimensionless]
Finally, the government financial state affects its employment rate. This
effect is represented by Eq. C.1.11.
FRCGEt =
2/
(
1 + e
−
PRCGE ·AGRCt
AGRC0
)
− 1
2/
(
1 + e−PRCGE
)
− 1
(C.1.11)
FRCGE = Effect of government financial reserve coverage on
the government employment rate [Dimensionless]
PRCGE (C.1.12) = Concaveness of the function FRCGE: effect of re-
serve on government employment rate [Dimension-
less]
AGRC (C.3.39) = Government financial reserve coverage time [Year]
PRCGE = 2 (C.1.12)
PRCGE = Concaveness of the function FRCGE (effect of reserve on gov-
ernment employment rate—C.1.11) [Dimensionless]
Different governments may have different human resource policies with vary-
ing sensitivity to their financial limitations. Some may be very conservative and
thus limit employment of new workforce in face of a financial difficulty. Others
might be more liberal in this regard. Parameter PRCGE in Eq. C.1.11 de-
termines this level of cautiousness. Variation in the output of this equation in
response to different values of PRCGE is depicted in Fig. C.1.1. Higher values
of PRCGS represent more liberal policy mindset in relation to government ex-
penditure. Lower values of PRCGS represent a more frugal governance. This is
particularly important for testing hypotheses that state liberal public spending
in the face of a natural resource windfall could lead to a curse. Government
expenditures will be discussed in further details in Section C.3.
Private sector’s desired workforce, in contrast to the government’s, depends
only on investment rate in the sector.
APDWt = NPDWI ·RPIt (C.1.13)
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Figure C.1.1: Effect of government’s financial state on its desired workforce
APDW = Private sector desired workforce [Person]
NPDWI (C.1.14) = Private sector desired workforce per unit of invest-
ment in the sector [Year*Person/ $]
RPI (C.2.8) = Private sector investment rate [$/ Year]
NPDWI =
NPW
RPI0
(C.1.14)
NPDWI = Private sector desired workforce per unit of investment
in the sector [Year*Person/ $]
NPW (C.1.41) = Initial (normal) private sector workforce [Person]
RPI (C.2.8) = Private sector investment rate [$/ Year]
Government workforce adjustment modifies the level of government work-
force. This level is also affected by corruption rate (RGCO C.1.19).
LGWt = LGW0 +
∫ t
0
(RGWAτ −RGCOτ ) · dτ (C.1.15)
LGW0 = NGW
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LGW = Workforce employed in the government sector [Person]
NGW (C.1.16) = Initial (normal) government sector workforce [Person]
RGWA (C.1.2) = Workforce adjustment rate in the government sector
[Person/ Year]
RGCO (C.1.19) = Government workforce who become corrupt [Person/
Year]
NGW = 30 (C.1.16)
NGW = Initial (normal) government sector workforce [Person]4
RGCO can be positive or negative. As corruption increases RGCO becomes
positive and stock of government workforce depletes and adds up to the stock
of “corrupt offices” (LCO C.1.17). Negative values of RGCO works in reverse
direction.
LCOt = LCO0 +
∫ t
0
RGCOτ · dτ (C.1.17)
LCO0 = NCO
LCO = Corrupt government officers: part of the government
workforce who get involved in corrupt and illegal ac-
tivities [Person]
NCO (C.1.18) = Initial (normal) corrupt government officers [Person]
RGCO (C.1.19) = Government workforce who become corrupt [Person/
Year]
NCO = 5 (C.1.18)
NCO = Initial (normal) corrupt government officers [Person]
RGCOt =
max(0, AICOt − LCOt) · FGWAt + min(0, AICOt − LCOt)
TEMP
(C.1.19)
4Population of employment states and their corresponding parameters are scaled down in
order to reduce unnecessary numerical complexity.
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RGCO = Government workforce who become corrupt [Person/
Year]
AICO (C.1.22) = Indicated corrupt government officers [Person]
LCO (C.1.17) = Corrupt government officers: part of the government
workforce who get involved in corrupt and illegal ac-
tivities [Person]
FGWA (C.1.20) = Availability indicator of the government sector work-
force [Dimensionless]
TEMP (C.1.4) = Employment adjustment time delay [Year]
The function FGWA (C.1.20) provides a first order control so that the pop-
ulation of government workforce (LGW—C.1.15) will never go below zero.
FGWAt =
(PWA+ 1) · LGWt/NGW
PWA+ LGWt/NGW
(C.1.20)
FGWA = Availability indicator of the government sector work-
force [Dimensionless]
PWA (C.1.21) = Concaveness of the workforce availability function [Di-
mensionless]
LGW (C.1.15) = Workforce employed in the government sector [Person]
NGW (C.1.16) = Initial (normal) population of workforce employed in
the government sector [Person]
PWA = 0.5 (C.1.21)
PWA = Concaveness of the workforce availability function [Dimension-
less]
Concept of corruption in developing countries has been widely studied5.
Here, we define corruption as an aggregate measure of all sorts of illegal activ-
ities practiced by government officials that could lead to distortion of normal
distribution of scarce resources. Corruption rate in the model depends on two
factors: attractiveness of corrupt activities and transparency. Attractiveness
of corruption is assumed to be equal to attractiveness of illegal activities—
something that is called being “parasite” here. An incentive for being a parasite
generates incentives for government officials to get involve in some sorts of ille-
gal activities or corruption. For instance, if there is a considerable stake in drug
trafficking then dealers may be willing to offer notable bribes to border patrol
agents. These incentives may be significant in some cases and insignificant in
others. Nonetheless, it should be reasonable to assume that their average value
5See Søreide (2014) for a comprehensive overview.
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is proportionate to “parasite attractiveness.” Attractiveness of being parasite
will be discussed later.
AICOt = NCO ·AAPt · FTCt (C.1.22)
AICO = Indicated corrupt government officers [Person]
NCO (C.1.18) = Initial (normal) corrupt government officers [Person]
AAP (C.4.43) = Attractiveness of being parasite [Dimensionless]
FTC (C.1.23) = Effect of good institutions on corruption [Dimension-
less]
Although not decisive, but transparency is another key factor affecting the
rate of corruption (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). A transparent society is less sus-
ceptible to corruption. Some scholars believe that a broader set of factors ag-
gregated in the concept of “good institutions” are responsible for the magnitude
of corruption (Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2014). Good institutions
are those social settings which foster socio-political-economic growth while bad
institutions encourage rent-seeking and other harmful social behavior. Impact
of good institution on corruption is represented by Eq. C.1.23:
FTCt =
2/
(
1 + e
PTCA · LGIt
LGI0
)
+ PTCC
2/
(
1 + ePTCA
)
+ PTCC
(C.1.23)
FTC = Effect of good institutions on corruption [Dimension-
less]
PTCA (C.1.24) = Convexness of the function FTC: effect of good insti-
tutions on corruption [Dimensionless]
LGI (C.1.26) = Number of good institutions [Dimensionless]
PTCC (C.1.25) = Slope of the function FTC: effect of good institutions
on corruption [Dimensionless]
PTCA = 1.5 (C.1.24)
PTCA = Convexness of the function FTC (effect of good institutions on
corruption C.1.23)
PTCC = 0.5 (C.1.25)
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PTCC = Slope of the function FTC: effect of good institutions on cor-
ruption [Dimensionless]
This function creates a relationship between the magnitude of good insti-
tutions and level of corruption. PTCA and PTCC are parameters that help
us to test different levels of sensitivity of corruption to good institutions. As
illustrated in Fig. C.1.2, variation in these parameters alters the shape of the
function.
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Figure C.1.2: Effect of good institutions on corruption
Magnificence of good institutions, on the other hand, is determined by the
level of civil right activities. Good institutions are developed and maintained
by the civil society. Benevolent dictatorship could also help to develop good
institutions but those institutions may not last for long if the civil society has
not developed to maturity (Langarudi and Radzicki, 2015). One may argue
that this also depends on other factors such as state control too. As we will see
later, such factors come into play to affect growth of the civil society, thus they
eventually affect the institutions in one way or another.
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LGIt = LGI0 +
∫ t
0
(RIIτ −RIDτ ) · dτ (C.1.26)
LGI0 = RII0 · TIL
LGI = Number of good institutions
RII (C.1.27) = Institution development rate [1/Year]
RID (C.1.29) = Institution decay [1/Year]
TIL (C.1.30) = Institution life time [Year]
Development of good institution not only depends on activities of the civil
society but is also affected by activists’ relative economic power. As the civil
society tries to establish its power, those who benefit from corruption and chaos
act in the opposite direction trying to counter establishment of good institutions
which will be a limiting factor for their economic advantages.
RIIt = NIDt · LCWt · LWRt
APARIt
(C.1.27)
RII = Institution development rate [1/Year]
NID (C.1.28) = Initial (normal) institution development rate [1/Year]
LCW (C.1.31) = Workforce employed by civil institutions [Person]
LWR (C.5.4) = Average wage rate of the working class [$/ Year-
Person]
APARI (C.4.5) = Total income of parasites [$/Year]
NID = 20 (C.1.28)
NID = Initial (normal) institution development rate [1/Year]
RIDt =
LGIt
TIL
(C.1.29)
RID = Institution decay [1/Year]
LGI (C.1.26) = Number of good institutions
TIL (C.1.30) = Institution life time [Year]
TIL = 5 (C.1.30)
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TIL = Institution life time [Year]
Population of civil activists is a fraction of private sector workforce. This
fraction could change depending on two factors: level of freedom in the society,
and economic welfare of the working class.
LCWt = LCW0 +
∫ t
0
RPCAτ · dτ (C.1.31)
LCW0 = NCW
LCW = Workforce employed by civil institutions [Person]
NCW (C.1.32) = Initial (normal) civil activist population [Person]
RPCA (C.1.35) = Private sector workforce who become civil activist
[Person/ Year]
NCW = NCAF ·NPW (C.1.32)
NCW = Initial (normal) civil activist population [Person]
NCAF (C.1.33) = Initial (normal) fraction of private workforce who are
involved in civil activities [Dimensionless]
NPW (C.1.41) = Initial (normal) private sector workforce [Person]
NCAF = 0.1 (C.1.33)
NCAF = Initial (normal) fraction of private workforce who are involved
in civil activities [Dimensionless]
APOPt = LCWt + LCOt + LGWt + LPWt + LPt + LUt (C.1.34)
APOP = Workforce population [Person]
LCW (C.1.31) = Workforce employed by civil institutions [Person]
LCO (C.1.17) = Corrupt government officers: part of the government
workforce who get involved in corrupt and illegal ac-
tivities [Person]
LGW (C.1.15) = Workforce employed in the government sector [Person]
LPW C.1.40 = Workforce employed in the private sector [Person]
LP (C.1.42) = Parasites: part of workforce who do not work but enjoy
consuming of others’ production [Person]
LU (C.1.1) = Unemployed workforce [Person]
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RPCAt =
AICAt − LCWt
TEMP
(C.1.35)
RPCA = Private sector workforce who become civil activist [Per-
son/ Year]
AICA (C.1.36) = Indicated civil activist population [Person]
LCW (C.1.31) = Workforce employed by civil institutions [Person]
TEMP (C.1.4) = Employment adjustment time delay [Year]
AICAt = NCAF · LPWt · FFCAGt · FWCAGt (C.1.36)
AICA = Indicated civil activist population [Person]
NCAF (C.1.33) = Initial (normal) fraction of private workforce who
are involved in civil activities [Dimensionless]
LPW (C.1.40) = Workforce employed in the private sector [Person]
FFCAG (C.1.37) = Effect of freedom on growth of civil activist popu-
lation [Dimensionless]
FWCAG (C.1.39) = Effect of economic welfare on growth of civil activist
population [Dimensionless]
Freedom is an indicator for coercion of the state. High levels of freedom show
relatively high tolerance of the government towards the society and its activism
(see Eq. C.7.28). A coercive government limits the space for civil activism. One
may argue that lack of freedom may also encourage civil activism. That might
be true if we limit the definition of civil activism to be relevant only to political
matters. Nevertheless, the term “civil activism” here refers to a broader concept
that encompasses other areas such as environmental, cultural, economic, and
social issues. In fact, it is assumed that in presence of a coercive government
“civil activism” in total becomes less significant. However, distribution of forces
within the body of activist may align towards political issues. Therefore, one
possible relationship between freedom and civil activism could be defined as
follows:
FFCAGt =
2/
(
1 + e
−LFREEt·ln
1 +NCAF/PMCAF
1−NCAF/PMCAF
)
− 1
2/
(
1 + e
− ln
1 +NCAF/PMCAF
1−NCAF/PMCAF
)
− 1
(C.1.37)
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FFCAG = Effect of freedom on growth of civil activist popula-
tion [Dimensionless]
LFREE (C.7.28) = Freedom [Dimensionless]
NCAF (C.1.33) = Initial (normal) fraction of private workforce who
are involved in civil activities [Dimensionless]
PMCAF (C.1.38) = Maximum fraction of private workforce who are in-
volved in civil activities [Dimensionless]
PMCAF = 0.25 (C.1.38)
PMCAF = Maximum fraction of private workforce who are involved in
civil activities [Dimensionless]
Shape of this function and its variations in response to changes in parameters
NCAF and PMCAF are shown in Fig. C.1.3.
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Figure C.1.3: Effect of freedom on civil activism
Economic condition of the middle class—represented here by the average
wage rate of workers—directly affects the level of civil activities (Oliver, 1999).
Eq. C.1.39 shows such impact. Shape of this function and its variation are
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exactly similar to those of Eq. C.1.37 (see Fig. C.1.3).
FWCAGt =
2/
(
1 + e
−
LWRt
NWR
·ln
1 +NCAF/PMCAF
1−NCAF/PMCAF
)
− 1
2/
(
1 + e
− ln
1 +NCAF/PMCAF
1−NCAF/PMCAF
)
− 1
(C.1.39)
FWCAG = Effect of economic welfare on growth of civil activist
population [Dimensionless]
LWR (C.5.4) = Average wage rate of the working class [$/ Year-
Person]
NWR (C.5.2) = Initial (normal) average wage rate of the working
class [$/ Year-Person]
NCAF (C.1.33) = Initial (normal) fraction of private workforce who
are involved in civil activities [Dimensionless]
PMCAF (C.1.38) = Maximum fraction of private workforce who are in-
volved in civil activities [Dimensionless]
As people spend more of their time on civil activities they will have less
time to spend on productive work. Population of private workforce (shown
in Eq. C.1.40) represent total human resources the private sector allocates to
production of goods and services.
LPWt = LPW0 +
∫ t
0
(RPWAτ −RPCAτ −RPPARτ ) · dτ (C.1.40)
LPW0 = NPW
LPW = Workforce employed in the private sector [Person]
NPW (C.1.41) = Initial (normal) private sector workforce [Person]
RPWA (C.1.3) = Workforce adjustment rate in the private sector [Per-
son/ Year]
RPCA (C.1.35) = Private sector workforce who become civil activist
[Person/ Year]
RPPAR (C.1.44) = Private workforce who become parasite [Person/
Year]
NPW = 50 (C.1.41)
NPW = Initial (normal) private sector workforce [Person]
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Parts of private workforce may become parasites depending on how attrac-
tive it is to become a parasite 6.
LPt = LP0 +
∫ t
0
(RPPARτ +RUPτ ) · dτ (C.1.42)
LP0 = NPAR
LP = Parasites: part of workforce who do not work but
enjoy consuming of others’ production [Person]
NPAR (C.1.43) = Initial (normal) parasites [Person]
RPPAR (C.1.44) = Private workforce who become parasite [Person]
RUP (C.1.47) = Unemployed workforce who become parasite [Person]
NPAR = 5 (C.1.43)
NPAR = Initial (normal) parasites [Person]
RPPARt = max(0, AIPARt − LPt) · FPWAt
TEMP
(C.1.44)
RPPAR = Private workforce who become parasite [Person/
Year]
AIPAR (C.1.45) = Indicated population of parasites [Person]
LP (C.1.42) = Parasites: part of workforce who do not work but
enjoy consuming of others’ production [Person]
FPWA (C.1.46) = Availability indicator of the private sector workforce
[Dimensionless]
TEMP (C.1.4) = Employment adjustment time delay [Year]
AIPARt = NPAR ·AAPt (C.1.45)
6We define the variable “parasites” as a fraction of private human resources that is al-
located to extraction and consumption of the society’s resources without contributing to its
production. Please note that all the stocks (levels) in the model are average of the corre-
sponding variable. For example, an individual could be at the same time in stock of LPW
(C.1.40) and LP (C.1.42). In other words, individuals could spend some part of their life
being productive but also in some other parts of their lives they can get involve in illegal
activities, or any engagement that might be harmful for the rest of the society—this is called
being a “parasite” here. Another way to think of this concept is to consider each of the levels
as an accumulation of FTEs (Full Time Equivalents) the society allocates to different activ-
ities. While these FTEs could be separable at the aggregate level, they may be distributed
differently for individuals. Since the model here deals only with aggregate variables at the
societal level, this separation of FTEs is a reasonable assumption.
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AIPAR = Indicated population of parasites [Person]
NPAR (C.1.43) = Initial (normal) population of parasites: part of work-
force who do not work but enjoy consuming others’
production [Person]
AAP (C.4.43) = Attractiveness of being parasite [Dimensionless]
FPWAt =
(PWA+ 1) · LPWt/NPW
PWA+ LPWt/NPW
(C.1.46)
FPWA = Availability indicator of the private sector workforce
[Dimensionless]
PWA (C.1.21) = Concaveness of the workforce availability function [Di-
mensionless]
LPW (C.1.40) = Workforce employed in the private sector [Person]
NPW (C.1.41) = Initial (normal) population of workforce employed in
the private sector [Person]
Unemployed workforce have more incentives than the employed people to
become parasites:
RUPt =
min(AIPARt − LPt, LUt)
3 · TEMP (C.1.47)
RUP = Unemployed workforce who become parasite [Person/
Year]
AUR (C.1.48) = Unemployment rate [Dimensionless]
PNUR (C.1.49) = Natural unemployment rate [Person]
AIPAR (C.1.45) = Indicated population of parasites [Person]
LP (C.1.42) = Parasites: part of workforce who do not work but
enjoy consuming of others’ production [Person]
TEMP (C.1.4) = Employment adjustment time delay [Year]
AURt =
LUt
APOPt
(C.1.48)
AUR = Unemployment rate [Dimensionless]
LU (C.1.1) = Unemployed workforce [Person]
APOP (C.1.34) = Workforce population [Person]
PNUR = 0.05 (C.1.49)
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PNUR = Natural unemployment rate (Dimensionless)
C.2 Private Investment
This section describes the process of capital formation in the private sector.
This process is relatively straightforward and mainly based upon conventional
theories of economic growth.
Capital formation rate (RPCF ) accumulates in the stock of capital (LPC)
and depreciation (RPCD) drains it:
LPCt = LPC0 +
∫ t
0
(RPCFτ −RPCDτ ) · dτ (C.2.1)
LPC0 = NPC
LPC = Stock of private capital [$]
NPC (C.2.2) = Initial (normal) private capital [$]
RPCF (C.2.5) = Private capital formation rate [$/Year]
RPCD (C.2.4) = Private capital depreciation rate [$/Year]
NPC = RPCF0 · TCL (C.2.2)
NPC = Initial (normal) private capital [$]
RPCF (C.2.5) = Private capital formation rate [$/Year]
TCL (C.2.3) = Capital life [Year]
TCL = 15 (C.2.3)
TCL = Capital life [Year]
RPCDt = LPCt/TCL (C.2.4)
RPCD = Private capital depreciation rate [$/Year]
LPC (C.2.1) = Stock of private capital [$]
TCL (C.2.3) = Capital life [Year]
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Capital in progress (LPCP ) flows into the stock of capital (LPC) with a
delay (TCF ). This flow is affected by availability of workforce in the sector
(FPWA):
RPCFt =
LPCPt · FPWAt
TCF
(C.2.5)
RPCF = Private capital formation rate [$/Year]
LPCP (C.2.7) = Private capital in progress [$]
FPWA (C.1.46) = Availability indicator of the private sector workforce
[Dimensionless]
TCF (C.2.6) = Capital formation time delay [Year]
TCF = 6 (C.2.6)
TCF = Capital formation time delay [Year]
LPCP increases as the the private sector invests from its financial reserves:
LPCP =
∫ t
0
(RPIτ −RPCFτ ) · dτ (C.2.7)
LPCP0 = RPI0 · TCF
LPCP = Private capital in progress [$]
RPI (C.2.8) = Private sector investment rate [$/Year]
RPCF (C.2.5) = Private capital formation rate [$/Year]
TCF (C.2.6) = Capital formation time delay [Year]
Besides availability of financial reserves, investment in the private sector
depends on two factors: profitability of production in the sector and level of
chaos in the society.
RPIt = LPRt ·NIF · LPPPPWt · FCHI1−PPWt (C.2.8)
RPI = Private sector investment rate [$/Year]
LPR (C.2.19) = Private sector financial reserves [$]
NIF (C.2.9) = Initial (normal) investment fraction [1/Year]
LPP (C.2.11) = Perceived profitability [Dimensionless]
PPW (C.2.10) = Weight of profitability (vs effect of chaos) in the private
investment function [Dimensionless]
FCHI (C.2.15) = Effect of chaos on investment [Dimensionless]
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NIF = 0.2 (C.2.9)
NIF = Initial (normal) investment fraction [1/Year]
PPW = 0.5 (C.2.10)
PPW = Weight of “profitability” (relative to “effect of chaos”) in the
private investment function [Dimensionless]
It takes some time for investors to fully perceive profitability of production
in the sector7.
LPPt = LPP0 +
∫ t
0
(
FPτ − LPPτ
TP
) · dτ (C.2.11)
LPP0 = 1
LPP = Perceived profitability [Dimensionless]
FP (C.2.13) = Profitability of the private production [Dimensionless]
TP (C.2.12) = Perception time delay [Year]
TP = 5 (C.2.12)
TP = Perception time delay [Year]
FPt =

2/
(
1 + e
− PPC ·NPC ·APPt
APP0 · LPCt
)
− 1
2/
(
1 + e−PPC
)− 1 , APPt > 0
0 , APPt ≤ 0
(C.2.13)
7Please note that a max function is used to take only positive values of profits into account.
In fact, it is assumed that the private sectors shuts down its investment as long as profits are
negative.
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FP = Profitability of the private production [Dimensionless]
PPC (C.2.14) = Concaveness of the profitability function [Dimension-
less]
NPC (C.2.2) = Initial (normal) private capital [$]
APP (C.4.25) = Private profit [$/Year]
LPC (C.2.1) = Stock of private capital [$]
PPC = ln
(1 +NIF
1−NIF
)
(C.2.14)
PPC = Concaveness of the profitability function [Dimensionless]
NIF (C.2.9) = Initial (normal) investment fraction [1/Year]
The profitability function (FP ) which determines the effect of profitability
on private investment can take different shapes depending on the value of normal
investment fraction (NIF ). These variations are shown in Fig. C.2.1.
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Figure C.2.1: Effect of profitability on private investment
Another factor affecting the investment rate is sociopolitical chaos. Here the
term “chaos” is defined as unlawful behavior of citizens in all levels of a society.
This includes, theft, violence, arbitrary government actions, tax evasion, or
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any other kind of action that breaks the rule of law. From this point of view,
chaos—which conceptually is very close to lawlessness—has a negative impact
on private investment (Dixit, 2007; Haggard and Tiede, 2011). Eq. C.2.15 which
is graphically illustrated in Fig. C.2.2 replicates this negative relationship.
FCHIt = PCHIM +
(1− PCHIM) ∗ (1 +NCHIM)
NCHIM + (LPCHt/LPCH0)PCHIS
(C.2.15)
FCHI = Effect of chaos on investment [Dimensionless]
PCHIM (C.2.16) = Minimum of the function FCHI (effect of chaos on
investment) [Dimensionless]
NCHIM (C.2.17) = Maximum of the function FCHI: effect of chaos on
investment [Dimensionless]
LPCH (C.7.8) = Perceived chaos [Dimensionless]
PCHIS (C.2.18) = Slope of the function FCHI: effect of chaos on invest-
ment [Dimensionless]
PCHIM = 0.1 (C.2.16)
PCHIM = Minimum of the function FCHI (effect of chaos on investment)
[Dimensionless]
NCHIM =
(PCHIM − 1) ·NIF
NIF − 1 (C.2.17)
PCHIM = Maximum of the function FCHI (effect of chaos on investment)
[Dimensionless]
PCHIS = 2 (C.2.18)
PCHIS = Slope of the function FCHI (effect of chaos on investment)
[Dimensionless]
While investment rate depletes private sector’s financial reserves, saving rate
increases them:
LPRt = LPR0 +
∫ t
0
(RPSτ −RPIτ ) · dτ (C.2.19)
LPR0 = NDI · 1−NMPC
NIF
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Figure C.2.2: Effect of chaos on private investment
LPR = Private sector financial reserves [$]
RPS (C.2.21) = Saving rate of the private sector [$/Year]
RPI (C.2.8) = Private sector investment rate [$/Year]
NDI (C.2.27) = Initial (normal) disposable income [$/Year]
NMPC (C.2.20) = Initial (normal) marginal propensity to consume [Di-
mensionless]
NIF (C.2.9) = Initial (normal) investment fraction [1/Year]
NMPC = 0.7 (C.2.20)
NMPC = Initial (normal) marginal propensity to consume [Dimension-
less]
RPSt = ADIt −APCt (C.2.21)
RPS = Saving rate of the private sector [$/Year]
ADI (C.2.22) = Disposable income [$/Year]
APC (C.2.23) = Private consumption [$/Year]
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From national accounting we have:
ADIt = AOt −ATAXt + LATPt −AGOt +AGWt (C.2.22)
ADI = Disposable income [$/Year]
AO (C.4.26) = Total output of the economy [$/Year]
ATAX (C.3.31) = Government tax revenues [$/Year]
LATP (C.3.15) = Average transfer payments [$/Year]
AGO (C.4.27) = Total economic output of the government [$/Year]
AGW (C.4.3) = Wages paid by the government [$/Year]
A fraction of income will be consumed every year. Note that the consumption
function is non-linear. In fact, MPC (marginal propensity to consume) is a
function of disposable income. For higher levels of disposable income, MPC is
lower and vice versa.
APCt = ADIt · FMPCt (C.2.23)
APC = Private consumption [$/Year]
ADI (C.2.22) = Disposable income [$/Year]
FMPC (C.2.24) = Marginal propensity to consume [Dimensionless]
FMPCt = PMPCM +
1− PMPCM
(ADIt/NDI)PMPCS + 1
(C.2.24)
FMPC = Marginal propensity to consume [Dimensionless]
PMPCM (C.2.25) = Minimum marginal propensity to consume [Dimen-
sionless]
ADI (C.2.22) = Disposable income [$/Year]
NDI (C.2.27) = Initial (normal) disposable income [$/Year]
PMPCS (C.2.26) = Slope of the MPC function [Dimensionless]
PMPCM = 2 ·NMPC − 1 (C.2.25)
PMPCM = Minimum marginal propensity to consume [Dimen-
sionless]
NMPC (C.2.20) = Initial (normal) marginal propensity to consume [Di-
mensionless]
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PMPCS = 4 (C.2.26)
PMPCS = Slope of the MPC function [Dimensionless]
For the base case, normal MPC is set to 0.7 but other values could also be
tested for this function. Furthermore, slope of the MPC function could change.
Fig. C.2.3 shows variation of this function in response to different values of
PMPCS.
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Figure C.2.3: Marginal propensity to consume
NDI = NO −NTAXR · (NO −NWR · (NCO +NPAR)) (C.2.27)
+LGR0 ·NFTP +NWR · (NGW +NCO)−NGO
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NDI = Initial (normal) disposable income [$/Year]
NO (C.4.19) = Initial (normal) total output of the economy [$/Year]
NTAXR (C.3.33) = Initial (normal) tax rate [Dimensionless]
NWR (C.5.2) = Initial (normal) average wage rate of the working
class [$/Year-Person]
NCO (C.1.18) = Initial (normal) corrupt government officers [Person]
NPAR (C.1.43) = Initial (normal) parasites [Person]
LGR (C.3.13) = Government financial reserves [$]
NFTP (C.3.21) = Initial (normal) fraction of government financial re-
serves to be spent on transfer payments [1/Year]
NGW (C.1.16) = Initial (normal) population of workforce employed in
the government sector [Person]
NGO (C.4.35) = Initial (normal) government production [$/Year]
C.3 Government Investment
Government investment module has a capital chain similar to the private in-
vestment module (see Section C.2). Only new features are explained in this
section.
LGCt = LGC0 +
∫ t
0
(RGCFτ −RGCDτ ) · dτ (C.3.1)
LGC0 = NGC
LGC = Stock of government capital [$]
NGC (C.3.2) = Initial (normal) government capital [$]
RGCF (C.3.4) = Government capital formation rate [$/Year]
RGCD (C.2.4) = Government capital depreciation rate [$/Year]
NGC = RGCF0 · TCL (C.3.2)
NGC = Initial (normal) government capital [$]
RGCF (C.3.4) = Government capital formation rate [$/Year]
TCL (C.2.3) = Capital life [Year]
RGCDt = LGCt/TCL (C.3.3)
RGCD = Government capital depreciation rate [$/Year]
LGC (C.3.1) = Stock of government capital [$]
TCL (C.2.3) = Capital life [Year]
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RGCFt =
LGCPt · FGWAt
TCF
(C.3.4)
RGCF = Government capital formation rate [$/Year]
LGCP (C.3.5) = Government capital in progress [$]
FGWA (C.1.20) = Availability indicator of the government sector work-
force [Dimensionless]
TCF (C.2.6) = Capital formation time delay [Year]
LGCP =
∫ t
0
(RGIτ −RGCFτ ) · dτ (C.3.5)
LGCP0 = RGI0 · TCF
LGCP = Government capital in progress [$]
RGI (C.3.6) = Government sector investment rate [$/Year]
RGCF (C.3.4) = Government capital formation rate [$/Year]
TCF (C.2.6) = Capital formation time delay [Year]
Unlike the private sector’s, government investment is not driven by prof-
itability. Instead, it is driven by public needs and availability of public funds.
Unemployment rate is used as a proxy to signal the government that the econ-
omy needs state intervention so public expenditures could be adjusted accord-
ingly. As unemployment rises the government increases its investment in order
to compensate for shortage of private investment. If unemployment rate de-
clines, government expenditure will be used differently.
RGIt = LGRt ·NIF · FUGIt (C.3.6)
RGI = Government sector investment rate [$/Year]
LGR (C.3.13) = Government financial reserves [$]
NIF (C.2.9) = Initial (normal) investment fraction [1/Year]
FUGI (C.3.7) = Effect of unemployment on the government investment
rate [Dimensionless]
FUGIt =
(
2/
(
1 + e
−PUGIA·
(
(
LPURt
PNUR
)PUGIS−1
)))PUGIR
(C.3.7)
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FUGI = Effect of unemployment on the government invest-
ment rate [Dimensionless]
PUGIA (C.3.8) = A parameter that adjusts minimum of the function
FUGI; the greater the PUGIA the lower the min-
inum of FUGI [Dimensionless]
LPUR (C.3.9) = Perceived unemployment rate [Dimensionless]
PNUR (C.1.49) = Natural unemployment rate [Dimensionless]
PUGIS (C.3.10) = Slope of the function FUGI (effect of unemployment
rate on government investment) [Dimensionless]
PUGIR (C.3.11) = Variation range of the function FUGI (effect of un-
employment rate on government investment) [Dimen-
sionless]
PUGIA = 1 (C.3.8)
PUGIA = A parameter that adjusts minimum of the function FUGI;
the greater the PUGIA the lower the mininum of FUGI [Di-
mensionless]
LPURt = LPUR0 +
∫ t
0
AURτ − LPURτ
TP
· dτ (C.3.9)
LPUR0 = PNUR
LPUR = Perceived unemployment rate [Dimensionless]
PNUR (C.1.49) = Natural unemployment rate [Dimensionless]
AUR (C.1.48) = Unemployment rate [Dimensionless]
TP (C.2.12) = Perception time delay [Year]
PUGIS = 2 (C.3.10)
PUGIS = Slope of the function FUGI (effect of unemployment rate on
government investment) [Dimensionless]
PUGIR = ln
(PMGIF/NIF
ln 2
)
(C.3.11)
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PUGIR = Variation range of the function FUGI (effect of un-
employment rate on government investment) [Di-
mensionless]
PMGIF (C.3.12) = Maximum government investment fraction [1/Year]
NIF (C.2.9) = Initial (normal) investment fraction [1/Year]
PMGIF = 0.8 (C.3.12)
PMGIF = Maximum government investment fraction [1/Year]
FUGI function (Eq. C.3.7) provides a wide range of alternative state policies
for the case of government investment in response to the state of unemployment.
Fig. C.3.1 shows some of these alternatives. For example, the government
with the parameter set (PUGIS = 1.0, PUGIA = 0.5) is relatively slow in
reacting to changes in unemployment while the government with the parameter
set (PUGIS = 3.0, PUGIA = 0.1) reacts slowly only when unemployment rate
declines below normal rate. It acts rather aggressively when unemployment rises
above normal rate.
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Figure C.3.1: Effect of unemployment on government investment
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Government financial reserves is a stock that accumulates government rev-
enues. Government expenditure and investment deplete this stock.
LGRt = LGR0 +
∫ t
0
(RGRτ +RM −RGEτ −RGIτ ) · dτ (C.3.13)
LGR0 = (NTAXR · (NO −NWR · (NCO +NPAR))
− (NGW +NCO) ·NWR+NGO)/(NFTP +NIF )
LGR = Government financial reserves [$]
RGR (C.3.30) = Government revenues [$/Year]
RM (C.3.43) = Rate of issuing new money [$/Year]
RGE (C.3.14) = Government expenditure [$/Year]
RGI (C.3.6) = Government sector investment rate [$/Year]
NTAXR (C.3.33) = Initial (normal) tax rate [Dimensionless]
NO (C.4.19) = Initial (normal) total output of the economy [$/Year]
NWR (C.5.2) = Initial (normal) average wage rate of the working
class [$/Year-Person]
NCO (C.1.18) = Initial (normal) corrupt government officers [Person]
NPAR (C.1.43) = Initial (normal) parasites [Person]
NGW (C.1.16) = Initial (normal) population of workforce employed in
the government sector [Person]
NGO (C.4.35) = Initial (normal) government production [$/Year]
NFTP (C.3.21) = Initial (normal) fraction of government financial re-
serves to be spent on transfer payments [1/Year]
NIF (C.2.9) = Initial (normal) investment fraction [1/Year]
Government expenditure includes wage and transfer payments:
RGEt = LATPt +AGWt (C.3.14)
RGE = Government expenditure [$/Year]
LATP (C.3.15) = Average transfer payments [$/Year]
AGW (C.4.3) = Wages paid by the government [$/Year]
Wage payments will be discussed in Section C.5. Here, we focus on transfer
payments, though. It is assumed that governments—particularly in developing
countries—increase transfer payments in case of a natural resource windfall.
However, they do not react symmetrically when the opposite happens i.e. when
government revenues decline for whatever reason (Karl, 1997, 1999). It is be-
cause citizens become used to a certain level of consumption and any reduction
in that level of consumption could cause a significant surge in public dissatis-
faction. Such decline in public satisfaction may not be very desirable for any
government. But it can be fatal particularly for democratic governments. There-
fore, it is assumed that the level of transfer payments changes asymmetrically:
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it grows faster than it declines. This assumption is applied by selecting different
time delays for increase and decrease of transfer payments. Transfer payments
decrease more slowly than than they increase.
LATPt = LATP0 +
∫ t
0
(RTPIτ −RTPDτ ) · dτ (C.3.15)
LATP0 = NFTP · (NTAXR · (NO −NWR · (NCO +NPAR))
− (NGW +NCO) ·NWR+NGO)/(NFTP +NIF )
LATP = Average transfer payments [$/Year]
RTPI (C.3.16) = Rate of increase of transfer payments [$/Y ear2]
RTPD (C.3.17) = Rate of decline of transfer payments [$/Y ear2]
NFTP (C.3.21) = Initial (normal) fraction of government financial re-
serves to be spent on transfer payments [1/Year]
NTAXR (C.3.33) = Initial (normal) tax rate [Dimensionless]
NO (C.4.19) = Initial (normal) total output of the economy [$/Year]
NWR (C.5.2) = Initial (normal) average wage rate of the working
class [$/Year-Person]
NCO (C.1.18) = Initial (normal) corrupt government officers [Person]
NPAR (C.1.43) = Initial (normal) parasites [Person]
NGW (C.1.16) = Initial (normal) population of workforce employed in
the government sector [Person]
NGO (C.4.35) = Initial (normal) government production [$/Year]
NIF (C.2.9) = Initial (normal) investment fraction [1/Year]
RTPIt =
max(0, ADTPt − LATPt)
TTPI
(C.3.16)
RTPI = Rate of increase of transfer payments [$/Y ear2]
ADTP (C.3.20) = Desired transfer payments [$/Year]
LATP (C.3.15) = Average transfer payments [$/Year]
TTPI (C.3.18) = Time delay to increase transfer payments [Year]
RTPDt = −min(0, ADTPt − LATPt)
TTPD
(C.3.17)
RTPD = Rate of decline of transfer payments [$/Y ear2]
ADTP (C.3.20) = Desired transfer payments [$/Year]
TTPD (C.3.19) = Time delay to decrease transfer payments [Year]
TTPI = 2 (C.3.18)
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TTPI = Time delay to increase transfer payments [Year]
TTPD = 5 (C.3.19)
TTPD = Time delay to decrease transfer payments [Year]
Transfer payments mainly depend on availability of government financial
reserves. Another factor, however, is the government’s perception of its own
popularity. If the government realizes that citizens are not satisfied with the
current state of governance, a compensation in the form of transfer payments
may be launched.
ADTPt = NFTP · LGRt ·max(1, FSTPt) (C.3.20)
ADTP = Desired transfer payments [$/Year]
NFTP (C.3.21) = Initial (normal) fraction of government financial re-
serves to be spent on transfer payments [1/Year]
LGR (C.3.13) = Government financial reserves [$]
FSTP (C.3.22) = Effect of government popularity on transfer payments
[Dimensionless]
NFTP = 0.1 (C.3.21)
NFTP = Initial (normal) fraction of government financial reserves to be
spent on transfer payments [1/Year]
FSTPt = PSTPM +
2 · (1− PSTPM)
LPPSPSTPSt + 1
(C.3.22)
FSTP = Effect of government popularity on transfer pay-
ments
PSTPM (C.3.23) = Minimum of the function FSTP (effect of govern-
ment popularity on transfer payments) [Dimension-
less]
LPPS (C.3.25) = Perceived government popularity [Dimensionless]
PSTPS (C.3.29) = Slope of the function FSTP (effect of government
popularity on transfer payments) [Dimensionless]
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PSTPM =
2 ·NFTP − PTFM
NFTP
(C.3.23)
PSTPM = Minimum of the function FSTP (effect of government
popularity on transfer payments) [Dimensionless]
NFTP (C.3.21) = Initial (normal) fraction of government financial re-
serves to be spent on transfer payments [1/Year]
PTFM (C.3.24) = Maximum fraction of transfer payments [1/Year]
PTFM = 2 ·NFTP − (NFTP
PTFL
)PSTPR (C.3.24)
PTFM = Maximum fraction of transfer payments [1/Year]
NFTP (C.3.21) = Initial (normal) fraction of government financial re-
serves to be spent on transfer payments [1/Year]
PTFL (C.3.27) = Ultimate limit for fraction of transfer payments
[1/Year]
PSTPR (C.3.28) = Parameter to change variation range of the function
FSTP (effect of government popularity on transfer
payments); the higher PSTPR the wider the varia-
tion range [Dimensionless]
LPPSt = LPPS0 +
∫ t
0
LPSτ − LPPSτ
TP
· dτ (C.3.25)
LPPS0 = 1 (C.3.26)
LPPS = Perceived government popularity [Dimensionless]
LPS (C.7.11) = State popularity [Dimensionless]
TP (C.2.12) = Perception time delay [Year]
PTFL = 1 (C.3.27)
PTFL = Ultimate limit for fraction of transfer payments [1/Year]
PSTPR = 2 (C.3.28)
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PSTPR = Parameter to change variation range of the function FSTP
(effect of government popularity on transfer payments); the
higher PSTPR the wider the variation range [Dimensionless]
PSTPS = 1.5 (C.3.29)
PSTPS = Slope of the function FSTP (effect of government popularity
on transfer payments) [Dimensionless]
This function is meticulously designed so that the fraction of transfer pay-
ments never exceed a plausible range. Shape of the function with different
selection of parameters is illustrated in Fig. C.3.2. Different shapes represent
different transfer payments adjustment policies when reacting to the public opin-
ion about the government. Some governments might be more responsive while
others may be reluctant to change. Although financial restriction may force
governments to limit their public expenditures and transfer payments, but it is
assumed that government popularity higher than normal level will not cause a
decline in such payments. This assumption could be changed for experimental
purposes though.
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Figure C.3.2: Effect of government popularity on transfer payments
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Although the government can have budget deficit for short- and mid-term
but expenditure and investment must be covered by stream of revenues in the
long-term8. Government revenues consist of tax and revenues from production of
goods and services9 which includes production and export of natural resources.
RGRt = ATAXt +AGOt (C.3.30)
RGR = Government revenues [$/Year]
ATAX (C.3.31) = Government tax revenues [$/Year]
AGO (C.4.27) = Total economic output of the government [$/Year]
Government production (AGO) will be explained in Section C.4. Here we
focus on tax revenues. A fraction of taxable output (ATO) will be received by
the government as tax revenues.
ATAXt = ATRt ·ATOt · FTAXCt (C.3.31)
ATAX = Government tax revenues [$/Year]
ATR (C.3.32) = Tax rate [Dimensionless]
ATO (C.3.42) = Taxable economic output [$/Year]
FTAXC (C.3.40) = Tax collectability [Dimensionless]
An important property of natural resource windfall aftermath—particularly
for the case of developing (or underdeveloped) nations with democratic political
systems—is that authorities receiving these revenues spend them to gain short-
term political benefits (Robinson et al., 2006). For instance, they cut tax rates,
or—as we saw earlier—increase public expenditures. Thus, tax rate in the model
is a function of financial situation of the government. If government financial
status improves, tax rate declines. The opposite could also happen but—as we
will see soon—a rise in the tax rate does not necessarily translate into higher
tax revenues. In fact, it requires a powerful, legitimate government to effectively
collect taxes.
ATRt = NTAXR · FGRCTt (C.3.32)
ATR = Tax rate [Dimensionless]
NTAXR (C.3.33) = Initial (normal) tax rate [Dimensionless]
FGRCT (C.3.34) = Effect of government financial reserve coverage time
on tax rate [Dimensionless]
8Despite Post-Keynesian theory of money which relaxes this assumption considering no
limit for authorities to issue money (Wray, 2015), we believe that in reality, governments try
to achieve—at least a long-run—balance for their budget.
9While this may not be significant for capitalist economies, resource-rich developing coun-
tries usually have a large government-owned production sector.
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NTAXR = 0.08 (C.3.33)
NTAXR = Initial (normal) tax rate [Dimensionless]
FGRCTt = PGRCTM +
(1− PGRCTM) · (1 + PGRCTX)
PGRCTX + (AGRCt/AGRC0)PGRCTS
(C.3.34)
FGRCT = Effect of government financial reserve coverage
time on tax rate [Dimensionless]
PGRCTM (C.3.35) = Minimum of the function FGRCT (effect of gov-
ernment financial reserve coverage time on tax
rate) [Dimensionless]
PGRCTX (C.3.36) = Maximum of the function FGRCT (effect of gov-
ernment financial reserve coverage time on tax
rate) [Dimensionless]
AGRC (C.3.39) = Government financial reserve coverage time [Year]
PGRCTS (C.3.38) = Slope of the function FGRCT (effect of govern-
ment financial reserve coverage time on tax rate)
[Dimensionless]
PGRCTM = 0.8 (C.3.35)
PGRCTM = Minimum of the function FGRCT (effect of government
financial reserve coverage time on tax rate) [Dimensionless]
PGRCTX =
(PGRCTM − 1) ·NTAXR
NTAXR− PTAXRM (C.3.36)
PGRCTX = Maximum of the function FGRCT (effect of gov-
ernment financial reserve coverage time on tax
rate) [Dimensionless]
PGRCTM (C.3.35) = Minimum of the function FGRCT (effect of gov-
ernment financial reserve coverage time on tax
rate) [Dimensionless]
NTAXR (C.3.33) = Initial (normal) tax rate [Dimensionless]
PTAXRM (C.3.37) = Maximum tax rate [Dimensionless]
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PTAXRM = 0.4 (C.3.37)
PTAXRM = Maximum tax rate [Dimensionless]
PGRCTS = 2 (C.3.38)
PGRCTS = Slope of the function FGRCT (effect of government finan-
cial reserve coverage time on tax rate) [Dimensionless]
AGRCt =
LGRt
RGEt +RGIt
(C.3.39)
AGRC = Government financial reserve coverage time [Year]
LGR (C.3.13) = Government financial reserves [$]
RGE (C.3.14) = Government expenditure [$/Year]
RGI (C.3.6) = Government sector investment rate [$/Year]
Government financial coverage time—presented in Eq. C.3.39 indicates the
length of time that the current financial reserves could cover normal expenses.
In other words, it shows—given the current rate of its expenditures remain
unchanged—length of time for which the government can run without having
any revenues, borrowing, or issuing new money. If the coverage time increases,
it shows that government’s financial status is better than normal. In fact, Eq.
C.3.34 is a decision rule that may differ from government to government. As Fig.
C.3.3 shows, Eq. C.3.34 creates a wide range of possibilities so that many of the
policy-making approaches could be examined. Note that slope of the function
is the only changing parameter here. Minimum and maximum of the function
also could vary to provide even a wider selection range. These variations are
not depicted in C.3.3.
As it was mentioned before, tax revenues also depend on power of the govern-
ment. A powerful government could collect taxes more effectively than a weak
government. A tax collectability indicator is defined as a function of “state
controlling power” to take this into account:
FTAXCt =
2/
(
1 + e−PTAXCC·ASCt
)− 1
2/
(
1 + e−PTAXCC
)− 1 (C.3.40)
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Figure C.3.3: Effect of government reserve coverage on tax rate
FTAXC = Tax collectability [Dimensionless]
PTAXCC (C.3.41) = Concaveness of the function FTAXC (tax col-
lectability) [Dimensionless]
ASC (C.7.35) = State controlling power [Dimensionless]
PTAXCC = ln
(1 +NTAXR/PTAXRM
1−NTAXR/PTAXRM
)
(C.3.41)
PTAXCC = Concaveness of the function FTAXC (tax col-
lectability) [Dimensionless]
NTAXR (C.3.33) = Initial (normal) tax rate [Dimensionless]
PTAXRM (C.3.37) = Maximum tax rate [Dimensionless]
This function and its variations are illustrated in Fig. C.3.4. Note that
normal tax rate is the average tax rate that an average government could collect
taxes at. On average, some tax aversion may happen. That is why, FTAXC
could go beyond 1 meaning that if the government is more powerful than normal,
it can collect more than average tax rates.
Another important determinant of government tax revenues includes the
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Figure C.3.4: Tax collectability multiplier
total taxable economic output. Taxable output includes those economic activi-
ties that could be traced and taxed by the government. Underground economy
or those activities performed by the parasites are naturally excluded from this
definition.
ATOt = AOt −APARIt (C.3.42)
ATO = Taxable economic output [$/Year]
AO (C.4.26) = Total output of the economy [$/Year]
APARI (C.4.5) = Total income of parasites [$/Year]
If government revenues are not sufficient to cover expenditures in the long-
term new money would be issued and injected into the state reserves.
RM = max
(
0, 1− AGRCt
AGRC0
) · (RGEt +RGIt) (C.3.43)
RM = Rate of issuing new money [$/Year]
AGRC (C.3.39) = Government financial reserve coverage time [Year]
RGE (C.3.14) = Government expenditure [$/Year]
RGI (C.3.6) = Government sector investment rate [$/Year]
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C.4 Income
This section describes calculation of production and income in both private and
government sectors. It also includes the way parasites exploit the economy.
From these outputs, a rough measure of income equality will be computed.
Although income equality might not be a complete measure of equality in general
(Allison, 1978), but it is certainly a crucial factor. The goal of this chapter is
not to investigate inequality issues so, only a simple measure of equality is used
here. This sacrifice has been made for the compactness of the model. Equality
measure in this model is shown by the ratio of wages paid to the working class
to total income of the society (wages, profit, and parasite exploitations)10.
AEQt =
AWt
(APARIt +AWt +APPt)
(C.4.1)
AEQ = Income equality index [Dimensionless]
AW (C.4.2) = Total amount of wages paid to labor [$/Year]
APARI (C.4.5) = Total income of parasites [$/Year]
APP (C.4.25) = Private profit [$/Year]
AWt = AGWt +APWt (C.4.2)
AW (C.4.2) = Total amount of wages paid to labor [$/Year]
AGW (C.4.3) = Wages paid by the government [$/Year]
APW (C.4.4) = Wages paid by the private sector [$/Year]
AGWt = (LGWt + LCOt) · LWRt (C.4.3)
AGW = Wages paid by the government [$/Year]
LGW (C.1.15) = Workforce employed in the government sector [Person]
LCO (C.1.17) = Corrupt government officers: part of the government
workforce who get involved in corrupt and illegal ac-
tivities [Person]
LWR (C.5.4) = Average wage rate of the working class [$/(Year-
Person)]
10For simplicity, it is assumed that wage is the only source of income for the working class
while profit is the only source of income for the capital owners. For a more precise computation
of income equality, a per capita index must be used. Nevertheless, the model does not trace
class population so at this stage it will not be possible to have an equality index based on
income per capita of different classes. Instead it is assumed that the relative population of
classes remain more or less constant over the simulation period. With this assumption total
income of classes could be sufficient to yield a rough approximation of equality.
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APWt = LPWt · LWRt (C.4.4)
APW = Wages paid by the private sector [$/Year]
LPW (C.1.40) = Workforce employed in the private sector [Person]
LWR (C.5.4) = Average wage rate of the working class [$/(Year-
Person)]
Income of parasites depends on how much they can exploit the economy
which is in turn a function of three factors: (a) how much is available for
exploitation, (b) to what extent exploitation would be tolerated by authorities,
and (3) how corrupted the control force is. It is also affected by participation
of “corrupt officers” who would benefit from the exploitation. Exploitability is
a geometric average11 of these two factors. Relative weight of each factor in the
average function could be changed by the parameter PWEAE.
APARIt = AEPPt · (LPt + LCOt) (C.4.5)
APARI = Total income of parasites [$/Year]
AEPP (C.4.6) = Average economic output that a parasite could exploit
[$/(Year-Person)]
LP (C.1.42) = Parasites: part of workforce who do not work but enjoy
consuming of others’ production [Person]
LCO (C.1.17) = Corrupt government officers: part of the government
workforce who get involved in corrupt and illegal activ-
ities [Person]
AEPPt = NEPP · LEt (C.4.6)
AEPP = Average economic output that a parasite could exploit
[$/(Year-Person)]
NEPP (C.4.7) = Initial (normal) exploit per parasite [$/(Year-Person)]
LE (C.4.8) = Smoothed exploitability of the economy [Dimensionless]
NEPP = LWR0 (C.4.7)
11This is a geometric average because exploitability cannot happen—i.e. it must be zero—if
either of the variables affecting it declines to zero. As an extreme example, if total economic
output is zero for a particular year there would be nothing for the parasites to exploit regardless
of the state control and the level of corruption. This is also true for the other variables: if the
state is so powerful and effective it will not allow any instance of exploitation, notwithstanding
economic productivity.
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NEPP = Initial (normal) exploit per parasite [$/(Year-Person)]
LWR (C.5.4) = Average wage rate of the working class [$/(Year-Person)]
LEt = 1 +
∫ t
0
AEτ − LEτ
TEPP
dτ (C.4.8)
LE = Smoothed exploitability of the economy [Dimensionless]
AE (C.4.10) = Exploitability of the economy [Dimensionless]
TEPP (C.4.9) = Time to smooth economic output that a parasite could
exploit [Year]
TEPP = 5 (C.4.9)
TEPP = Time to smooth economic output that a parasite could exploit
[Year]
AEt = FRFE
PWRAE
t · FEFEPWEAEt (C.4.10)
· FCFE1−PWEAE−PWRAEt · (1 +AOMEt)
AE = Exploitability of the economy [Dimensionless]
FEFE (C.4.18) = Effect of economic situation on exploitability [Di-
mensionless]
PWEAE (C.4.11) = Weight of economic constraints in exploitability
function AE [Dimensionless]
FRFE (C.4.16) = Effect of corruption on exploitability [Dimension-
less]
PWRAE (C.4.12) = Weight of corruption in exploitability function AE
[Dimensionless]
FCFE (C.4.13) = Effect of state control on exploitability [Dimension-
less]
AOME (C.4.22) = Chance of exploitability from oil revenues [Dimen-
sionless]
PWEAE = 0.4 (C.4.11)
PWEAE = Weight of economic constraints in exploitability function AE
[Dimensionless]
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PWRAE = 0.4 (C.4.12)
PWRAE = Weight of corruption in exploitability function AE [Dimen-
sionless]
As (effective) controlling power of the government increases, parasites will
have less freedom to exploit the economy. Shape of this function and its variation
range could be modified by the provided parameters [see Fig. C.4.1].
FCFEt =
PECV R+ 2/
(
1 + ePECC·ASCt
)
PECV R+ 2/
(
1 + ePECC
) (C.4.13)
FCFC = Effect of state control on exploitability [Dimension-
less]
PECVR (C.4.14) = Parameter to set range of variation for the function
of exploitability from control [Dimensionless]
PECC (C.4.15) = Parameter to set convexness of the function of ex-
ploitability from control [Dimensionless]
ASC (C.7.35) = State controlling power [Dimensionless]
PECV R = 0.8 (C.4.14)
PECVR = Slope of the function of exploitability from control [Dimen-
sionless]
PECC = 3 (C.4.15)
PECC = Parameter to set convexness of the function of exploitability
from control [Dimensionless]
Corruption, to some extent, offsets the effect of the state control in two
ways. First, “corrupt officers” do not contribute to the controlling mechanism.
This per se reduces effectiveness of the state’s ability to control the exploitation.
This effect is already included in the state control though because state control
excludes “corrupt officers.” Second, since they have stake in it, “corrupt officers”
try to maximize the exploitation. This effect is replicated by Eq. C.4.16 which
is illustrated graphically in Fig. C.4.2.
154
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
ASC
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
FC
FE PECC = 3; PECVR = 0.4PECC = 1; PECVR = 0.4
PECC = 6; PECVR = 0.4
PECC = 3; PECVR = 0.1
PECC = 3; PECVR = 0.8
Figure C.4.1: Effect of state controlling power on exploitability
FRFEt =
(LCOt + 2 · LCO0
3 · LCO0
)PRFE
(C.4.16)
FRFE = Effect of corruption on exploitability [Dimensionless]
LCO (C.1.17) = Corrupt government officers: part of the government
workforce who get involved in corrupt and illegal ac-
tivities [Person]
PRFE (C.4.17) = Corruption elasticity of exploitability [Dimensionless]
PRFE = 1.5 (C.4.17)
PRFE = Corruption elasticity of exploitability [Dimensionless]
As economy becomes richer, ceteris paribus, a greater opportunity would
arise for parasite to exploit. Eq. C.4.18 captures this relationship.
FEFEt =
AOt −APARIt
NO −NPARI
PEEC
(C.4.18)
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Figure C.4.2: Effect of corruption on exploitability
FEFE = Effect of economic situation on exploitability [Dimen-
sionless]
AO (C.4.26) = Total output of the economy [$/Year]
NO (C.4.19) = Normal (initial) total output of the economy [$/Year]
APARI (C.4.5) = Total income of parasites [$/Year]
NPARI (C.4.20) = Normal (initial) total income of parasites [$/Year]
PEEC (C.4.21) = Parameter to set concaveness of the function of ex-
ploitability from adequacy of economic output [Di-
mensionless]
NO = NPO +NGO (C.4.19)
NO = Normal (initial) total output of the economy [$/Year]
NPO (C.4.41 = Initial (normal) private production [$/Year]
NGO (C.4.35) = Initial (normal) government production [$/Year]
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NPARI = NEPP · (NCO +NPAR) (C.4.20)
NPARI = Normal (initial) total income of parasites [$/Year]
NEPP (C.4.7) = Initial (normal) exploit per parasite [$/(Year-Person)]
NCO (C.1.18) = Initial (normal) corrupt government officers [Person]
NPAR (C.1.43) = Initial (normal) parasites [Person]
PEEC = 1 (C.4.21)
PEEC = Parameter to set concaveness of the function of exploitability
from adequacy of economic output [Dimensionless]
Another source of exploitation is the natural resource revenue which provides
a significant rent (Karl, 1997, 1999). So, as natural resource revenue increases,
chance of exploitation increases too. This chance, nevertheless, could be affected
by the institutional setting of the society. A society with “good” institutions
could limit the exploitation of natural resource revenues (Mehlum et al., 2006).
Eq. C.4.23 which is depicted in Fig. C.4.3 represent this assumption.
AOMEt = FOMEt · AOEXPt
AOt
(C.4.22)
AOME = Chance of exploitability from oil revenues [Dimension-
less]
FOME (C.4.23) = Effect of good institutions on exploitability of oil rev-
enues [Dimensionless]
AOEXP (C.8.1) = Oil Export [$/Year]
AO (C.4.26) = Total output of the economy [$/Year]
FOMEt =
5(LGIt
LGI0
)POME
+ 4
(C.4.23)
FOME = Effect of good institutions on exploitability of oil rev-
enues [Dimensionless]
LGI (C.1.26) = Number of good institutions [Dimensionless]
POME (C.4.24) = Concaveness of the function FOME [Dimensionless]
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POMEt = 2 (C.4.24)
POME = Concaveness of the function FOME [Dimensionless]
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Figure C.4.3: Effect of good institutions on exploitability of oil revenues
As mentioned before, the only source of income for capital owners is the
profit from production. Profit is simply the difference between production value
and total wage which is paid to the labor.
APPt = APOt −APWt (C.4.25)
APP = Private profit [$/Year]
APO (C.4.39) = Total economic output of the private sector [$/Year]
APW (C.4.4) = Wages paid by the private sector [$/Year]
Total output of the economy consists of government and private production:
AOt = AGOt +APOt (C.4.26)
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AO = Total output of the economy [$/Year]
AGO (C.4.27) = Total economic output of the government [$/Year]
APO (C.4.39) = Total economic output of the private sector [$/Year]
Goods and services produced in the economy are classified into two cate-
gories: traded and non-traded. This is to capture the impact of natural re-
source windfall on reallocation of production factors which results in decline
of production of traded goods and services in favor of non-traded goods and
services.
AGOt =LTPFt ·AGPROt · LTPIt · LEPTGt (C.4.27)
+ (1− LTPFt) ·AGPROt · LNTPIt +AOEXPt
AGO = Total economic output of the government [$/Year]
LTPF (C.4.28) = Fraction of production capacity allocated to traded
goods sector [Dimensionless]
AGPRO (C.4.34) = Production capacity in the government sector
[$/Year]
LTPI (C.5.9) = Price index of traded goods [Dimensionless]
LEPTG (C.4.32) = Effect of experience on production of traded goods
[Dimensionless]
LNTPI (C.5.21) = Price index of non-traded goods [Dimensionless]
AOEXP (C.8.1) = Oil Export [$/Year]
Relative price indexes in traded and non-traded sectors determine the frac-
tion of production capacity that must be allocated to each sector. This reallo-
cation, however, is subject to a time delay represented by TRPF (C.4.31).
LTPFt = LTPF0 +
∫ t
0
ATPFτ − LTPFτ
TRPF
· dτ (C.4.28)
LTPF0 = 1−NNTPF
LTPF = Fraction of production capacity allocated to traded
goods sector [Dimensionless]
NNTPF (C.4.29) = Initial (normal) fraction of production capacity allo-
cated to non-traded goods sector [Dimensionless]
ATPF (C.4.30) = Indicated fraction of production capacity allocated
to traded goods sector [Dimensionless]
TRPF (C.4.31) = Time delay to reallocate production factors [Year]
NNTPF = 0.6 (C.4.29)
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NNTPF = Initial (normal) fraction of production capacity allocated to
non-traded goods sector [Dimensionless]
ATPFt =
(
1−NNTPF
)(LNTPIt
LTPIt
)
(C.4.30)
ATPF = Indicated fraction of production capacity allocated
to traded goods sector [Dimensionless]
NNTPF (C.4.29) = Initial (normal) fraction of production capacity allo-
cated to non-traded goods sector [Dimensionless]
LNTPI (C.5.21) = Price index of non-traded goods [Dimensionless]
LTPI (C.5.9) = Price index of traded goods [Dimensionless]
TRPF = 5 (C.4.31)
TRPF = Time delay to reallocate production factors [Year]
One important aspect of the Dutch Disease theory that was particularly
highlighted in the system dynamics literature (Mashayekhi, 1978; Moxnes, 1983)
is that a reallocation of resources from traded goods to non-traded goods sector
could significantly harm the economy due to the lost experience in the produc-
tion of traded goods that might happen as a subsequent to the initial resource
reallocation. As identified by van der Ploeg (2011), this is one of the explana-
tions for the natural resource curse. A simple mechanism of experience accu-
mulation/decumulation is employed to capture this phenomenon. As fraction
of production capacity allocated to the traded sector increases, the experience
increases beyond its normal (equilibrium) state through learning by doing pro-
cess.
LEPTGt = LEPTG0 +
∫ t
0
LTPFτ
1−NNTPF − LEPTGτ
TLBD
· dτ (C.4.32)
LEPTG0 = 1
160
LEPTG = Effect of experience on production of traded goods
[Dimensionless]
LTPF (C.4.28) = Fraction of production capacity allocated to traded
goods sector [Dimensionless]
NNTPF (C.4.29) = Initial (normal) fraction of production capacity allo-
cated to non-traded goods sector [Dimensionless]
TLBD (C.4.33) = Time delay to accumulate experience from produc-
tion [Year]
TLBD = 10 (C.4.33)
TLBD = Time delay to accumulate experience from production [Year]
Production capacity in the model is defined as a variation of Cobb-Douglas
production function.
AGPROt = 0.5 ·NGO · 1− LCRFt
1−NCRF ·
(LGWt
NGW
)PLE
(C.4.34)
·
(
1 +
(AGRCAPt
NGC
)PCE)
AGPRO = Production capacity in the government sector
[$/Year]
NGO (C.4.35) = Initial (normal) government production [$/Year]
LCRF (C.7.40) = Fraction of government resources allocated to con-
trol means [Dimensionless]
NCRF (C.7.36) = Initial (normal) fraction of government resources
allocated to control means [Dimensionless]
LGW (C.1.15) = Workforce employed in the government sector [Per-
son]
NGW (C.1.16) = Initial (normal) government sector workforce [Per-
son]
PLE (C.4.36) = Output elasticity of labor [Dimensionless]
AGRCAP (C.4.38) = Real capital in the government sector [$]
NGC (C.3.2) = Initial (normal) government capital [$]
PCE (C.4.37) = Output elasticity of capital [Dimensionless]
NGO = NWR ·NGW (C.4.35)
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NGO = Initial (normal) government production [$/Year]
NWR (C.5.2) = Initial (normal) average wage rate of the working class
[$/(Year-Person)]
NGW (C.1.16) = Initial (normal) government sector workforce [Person]
PLE = 0.6 (C.4.36)
PLE = Output elasticity of labor [Dimensionless]
PCE = 0.4 (C.4.37)
PCE = Output elasticity of capital [Dimensionless]
AGRCAPt =
LTPFt · LGCt
LTPIt
+
(1− LTPFt) · LGCt
LNTPIt
(C.4.38)
AGRCAP = Real capital in the government sector [$]
LTPF (C.4.28) = Fraction of production capacity allocated to traded
goods sector [Dimensionless]
LGC (C.3.1) = Government capital [$]
LTPI (C.5.9) = Price index of traded goods [Dimensionless]
LNTPI (C.5.21) = Price index of non-traded goods [Dimensionless]
Production in the private sector uses the same format as the government
production does. The only differences are exclusion of oil export AOEXP from
the private production and variations in some parameters.
APOt =LTPFt ·APPROt · LTPIt · LEPTGt (C.4.39)
+ (1− LTPFt) ·APPROt · LNTPIt
APO = Total economic output of the private sector [$/Year]
LTPF (C.4.28) = Fraction of production capacity allocated to traded
goods sector [Dimensionless]
APPRO = Production capacity in the private sector [$/Year]
LTPI (C.5.9) = Price index of traded goods [Dimensionless]
LEPTG (C.4.32) = Effect of experience on production of traded goods
[Dimensionless]
LTPF (C.4.28) = Fraction of production capacity allocated to traded
goods sector [Dimensionless]
LNTPI (C.5.21) = Price index of non-traded goods [Dimensionless]
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APPROt = 0.5 ·NPO ·
(LPWt
NPW
)PLE · (1 + (APRCAPt
NPC
)PCE)
(C.4.40)
APPRO = Production capacity in the private sector [$/Year]
NPO (C.4.41 = Initial (normal) private production [$/Year]
LPW (C.1.40) = Workforce employed in the private sector [Person]
NPW (C.1.41) = Initial (normal) private sector workforce [Person]
APRCAP (C.4.42) = Real capital in the private sector [$]
NPC (C.2.2) = Initial (normal) private capital [$]
PCE (C.4.37) = Output elasticity of capital [Dimensionless]
NPO = 2 ·NWR ·NPW (C.4.41)
NPO = Initial (normal) private production [$/Year]
NWR (C.5.2) = Initial (normal) average wage rate of the working class
[$/(Year-Person)]
NPW (C.1.41) = Initial (normal) private sector workforce [Person]
APRCAPt =
LTPFt · LPCt
LTPIt
+
(1− LTPFt) · LPCt
LNTPIt
(C.4.42)
APRCAP = Real capital in the private sector [$]
LPC (C.2.1) = Stock of private capital [$]
LTPF (C.4.28) = Fraction of production capacity allocated to traded
goods sector [Dimensionless]
LTPI (C.5.9) = Price index of traded goods [Dimensionless]
LNTPI (C.5.21) = Price index of non-traded goods [Dimensionless]
Finally, the more the parasites earn the more attractive it becomes for others
to follow their footsteps. So, attractiveness of such activities including rent
seeking could be given by comparing parasite income and average labor wage.
AAPt =
AEPPt
LWRt
(C.4.43)
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AAP = Attractiveness of being parasite [Dimensionless]
AEPP (C.4.6) = Average economic output that a parasite could exploit
[$/(Year-Person)]
LWR (C.5.4) = Average wage rate of the working class [$/(Year-
Person)]
C.5 Price & Wage
“Price & Wage” computes wage rate of the working class in the society as well
as prices of good and services. Wage rate is determined by unemployment rate
which is used as a proxy for the labor demand-supply ratio. As unemploy-
ment increases wage rates decline. In contrast, a decline in unemployment rate
puts pressure on wage rates to increase. Wage elasticity of unemployment rate,
nonetheless, could be controlled by the parameter PWS (wage stickiness). The
base model assumes no wage stickiness though.
AWRt = NWR ·
(PNUR
AURt
)1−PWS
(C.5.1)
AWR = Indicated wage rate of the working class [$/(Year-
Person)]
NWR (C.5.2) = Initial (normal) average wage rate of the working class
[$/(Year-Person)]
PNUR (C.1.49) = Natural unemployment rate [Dimensionless]
AUR (C.1.48) = Unemployment rate [Dimensionless]
PWS (C.5.3) = Wage stickiness [Dimensionless]
NWR = 4 (C.5.2)
NWR = Initial (normal) average wage rate of the working class [$/(Year-
Person)]12
PWS = 0 (C.5.3)
PWS = Wage stickiness (0 indicates no stickiness; 1 indicates absolute
stickiness) [Dimensionless]
12Numerical value of this parameter is not of importance. What matters in our analysis is
only the variables’ qualitative changes of behavior over time.
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It takes time for wage rates to adjusts themselves with the market changes.
Also note that the average wage rate could increase (RWI: C.5.5) faster than
it decreases (RWD: C.5.7) due to wage down stickiness (PWDS: C.5.8). Base
model assumes no down stickiness but different levels of stickiness could be
tested as alternative scenarios.
LWRt = LWR0 +
∫ t
0
(RWIτ −RWDτ ) · dτ (C.5.4)
LWR0 = NWR
LWR = Average wage rate of the working class [$/(Year-Person)]
NWR (C.5.2) = Initial (normal) average wage rate of the working class
[$/(Year-Person)]
RWI (C.5.5) = Wage increase rate [$/(Person · Y ear2)]
RWD (C.5.7) = Wage decrease rate [$/(Person · Y ear2)]
RWIt =
max(0, AWRt − LWRt)
TWA
(C.5.5)
RWI = Wage increase rate [$/(Person · Y ear2)]
AWR (C.5.1) = Indicated wage rate of the working class [$/(Year-
Person)]
LWR (C.5.4) = Average wage rate of the working class [$/(Year-Person)]
TWA (C.5.6) = Time delay for wage rates to adjust [Year]
TWA = 5 (C.5.6)
TWA = Time delay for wage rates to adjust [Year]
RWDt = (1− PWDS) · −MIN(0, AWRt − LWRt)
TWA
(C.5.7)
RWD = Wage decrease rate [$/(Person · Y ear2)]
PWDS (C.5.3) = Wage down stickiness [Dimensionless]
AWR (C.5.1) = Indicated wage rate of the working class [$/(Year-
Person)]
LWR (C.5.4) = Average wage rate of the working class [$/(Year-
Person)]
TWA (C.5.6) = Time delay for wage rates to adjust [Year]
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PWDS = 0 (C.5.8)
PWDS = Wage down stickiness (0 indicates no stickiness; 1 indicates
absolute stickiness) [Dimensionless]
This section also describes the mechanism of changes in price index in two
markets: traded and non-traded goods and services. The mechanism is simi-
lar in both markets. Hence, one of them only is explained here. Price index
adjusts itself with the indicated (instantaneous) price, but with a delay. Fur-
thermore, average price could increase (RTRPI: C.5.10) faster than it decreases
(RTRPD: C.5.11) due to price down stickiness (PWDS: C.5.8). Base model
assumes no down stickiness but different levels of stickiness could be tested as
alternative scenarios. Initial price is set to the base price index i.e. 1.
LTPIt = LTPI0 +
∫ t
0
(RTRPIτ −RTRPDτ ) · dτ (C.5.9)
LTPI0 = 1
LTPI = Price index of traded goods [Dimensionless]
RTRPI (C.5.10) = Increase rate of price of traded goods and services
[1/Year]
RTRPD (C.5.11) = Decrease rate of price of traded goods and services
[1/Year]
RTRPIt =
max(0, ATPIt − LTPIt)
TPA
(C.5.10)
RTRPI = Increase rate of price of traded goods and services
[1/Year]
ATPI (C.5.14) = Indicated price index of traded goods and services [Di-
mensionless]
LTPI (C.5.9) = Price index of traded goods [Dimensionless]
TPA (C.5.9) = Time delay for prices to adjust [Year]
RTRPDt = (1− PTPDS) · −min(0, ATPIt − LTPIt)
TPA
(C.5.11)
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RTRPD = Decrease rate of price of traded goods and services
[1/Year]
PTPDS (C.5.12) = Down stickiness of traded goods price [Dimension-
less]
ATPI (C.5.14) = Indicated price index of traded goods and services
[Dimensionless]
LTPI (C.5.9) = Price index of traded goods [Dimensionless]
TPA (C.5.9) = Time delay for prices to adjust [Year]
PTPDS = 0 (C.5.12)
PTPDS = Down stickiness of traded goods price (0 indicates no sticki-
ness; 1 indicates absolute stickiness) [Dimensionless]
TPA = 5 (C.5.13)
TPA = Time delay for prices to adjust [Year]
Indicated price is determined by supply-demand ratio. A general price stick-
iness (PTPS: C.5.15) could also be applied. Base model assumes no price
stickiness though.
ATPIt =
(RTDt
RTS
)1−PTPS
(C.5.14)
ATPI = Indicated price index of traded goods and services [Di-
mensionless]
RTD (C.5.16) = Demand for traded goods [$/Year]
RTS (C.5.18) = Supply of traded goods [$/Year]
PTPS (C.5.15) = Stickiness of traded goods price [Dimensionless]
PTPS = 0 (C.5.15)
PTPS = Stickiness of traded goods price (0 indicates no stickiness; 1
indicates absolute stickiness) [Dimensionless]
Demand for traded goods and services is a simple equation based on national
accounting definition.
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RTDt = ARNOEt + (1−NNTPF ) · RGIt +RPIt +APCt
LTPIt
(C.5.16)
RTD = Demand for traded goods [$/Year]
ARNOE (C.5.17) = Real non-oil exports [$/Year]
NNTPF (C.4.29) = Initial (normal) fraction of production capacity al-
located to non-traded goods sector [Dimensionless]
RGI (C.3.6) = Government sector investment rate [$/Year]
RPI (C.2.8) = Private sector investment rate [$/Year]
APC (C.2.23) = Private consumption [$/Year]
LTPI (C.5.9) = Price index of traded goods [Dimensionless]
ARNOEt =
AEXPt −AOEXPt
LERt
(C.5.17)
ARNOE = Real non-oil exports [$/Year]
AEXP (C.6.11) = Exports [$/Year]
AOEXP (C.8.1) = Oil exports [$/Year]
LER (C.6.1) = Exchange rate [Dimensionless]
Supply of traded goods and services include domestic supply and imports.
RTSt = ATPROt +ARIMPt (C.5.18)
RTS = Supply of traded goods [$/Year]
ATPRO (C.5.19) = Production of traded goods and services [$/Year]
ARIMP (C.5.20) = Real imports [$/Year]
ATPROt = (APPROt +AGPROt) · LTPFt · LEPTGt (C.5.19)
ATPRO = Production of traded goods and services [$/Year]
APPRO (C.4.40) = Production capacity in the private sector [$/Year]
AGPRO (C.4.34) = Production capacity in the government sector
[$/Year]
LTPF (C.4.28) = Fraction of production capacity allocated to traded
goods sector [Dimensionless]
LEPTG (C.4.32) = Effect of experience on production of traded goods
[Dimensionless]
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ARIMPt =
AIMPt
LERt
(C.5.20)
ARIMP = Real imports [$/Year]
AIMP (C.6.19) = Imports [$/Year]
LER (C.6.1) = Exchange rate [Dimensionless]
As it was mentioned earlier, price adjustment in the non-traded goods market
is similar to the traded-goods’. Major difference, however, is that unlike what we
have seen for the traded sector, international trade is irrelevant for non-traded
market. In other words for such market, supply (RNTS: C.5.28) excludes
imports and exports are excluded from demand (RNTD: C.5.27).
LNTPIt = LNTPI0 +
∫
(RNTPIτ −RNTPDτ ) · dτ (C.5.21)
LNTPI0 = 1
LNTPI = Price index of non-traded goods [Dimensionless]
RNTPI (C.5.22) = Increase rate of price of non-traded goods and ser-
vices [1/Year]
RNTPD (C.5.23) = Decrease rate of price of non-traded goods and ser-
vices [1/Year]
RNTPIt =
max(0, ANTPIt − LNTPIt)
TPA
(C.5.22)
RNTPI = Increase rate of price of non-traded goods and ser-
vices [1/Year]
ANTPI (C.5.25) = Indicated price index of non-traded goods and ser-
vices [Dimensionless]
LNTPI (C.5.21) = Price index of non-traded goods [Dimensionless]
TPA (C.5.9) = Time delay for prices to adjust [Year]
RNTPDt = (1− PNTPDS) · −MIN(0, ANTPI − LNTPI)
TPA
(C.5.23)
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RNTPD = Decrease rate of price of non-traded goods and ser-
vices [1/Year]
PNTPDS (C.5.24) = Down stickiness of non-traded goods price [Dimen-
sionless]
ANTPI (C.5.25) = Indicated price index of non-traded goods and ser-
vices [Dimensionless]
LNTPI (C.5.21) = Price index of non-traded goods [Dimensionless]
TPA (C.5.9) = Time delay for prices to adjust [Year]
PNTPDS = 0 (C.5.24)
PNTPDS = Down stickiness of non-traded goods price (0 indicates no
stickiness; 1 indicates absolute stickiness) [Dimensionless]
ANTPIt =
(RNTDt
RNTSt
)1−PNTPS
(C.5.25)
ANTPI = Indicated price index of non-traded goods and ser-
vices [Dimensionless]
RNTD (C.5.27) = Demand for non-traded goods [$/Year]
RNTS (C.5.28) = Supply of non-traded goods [$/Year]
PNTPS (C.5.26) = Stickiness of non-traded goods price (0 indicates no
stickiness; 1 indicates absolute stickiness) [Dimen-
sionless]
PNTPS = 0 (C.5.26)
PNTPS = Stickiness of non-traded goods price [Dimensionless]
RNTDt = NNTPF · RGIt +RPIt +APCt
LNTPIt
(C.5.27)
RNTD = Demand for non-traded goods [$/Year]
NNTPF (C.4.29) = Initial (normal) fraction of production capacity allo-
cated to non-traded goods sector [Dimensionless]
RGI (C.3.6) = Government sector investment rate [$/Year]
RPI (C.2.8) = Private sector investment rate [$/Year]
APC (C.2.23) = Private consumption [$/Year]
LNTPI (C.5.21) = Price index of non-traded goods [Dimensionless]
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RNTSt = (APPROt +AGPROt) · (1− LTPFt) (C.5.28)
RNTS = Supply of non-traded goods [$/Year]
APPRO (C.4.40) = Production capacity in the private sector [$/Year]
AGPRO (C.4.34) = Production capacity in the government sector
[$/Year]
LTPF (C.4.28) = Fraction of production capacity allocated to traded
goods sector [Dimensionless]
C.6 Foreign Exchange
In this section we discuss how the foreign exchange rate and its apparatus are
captured in the model. Foreign exchange rate does not change spontaneously in
the model but with a delay. The model also can take symmetric and down stick-
iness of foreign exchange rate, the base model does not include this assumption
though.
LERt = LER0 +
∫ t
0
(RERIτ −RERDτ ) · dτ (C.6.1)
LER0 = 1
LER = Foreign exchange rate [Dimensionless]
RERI (C.6.2) = Exchange rate increase rate [1/Year]
RERD (C.6.3) = Exchange rate decrease rate [1/Year]
RERIt =
max(0, AERt − LERt)
TPA
(C.6.2)
RERI = Exchange rate increase rate [1/Year]
AER (C.6.5) = Indicated exchange rate [Dimensionless]
LER (C.6.1) = Foreign exchange rate [Dimensionless]
TPA (C.5.13) = Time delay for prices to adjust [Year]
RERDt = (1− PDSER) · −min(0, AERt − LERt)
TPA
(C.6.3)
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RERD = Exchange rate decrease rate [1/Year]
PDSER (C.6.4) = Down stickiness of exchange rate [Dimensionless]
AER (C.6.5) = Indicated exchange rate [Dimensionless]
LER (C.6.1) = Foreign exchange rate [Dimensionless]
TPA (C.5.13) = Time delay for prices to adjust [Year]
PDSER = 0 (C.6.4)
PDSER = Down stickiness of exchange rate [Dimensionless]
Foreign exchange rate could be affected by many political and economic
factors. Particularly, Mashayekhi (1991) examines the dynamics of foreign ex-
change in an oil exporting country. In this model, however, the main factor
influencing the exchange rate is the balance between supply and demand of for-
eign exchange in the domestic economy. This is represented by AEC (foreign
exchange coverage time) which indicates adequacy of foreign exchange reserves
to cover current level of imports (and any other international financial obliga-
tion).
AERt =
(NEC
AECt
)1−PSER
(C.6.5)
AER = Indicated exchange rate [Dimensionless]
NEC (C.6.6) = Initial (normal) foreign exchange coverage time [Year]
AEC (C.6.8) = Coverage time of foreign exchange reserves [Year]
PSER (C.6.7) = Exchange rate stickiness [Dimensionless]
NEC = 2 · NFE
NT
(C.6.6)
NEC = Initial (normal) foreign exchange coverage time [Year]
NFE (C.6.10) = Initial (normal) level of foreign exchange reserves [$]
NT (C.6.13) = Initial (normal) international trade [$/Year]
PSER = 0 (C.6.7)
PSER = Exchange rate stickiness [Dimensionless]
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AECt =
LFEt
AIMPt
(C.6.8)
AEC = Coverage time of foreign exchange reserves [Year]
LFE (C.6.9) = Level of foreign exchange reserves [$]
AIMP (C.6.19) = Imports [$/Year]
Foreign exchange reserves is a stock that accumulates inflow of exchange
that is gained through international transactions and declines though payments
the country has to make for imports on any other international obligation.
LFEt = LFE0 +
∫ t
0
(AEXPτ −AIMPτ −RNDPτ ) · dτ (C.6.9)
LFE0 = NFE
LFE = Level of foreign exchange reserves [$]
NFE (C.6.10) = Initial (normal) level of foreign exchange reserves [$]
AEXP (C.6.11) = Exports [$/Year]
AIMP (C.6.19) = Imports [$/Year]
RNDP (C.6.28) = Net foreign debt payment [$/Year]
NFE = 30000 (C.6.10)
NFE = Initial (normal) level of foreign exchange reserves [$]13
Exports are made based on the desired export but they are also limited by
international trade capacity.
AEXPt = ADEXPt · LERt · FTCMt +AOEXPt (C.6.11)
AEXP = Exports [$/Year]
ADEXP (C.6.12) = Desired export [$/Year]
LER (C.6.1) = Foreign exchange rate [Dimensionless]
FTCM (C.6.14) = Multiplier for adequacy of trade capacity [Dimen-
sionless]
AOEXP (C.8.1) = Oil Export [$/Year]
13Absolute numerical value of this parameter is not of importance. What matters is its
relative value to other parameters of the model. In fact, we are only interested in qualitative
changes of variables over time not their quantitative values.
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Desired export is a function of real exchange rate. A depreciation of real
exchange rate encourages exports and vice versa.
ADEXPt = 0.5 ·NT · LERt
LTPIt
(C.6.12)
ADEXP = Desired export [$/Year]
NT (C.6.13) = Initial (normal) international trade [$/Year]
LER (C.6.1) = Foreign exchange rate [Dimensionless]
LTPI (C.5.9) = Price index of traded goods [Dimensionless]
NT = 6000 (C.6.13)
NT = Initial (normal) international trade [$/Year]14
International trade requires various types of transportation infrastructure
including harbors, airports, transit highways, etc. as well as facilities such as
border customs and trade institutions. Inadequacy of such foundations may
limit international trade. Eq. C.6.14 imposes such limitation. Variations of this
function are depicted in Fig. C.6.1.
FTCMt = min
(
1, (1 + PTCM) · LTCt/ADTt(
PTCM + LTCt/ADTt
)) (C.6.14)
FTCM = Multiplier for adequacy of trade capacity [Dimension-
less]
PTCM (C.6.15) = Concaveness of the function FTCM (Multiplier for
adequacy of trade capacity) [Dimensionless]
LTC (C.6.16) = Trade capacity [$/Year]
ADT (C.6.18) = Desired trade [$/Year]
PTCM = 4 (C.6.15)
PTCM = Concaveness of the function FTCM (Multiplier for adequacy
of trade capacity) [Dimensionless]
14Absolute numerical value of this parameter is not of importance. What matters is its
relative value to other parameters of the model. In fact, we are only interested in qualitative
changes of variables over time not their quantitative values.
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Figure C.6.1: Effect of trade capacity on international trade
Trade capacity (infrastructure) needs time to develop. So, we have:
LTCt = LTC0 +
∫ t
0
ADTτ − LTCτ
TTCA
· dτ (C.6.16)
LTC0 = NT
LTC = Trade capacity [$/Year]
NT (C.6.13) = Initial (normal) international trade [$/Year]
ADT (C.6.18) = Desired trade [$/Year]
TTCA (C.6.17) = Time delay to adjust trade capacity [Year]
TTCA = 5 (C.6.17)
TTCA = Time delay to adjust trade capacity [Year]
ADTt = ADEXPt +ADIMPt (C.6.18)
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ADT = Desired trade [$/Year]
ADEXP (C.6.12) = Desired export [$/Year]
ADIMP (C.6.22) = Desired imports [$/Year]
In addition to trade capacity constraints, adequacy of foreign exchange re-
serves impose another limitation on imports.
AIMPt = ADIMPt · LERt · FTCMt · FEAt (C.6.19)
AIMP = Imports [$/Year]
ADIMP (C.6.22) = Desired imports [$/Year]
LER (C.6.1) = Foreign exchange rate [Dimensionless]
FTCM (C.6.14) = Multiplier for adequacy of trade capacity [Dimen-
sionless]
FEA (C.6.20) = Foreign exchange availability indicator [Dimension-
less]
Availability of foreign exchange is presented by Eq. C.6.20 which in terms
of shape is similar to Eq. C.6.14 above.
FEAt = (1 + PEA) · LFEt/NFE
PEA+ LFEt/NFE
(C.6.20)
FEA = Foreign exchange availability indicator [Dimensionless]
PEA (C.6.21) = Concaveness of the function FEA (foreign exchange
availability indicator) [Dimensionless]
LFE (C.6.9) = Level of foreign exchange reserves [$]
NFE (C.6.10) = Initial (normal) level of foreign exchange reserves [$]
PEA = 0.5 (C.6.21)
PEA = Concaveness of the function FEA (foreign exchange availability
indicator) [Dimensionless]
Appreciation of real exchange rate encourages imports:
ADIMPt = LNIMPt · LTPIt
LERt
(C.6.22)
ADIMP = Desired imports [$/Year]
LNIMP (C.6.23) = Normal imports [$/Year]
LTPI (C.5.9) = Price index of traded goods [Dimensionless]
LER (C.6.1) = Foreign exchange rate [Dimensionless]
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According to Mashayekhi (1998), societies could become accustomed to cer-
tain levels of imports. While import dependency could easily expand, it would
be relatively more difficult to reduce that level of dependency. To capture this
phenomenon a normal level of import is defined in the model that dynamically
adapts to the current level of imports. This normal import increases faster than
it declines:
LNIMPt = LNIMP0 +
∫ t
0
(RNIIτ −RNIDτ ) · dτ (C.6.23)
LNIMP0 = 0.5 ·NT
LNIMP = Normal imports [$/Year]
NT (C.6.13) = Initial (normal) international trade [$/Year]
RNII (C.6.24) = Normal imports increase rate [$/(Y ear2)]
RNID (C.6.25) = Normal imports decrease rate [$/(Y ear2)]
RNIIt =
max(0, AIMPt − LNIMPt)
TNII
(C.6.24)
RNII = Normal imports increase rate [$/(Y ear2)]
AIMP (C.6.19) = Imports [$/Year]
LNIMP (C.6.23) = Normal imports [$/Year]
TNII (C.6.26) = Time delay for normal imports to rise [Year]
RNIDt =
−min(0, AIMPt − LNIMPt)
TNID
(C.6.25)
RNID = Normal imports decrease rate [$/(Y ear2)]
AIMP (C.6.19) = Imports [$/Year]
LNIMP (C.6.23) = Normal imports [$/Year]
TNID (C.6.27) = Time delay for normal imports to decline [Year]
TNII = 2 (C.6.26)
TNII = Time delay for normal imports to rise [Year]
TNID = 5 (C.6.27)
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TNID = Time delay for normal imports to decline [Year]
Finally, if the country is short of foreign exchange they can borrow from
international financial markets. Nevertheless, interest must be paid on the funds
that are borrowed. These funds add to the foreign exchange reserves, as we
saw earlier so that imports or other obligations could be financed. Note that
RNDP (C.6.28) could accept both positive and negative values. Positive values
represent a net payment which deducts from foreign exchange reserves. Negative
values, in contrast, represent a net yield that could be either from a fund that is
borrowed or from interest earnings—the latter happens when LD (international
debt C.6.31) is negative.
RNDPt = RDPt −RBt (C.6.28)
RNDP = Net foreign debt payment [$/Year]
RDP (C.6.29) = Foreign debt payments [$/Year]
RB (C.6.32) = Foreign borrowing rate [$/Year]
Foreign debt payments, as explained above, can be positive or negative de-
pending on level of debt. Negative debt indicates financial assets that could
generate a stream of foreign exchange revenues for the country.
RDPt =
LDt
TDP
(C.6.29)
RDP = Foreign debt payments [$/Year]
LD (C.6.31) = International debt [$]
TDP (C.6.30) = Foreign debt payment time [Year]
TDP = 20 (C.6.30)
TDP = Foreign debt payment time [Year]
Initial level of debt is assumed to be zero. This level could increase (decrease)
if money is borrowed (lent), interest is paid (received), or when the principal
that is lent (borrowed) is paid back.
LDt = LD0
∫ t
0
(RBτ +RFIRτ −RDPτ ) · dτ (C.6.31)
LD0 = 0
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LD = International debt [$]
RB (C.6.32) = Foreign borrowing rate [$/Year]
RFIR (C.6.35) = Foreign interest revenues [$/Year]
RDP (C.6.29) = Foreign debt payments [$/Year]
Borrowing depends on the availability of foreign exchange and level of debt.
If the exchange availability is low, the country borrows more and vice versa. As
the level of debt increases borrowing becomes more and more difficult. This is
shown by the Eq. C.6.34.
RBt =
NFE
TFT
·
(
1− 10
√
AECt
NEC
)
· FDBt (C.6.32)
RB = Foreign borrowing rate [$/Year]
NFE (C.6.10) = Initial (normal) level of foreign exchange reserves [$]
TFT (C.6.33) = Foreign transaction time delay [Year]
AEC (C.6.8) = Coverage time of foreign exchange reserves [Year]
NEC (C.6.6) = Initial (normal) foreign exchange coverage time [Year]
FDB (C.6.34) = Effect of foreign debt on borrowing [Dimensionless]
TFT = 1 (C.6.33)
TFT = Foreign transaction time delay [Year]
FDB =
1
1 +
max 0, LDt
NFE
(C.6.34)
FDB = Effect of foreign debt on borrowing [Dimensionless]
NFE (C.6.10) = Initial (normal) level of foreign exchange reserves [$]
LD (C.6.31) = International debt [$]
It is assumed that interest rate in international market is constant. This
is not true in reality. However, factors that affect this rate are outside of the
model’s boundary. Thus, inclusion of these factors only adds to the model
complexity but not much value to our analysis.
RFIRt = LDt · PIR (C.6.35)
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RFIR = Foreign interest revenues [$/Year]
LD (C.6.31) = International debt [$]
PIR (C.6.36) = Average interest rate [1/Year]
PIR = 0.01 (C.6.36)
PIR = Average interest rate [1/Year]
C.7 State Power & Control
This section describes the equations in the module of “state power and control.”
Political power of the state is a stock that approaches to an indicated level of
power—explained further below—but with a delay.
LSPt = LSP0 +
∫ t
0
ASPτ − LSPτ
TPCH
· dτ (C.7.1)
LSP0 = NSP
LSP = State political power [Dimensionless]
NSP (C.7.2) = Initial (normal) state political power [Dimensionless]
ASP (C.7.5) = Indicated state political power [Dimensionless]
TPCH (C.7.4) = Time delay for political power to change [Year]
NSP = 1− 1
ePSPE
(C.7.2)
NSP = Initial (normal) state political power [Dimensionless]
PSPE (C.7.3) = Elasticity of state political power [Dimensionless]
PSPE = 1 (C.7.3)
PSPE = Elasticity of state political power [Dimensionless]
TPCH = 5 (C.7.4)
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TPCH = Time delay for political power to change [Year]
The indicated level of political power depends on its popularity and util-
ity of political power in the society. This assumption should be adequate for
democratic as well as non-democratic political systems. Elasticity of political
system, frequency and pace of political change, all can be modified to test dif-
ferent political settings. In fact, this module of the model can take a wide range
of assumptions to fit different political agendas. Indicated power is an index
between 0 an 1 where 0 represents no political power at all while 1 represents
absolute power of the government. Government here could be a ruling individ-
ual, family, tribe, or party. The model does not distinguish between different
rulers at different times and places because individual characteristics of the
ruling class is not of importance for analysis of this study. Consequently, sim-
ulation results do not show competition between political rivals. It only shows
the dynamics of political power of the incumbent ruler which is called here as
“state” or “government” interchangeably.
According to the Katouzian’s theory of arbitrary state and society (Lan-
garudi and Radzicki, 2015), popularity of ruler gives him (them) the opportu-
nity to gain more political power. So, the state popularity makes a political
rise more likely. Utility of political power is another factor affecting the state
power. As symptoms of social chaos—for instance, crime rates—increase in a
society, utility of a powerful government who could control the chaos would in-
crease. This could generate an space for the government to seize more power15.
Controlling power of the government is also important to protect its political
power. A government with significant controlling power could stay longer at
helm. Finally, foreign debt imposes political pressure on the government. This
pressure is represented by Eq. C.7.7.
ASPt = 1−
1
e
(
LPSt·ASPUt·ASCt·FDPt·PSPE
) (C.7.5)
ASP = Indicated state political power [Dimensionless]
LPS (C.7.11) = State popularity [Dimensionless]
ASPU (C.7.6) = Utility of state political power [Dimensionless]
ASC (C.7.35) = State controlling power [Dimensionless]
PSPE (C.7.3) = Elasticity of state political power [Dimensionless]
ASPUt =
LPCHt
LPCH0
· NSP
LSPt
(C.7.6)
15As we will see later, chaos works as a double edged sword. Beside its positive impact
on utility of power, it could reduce political power by declining political legitimacy of the
government, and hence damaging its popularity.
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ASPU = Utility of state political power [Dimensionless]
LPCH (C.7.8) = Perceived chaos [Dimensionless]
NSP (C.7.2) = Initial (normal) state political power [Dimensionless]
LSP (C.7.1) = State political power [Dimensionless]
FDP =
1
1 +
max(0, LDt)
NFE
(C.7.7)
FDP = Effect of foreign debt on the state power [Dimensionless]
LD (C.6.31) = International debt [$]
NFE (C.6.10) = Initial (normal) level of foreign exchange reserves [$]
Chaos is an indicator of arbitrariness in the society. Here we define chaos as
any form of activity that breaks the rule of law in a society or any phenomenon
that considerably changes the social order. Also note that it takes some time
for the society to perceive full extent of the actual level of chaos.
LPCHt = ACH0 +
∫ t
0
ACHτ − LPCHτ
TP
· dτ (C.7.8)
LPCH = Perceived chaos [Dimensionless]
ACH (C.7.9) = Socio-political-economic chaos [Dimensionless]
TP (C.2.12) = Perception time delay [Year]
Chaos in the model depends on population of people who may break the
rule of law. That includes parasites and corrupt government officers. If their
relative population increases cases of chaos become more likely to happen. State
popularity also plays a role in chaos. A discontent society is more prone to chaos.
A minimum level of chaos (PCH) which represents the chaos imposed by the
nature is also taken into account.
ACHt = PCH +
LCOt + LPt
APOPt · LPSt (C.7.9)
ACH = Socio-political-economic chaos [Dimensionless]
PCH (C.7.10) = Natural chaos [Dimensionless]
LCO (C.1.17) = Corrupt government officers: part of the government
workforce who get involved in corrupt and illegal ac-
tivities [Person]
LP (C.1.42) = Parasites: part of workforce who do not work but en-
joy consuming of others’ production [Person]
APOP (C.1.34) = Workforce population [Person]
LPS (C.7.11) = State popularity [Dimensionless]
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PCH = 0.02 (C.7.10)
PCH = Natural chaos [Dimensionless]
Classical macroeconomics is founded on an implicit premise that social wel-
fare function includes only inflation and unemployment. The model here is
assumed to contain more components including income equality, consumption,
leisure, and public safety and security. From this point of view, popularity of
the state depends on its performance. People expect the government to perform
its functions including providing public services, national security and defense,
public order and safety, etc. If a government fails to function at a reasonable
level, its popularity declines.
LPSt = LPS0 +
∫ t
0
(RPSIτ −RPSDτ ) · dτ (C.7.11)
LPS0 = 1
LPS = State popularity [Dimensionless]
RPSI (C.7.12) = Increase of the state popularity [1/Year]
RPSD (C.7.14) = Decrease of the state popularity [1/Year]
RPSIt =
max(0, APSt − LPSt)
TPSI
(C.7.12)
RPSI = Increase of the state popularity [1/Year]
APS (C.7.16) = Indicated state popularity [Dimensionless]
LPS (C.7.11) = State popularity [Dimensionless]
TPSI (C.7.13) = Time delay for the state popularity to increase [Year]
TPSI = 5 (C.7.13)
TPSI = Time delay for government popularity to increase [Year]
RPSDt =
−min(0, APSt − LPSt)
TPSD
(C.7.14)
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RPSD = Decrease of the state popularity [1/Year]
APS (C.7.16) = Indicated state popularity [Dimensionless]
LPS (C.7.11) = State popularity [Dimensionless]
TPSD (C.7.15) = Time delay for the state popularity to decrease [Year]
TPSD = 2 (C.7.15)
TPSD = Time delay for government popularity to decrease [Year]
Government performance is divided into two broad categories: economic
performance and political performance. These are not actual performance of
the state but rather perception of the public. The state popularity then is an
arithmetic average of these two factors. Weight of each factor in the function
could vary though.
APSt = AELt · PWES +APLt · (1− PWES) (C.7.16)
APS = Indicated state popularity [Dimensionless]
AEL (C.7.18) = Economic performance of the state [Dimensionless]
PWES (C.7.17) = Weight of economy in the state popularity function
[Dimensionless]
APL (C.7.25) = Political performance of the state [Dimensionless]
PWES = 0.5 (C.7.17)
PWES = Weight of economy in the state popularity function APS [Di-
mensionless]
As mentioned above, performance here refers to the society’s mental image
of how well the government is working. This may be right or wrong. Economic
performance of the government consists of three different elements. First ele-
ment is unemployment. Government, especially in the resource-rich countries,
is expected to lead the national economy towards full employment. Any unem-
ployment rate above the natural level would cause social discontent. Magnitude
of this effect could be modified and tested on the model through changes in
the elasticity parameters in the state economic performance function (see Eq.
C.7.18 below).
Second element affecting the image of the state’s economic performance is the
real consumption. Government can change level of consumption in the society
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through transfer payments or other public expenditures and investments. In
the real world this can also contain a wide variety of public services such as
health, education, etc. Considering the model’s level of aggregation, all these
government expenditures are reflected in the real consumption per capita. At
the same time, this variable represents the effect of inflation too. As prices
increase real consumption declines, ceteris paribus. Subsequently, economic
performance of the government declines. Note that this indicator is compared
with its remembered counterpart (LRC: C.7.21). As Frey and Stutzer (2010)
argue, people get used to their circumstances when it comes to economic factors
such as income and consumption.
People either compare their situation with their past or with others’ situation
(Frey and Stutzer, 2010). So, the third element is income equality. A decline
in equality negatively impacts social welfare (Easterlin, 2001; Oishi et al., 2011)
and thus, damages the state popularity.
AELt =
(PNUR
AURt
)PUEE · (ARCPCt
LRC
)PCEE · (AEQt
AEQ0
)PQEE
(C.7.18)
AEL = Economic performance of the state [Dimensionless]
PNUR (C.1.49) = Natural unemployment rate [Dimensionless]
AUR (C.1.48) = Unemployment rate [Dimensionless]
PUEE (C.7.19) = Unemployment elasticity of government economic
performance [Dimensionless]
ARCPC (C.7.20) = Real consumption per capita [$/(Person-Year)]
LRC (C.7.21) = Remembered consumption per capita [$/(Person-
Year)]
PCEE (C.7.23) = Consumption elasticity of government economic per-
formance [Dimensionless]
AEQ (C.4.1) = Income equality index [Dimensionless]
PQEE (C.7.24) = Income equality elasticity of government economic
performance [Dimensionless]
PUEE = 1 (C.7.19)
PUEE = Unemployment elasticity of government economic performance
[Dimensionless]
ARCPCt =
(1−NNTPF ) ·APCt
APOPt · LTPIt +
NNTPF ·APCt
APOPt · LNTPIt (C.7.20)
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ARCPC = Real consumption per capita [$/(Person-Year)]
NNTPF (C.4.29) = Initial (normal) fraction of production capacity allo-
cated to non-traded goods sector [Dimensionless]
APC (C.2.23) = Private consumption [$/Year]
APOP (C.1.34) = Workforce population [Person]
LTPI (C.5.9) = Price index of traded goods [Dimensionless]
LNTPI (C.5.21) = Price index of non-traded goods [Dimensionless]
LRCt = LRC0 +
∫ t
0
ARCPCτ − LRCτ
TPM
· dτ (C.7.21)
LRC0 = ARCPC0
LRC = Remembered consumption per capita [$/(Person-
Year)]
ARCPC (C.7.20) = Real consumption per capita [$/(Person-Year)]
TPM (C.7.22) = Length of time people can remember [Year]
TPM = 5 (C.7.22)
TPM = Length of time people can remember [Year]
PCEE = 1 (C.7.23)
PCEE = Consumption elasticity of government economic performance
[Dimensionless]
PQEE = 1 (C.7.24)
PQEE = Income inequality elasticity of government economic perfor-
mance [Dimensionless]
Providing peace and safety is considered to be the most important politi-
cal functionality of the government. Freedom must not be sacrificed though.
This challenge of the state to create a balance between freedom and security is
shown by the function AGQ (C.7.27) which implies that the government needs
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to control the chaos for maintaining its popularity but this control should not
reduce freedom, otherwise, the governance quality declines. Again, the per-
ception of security, freedom, or any other political performance measures could
adapt to new circumstances (Frey and Stutzer, 2010; Saeed et al., 2013). Hence,
the political performance is a comparison of current and remembered level of
governance quality.
APLt =
AGQt
LGQt
(C.7.25)
APL = Political performance of the state [Dimensionless]
AGQ (C.7.27) = State governance quality [Dimensionless]
LGQ (C.7.26) = Remembered state governance quality [Dimensionless]
LGQt = LGQ0 +
∫ t
0
AGQτ − LGQτ
TPM
· dτ (C.7.26)
LGQ0 = 1
LGQ = Remembered state governance quality [Dimensionless]
AGQ (C.7.27) = State governance quality [Dimensionless]
TPM (C.7.22) = Length of time people can remember [Year]
AGQt = LFREEt · LPCH0
LPCHt
(C.7.27)
AGQ = State governance quality [Dimensionless]
LFREE (C.7.28) = Freedom [Dimensionless]
LPCH (C.7.8) = Perceived chaos [Dimensionless]
Control of the state and how it impacts freedom is also described in this
section. A positive interpretation of political freedom is used here to define the
term freedom as free exercise of social and group political rights without the
fear of coercion or oppression16. From this point of view, freedom is mainly con-
strained by the coercive force of the government. Thus freedom is formulated to
be negatively related to the state controlling power. However, a powerful gov-
ernment does not necessarily limit freedom. The coerciveness of the government
could be affected by the extent to which it relies on taxes as a source of rev-
enue. A government with considerable revenues from external sources such as
natural resources is less reliant on—thus less accountable to—the public (Ross,
16See Berlin (1990) for a philosophical discussion on the issue.
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2001, 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). The significance of each of these
effects might differ for different political systems. Many scholars believe that
these differences arise from the quality of institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2003;
Bulte et al., 2005; Mehlum et al., 2006; Luong and Weinthal, 2010). “Good”
institutions, in their view, are responsible for sensitivity of the state coercive-
ness in response to different levels of controlling power and reliance on natural
resource revenues. Freedom in a country such as Norway may not be affected
by the state control or its reliability on natural resources as much as it may be
in Nigeria. This concept is formulated by Eq. C.7.34 and affects freedom in
Eq. C.7.30. Note that there is a delay for the indicated freedom to root in the
foundation of the society. This is also true for the decline of the freedom [see
Eq. C.7.28].
LFREEt = LFREE0 +
∫ t
0
AFREEτ − LFREEτ
TFREE
· dτ (C.7.28)
LFREE0 = 1
LFREE = Freedom [Dimensionless]
AFREE (C.7.30) = Indicated freedom [Dimensionless]
TFREE (C.7.29) = Time delay for freedom to be established [Year]
TFREE = 2 (C.7.29)
TFREE = Time delay for freedom to be established [Year]
AFREEt =
(LFTt
ASCt
)AEFt
(C.7.30)
AFREE = Indicated freedom [Dimensionless]
LFT (C.7.31) = Freedom from share of tax in government revenues [Di-
mensionless]
AEF (C.7.34) = Elasticity of freedom [Dimensionless]
ASC (C.7.35) = State controlling power [Dimensionless]
LFTt = LFT0 +
∫ t
0
AFTτ − LFTτ
TSTF
dτ (C.7.31)
LFT0 = 1
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LFT = Smoothed freedom from share of tax in government
revenues [Dimensionless]
AFT (C.7.33) = Freedom from share of tax in government revenues [Di-
mensionless]
TSTF (C.7.32) = Time to smooth effect of tax on freedom [Year]
TSTF = 5 (C.7.32)
TSTF (C.7.32) = Time to smooth effect of tax on freedom [Year]
AFT =
ATAXt/RGRt
ATAX0/RGR0
(C.7.33)
AFT = Freedom from share of tax in government revenues [Di-
mensionless]
ATAX (C.3.31) = Government tax revenues [$/Year]
RGR (C.3.30) = Government revenues [$/Year]
AEF =
1
1 +
LGIt
LGI0
(C.7.34)
AEF = Elasticity of freedom [Dimensionless]
LGI (C.1.26) = Number of good institutions [Dimensionless]
State controlling power depends on magnitude of the society’s resources
owned by the government. It also matters that what fraction of these resources
are allocated to control vs. production. Please note that only non-corrupt
government workforce contribute to the control resources. Political power of
the government is another crucial factor to determine controlling power of the
state. A government without effective political leadership will not be able to
elicit the full potential of its controlling resources.
ASCt =
(LSPt · FCRt +NGW ·NCRF · LSP0
2 ·NGW ·NCRF · LSP0
)PESC
(C.7.35)
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ASC = State controlling power [Dimensionless]
LSP (C.7.1) = State political power [Dimensionless]
FCR (C.7.38) = Current state of control resources [Person]
NGW (C.1.16) = Initial (normal) government sector workforce [Person]
NCRF (C.7.36) = Initial (normal) fraction of government resources allo-
cated to control means [Dimensionless]
PESC (C.7.37) = Elasticity of state control [Dimensionless]
NCRF = 0.4 (C.7.36)
NCRF = Initial (normal) fraction of government resources allocated to
control means [Dimensionless]
PESC = 0.5 (C.7.37)
PESC = Elasticity of state control [Dimensionless]
FCRt = 0.5 · LGWt · LCRFt ·
(
1 +
(LGCt
NGC
)PCEC)
(C.7.38)
FCR = Current state of control resources [Person]
LGW (C.1.15) = Workforce employed in the government sector [Person]
LCRF (C.7.40) = Fraction of government resources allocated to control
means [Dimensionless]
LGC (C.3.1) = Government capital [$]
NGC (C.3.2) = Initial (normal) government capital [$]
PCEC (C.7.39) = Capital elasticity of state control [Dimensionless]
PCEC = 0.1 (C.7.39)
PCEC (C.7.39) = Capital elasticity of state control [Dimensionless]
It takes some time for resources to fully reallocate:
LCRFt = LCRF0 +
∫ t
0
ACRFτ − LCRFτ
TCRF
(C.7.40)
LCRF0 = NCRF · dτ
190
LCRF = Fraction of government resources allocated to control
means [Dimensionless]
NCRF (C.7.36) = Initial (normal) fraction of government resources allo-
cated to control means [Dimensionless]
ACRF (C.7.42) = Indicated fraction of resources that must be allocated
to control [Dimensionless]
TCRF (C.7.41) = Time delay for reallocation of state control resource
[Year]
TCRF = 5 (C.7.41)
TCRF = Time delay for reallocation of state control resource [Year]
The way the government allocates its resources is pretty simple. Reallocation
process is based on comparison between economic and political performance of
the state. If political performance is relatively low i.e. (based on our definition)
government has not been very successful in maintaining stability, peace, safety,
and security, then more resources would be allocated to control. In contrast,
if economic performance is relatively low, less resources would be allocated to
control which means that more resources shift towards production. Different
governments may weigh each of these elements differently. This variation could
be tested by the parameter PWEC (C.7.43).
ACRFt = NCRF · FEPCtPWEC · FPPCt1−PWEC (C.7.42)
ACRF = Indicated fraction of resources that must be allocated
to control [Dimensionless]
NCRF (C.7.36) = Initial (normal) fraction of government resources al-
located to control means [Dimensionless]
PWEC (C.7.43) = Weight of economy in government resource allocation
policy [Dimensionless]
FEPC (C.7.47) = Effect of state economic performance on fraction of
resources allocated to control [Dimensionless]
FPPC (C.7.44) = Effect of political performance on fraction of resources
allocated to control [Dimensionless]
PWEC = 0.5 (C.7.43)
PWEC = Weight of economy in government resource allocation policy
[Dimensionless]
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Effect of political performance on the share of control of total government
resources is represented by Eq. C.7.44. Shape and variation of this function are
depicted in Fig. C.7.1.
FPPCt =
1
(1−NCRF ) · (LPPPPPPCt ) +NCRF
(C.7.44)
FPPC = Effect of political performance on fraction of resources
allocated to control [Dimensionless]
NCRF (C.7.36) = Initial (normal) fraction of government resources allo-
cated to control means [Dimensionless]
LPPP (C.7.46) = Perceived political performance [Dimensionless]
PPPC (C.2.14) = Political performance elasticity of control resource
fraction [Dimensionless]
PPPC = 2 (C.7.45)
PPPC = Political performance elasticity of control resource fraction [Di-
mensionless]
Receiving feedback from the society to evaluate political performance is a
challenge per se. Indeed, many times governments could not perceive the situ-
ation correctly, or they perceive it with a delay, at best. This phenomenon is
reflected by Eq. C.7.46.
LPPPt = LPPP0 +
∫ t
0
APLτ − LPPPτ
TP
· dτ (C.7.46)
LPPP0 = 1
LPPP = Perceived political performance [Dimensionless]
APL (C.7.25) = Political performance of the state [Dimensionless]
TP (C.2.12) = Perception time delay [Year]
Eq. C.7.47 represents the effect of perceived economic performance on frac-
tion of resources that the state allocates to control. Variation of this function
is demonstrated in Fig. C.7.2.
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Figure C.7.1: Effect of political performance on control resource fraction
FEPCt =
(1 + PEPC)/
(
1 + e
− ln
(1 +NCRF
1−NCRF
)
·LPEP)
− 1
(1 + PEPC)/
(
1 + e
− ln
(1 +NCRF
1−NCRF
))
− 1
(C.7.47)
FEPC = Effect of state economic performance on fraction of
resources allocated to control [Dimensionless]
PEPC (C.7.48) = Concaveness of the function FEPC (effect of state
economic performance on fraction of resources allo-
cated to control) [Dimensionless]
NCRF (C.7.36) = Initial (normal) fraction of government resources allo-
cated to control means [Dimensionless]
LPEP (C.7.49) = Perceived economic performance [Dimensionless]
PEPC = 1.2 (C.7.48)
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PEPC = Concaveness of the function FEPC (effect of state economic
performance on fraction of resources allocated to control) [Di-
mensionless]
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Figure C.7.2: Effect of economic performance on state control resource fraction
Similar to political performance, economic performance must be perceived
which may take some time.
LPEPt = LPEP0 +
∫ t
0
AELτ − LPEPτ
TP
· dτ (C.7.49)
LPEP0 = 1
LPEP = Perceived economic performance [Dimensionless]
AEL (C.7.18) = Economic performance of the state [Dimensionless]
TP (C.2.12) = Perception time delay [Year]
C.8 Oil Export
Oil export in the model is exogenous. Nonetheless, any possible scenario could
be applied to the variable in order to test the model. These scenarios are
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included in the default version of the model but other cases may be added too:
• a constant level of oil export which is a fraction of total economic output
(Eq. C.8.2)—all other scenarios only work when this constant export is
non-zero;
• an oscillatory level of oil export (see Eq. C.8.4);
• a bell-shape behavior over time for the level of oil export (Eq. C.8.7); and
• a S-shape behavior over time for oil export which is applied by a logistic
function (Eq. C.8.10).
The functions introduced in this section are flexible to a great extent. The
parameters provided here could be used to change the shape and range of the
corresponding functions.
AOEXPt = AOILCt ·AOILSt ·AOILBt ·AOILLt (C.8.1)
AOEXP = Oil Export [$/Year]
AOILC (C.8.2) = Constant oil export [$/Year]
AOILS (C.8.4) = An oscillatory multiplier for oil export [Dimension-
less]
AOILB (C.8.7) = Bell-shape multiplier for oil export [Dimensionless]
AOILL (C.8.10) = logistic multiplier for oil export [Dimensionless]
AOILCt =
{
0 , t ≤ 1
NOt · POILC , t > 1
(C.8.2)
AOILC = Constant oil export [$/Year]
NO (C.4.19) = Initial (normal) total output of the economy [$/Year]
POILC (C.8.3) = Fraction of initial level of total output as constant oil
export multiplier [Dimensionless]
POILC = 0 (C.8.3)
POILC = Fraction of initial level of total output as constant oil export
multiplier [Dimensionless]
AOILSt = 1 + POILA · sin(t · POILF ) (C.8.4)
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AOILS = An oscillatory multiplier for oil export [Dimensionless]
POILA (C.8.5) = Amplitude of oscillation for oil export [Dimensionless]
POILF (C.8.6) = Frequency of oscillation for oil export [Dimensionless]
POILA = 0 (C.8.5)
POILA = Amplitude of oscillation for oil export [Dimensionless]
POILF = 0.4 (C.8.6)
POILF = Frequency of oscillation for oil export [Dimensionless]
AOILBt = 1− POILBS +
10 · POILBS
POILSD · √2pi · e
(
(10t− 5T )/T )2
2 · POILSD2
(C.8.7)
AOILB = Bell-shape multiplier for oil export [Dimensionless]
POILBS (C.8.8) = Switch to turn on bell-shape multiplier for oil export
[Dimensionless]
POILSD (C.8.9) = Standard deviation of the bell curve for oil export
[Dimensionless]
T (C.8.14) = The final time for the simulation [Year]
POILBS = 0 (C.8.8)
POILBS = Switch to turn on bell-shape multiplier for oil export [Dimen-
sionless]
POILSD = 1 (C.8.9)
POILSD = Standard deviation of the bell curve for oil export [Dimen-
sionless]
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AOILLt = 1− POILS +
2 · POILS
1 + e
− 10 · PSOIL(t− POILM · T )
T
(C.8.10)
AOILL = logistic multiplier for oil export [Dimensionless]
POILS (C.8.11) = Switch to turn on logistic multiplier for oil export
[Dimensionless]
PSOIL (C.8.12) = Slope of the logistic multiplier for oil export [Dimen-
sionless]
POILM (C.8.13) = Sigmoid midpoint of logistic multiplier for oil export
[Dimensionless]
T (C.8.14) = The final time for the simulation [Year]
POILS = 0 (C.8.11)
POILS = Switch to turn on logistic multiplier for oil export [Dimension-
less]
PSOIL = 1 (C.8.12)
PSOIL = Slope of the logistic multiplier for oil export [Dimensionless]
POILM = 0.5 (C.8.13)
POILM = Sigmoid midpoint of logistic multiplier for oil export [Dimen-
sionless]
T = 50 (C.8.14)
T = The final time for the simulation [Year]
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